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THE FUTURE OF THE SECOND CHAMBER:  
THE COALITION GOVERNMENT AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
On 17th May 2011, the Government published its House of Lords Reform Draft Bill and 
accompanying White Paper, which contained proposals for a smaller, reformed House of 
Lords. The Draft Bill proceeded to pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both 
Houses of Parliament, which held its first public evidence sessions in October 2011. The 
Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill is due to publish its report in 
March 2012, and it is expected that the Government will introduce a Bill with a view to 
holding the first elections to the reformed House in 2015. This thesis seeks to examine 
the implications of the Government’s proposals and endeavours to determine whether 
such reform of the House of Lords is both necessary and desirable. It addresses both the 
strengths and weaknesses of the House as presently constituted, and attempts to 
evaluate the performance of the current chamber in the execution of its roles and 
functions. Consideration is given to both the advantages and disadvantages of altering 
the composition of the upper chamber by moving to a wholly or predominantly elected 
House, and seeks to address the question of whether or not a more incremental, 
evolutionary path of reform might better answer the so-called ‘second chamber 
paradox’, whilst retaining the inherent qualities of the present House, and ensuring it 
can continue to fulfil its functions effectively and efficiently. 
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Durham University 
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THE FUTURE OF THE SECOND CHAMBER: 
THE COALITION GOVERNMENT AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
 
 
 
 
“to devise a good second chamber; to discover for it a basis which shall be at 
once intelligible and differentiating; to give it powers of revision without powers 
of control; to make it amenable to permanent public sentiment and yet 
independent of transient public opinion; to erect a bulwark against revolution 
without interposing a barrier to reform – this is the task which has tried the 
ingenuity of constitution makers from time immemorial.” 
J.A.R. Marriott Second Chambers (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1910), 
p.298 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the time since it took office in May 2010, the Coalition Government has succeeded in placing 
constitutional and political reform firmly back on the legislative agenda in the United Kingdom. 
It would appear that the desire of the political class to cast off the shadow of the expenses 
scandal that engulfed Parliament in 2009 has awoken a new determination amongst Britain’s 
political leaders to ‘clean up politics’, a goal which the present Government appears to hope can 
be realised through a programme of rather radical constitutional reform. The Liberal Democrats 
may have failed to convince the British public of the virtues of electoral reform,1 but as we 
reflect on the significance of what was only the United Kingdom’s second ever nationwide 
referendum, and as we ponder the implications of the United Kingdom’s first fixed-term 
Parliament,2 there has hardly been a more fitting time to discuss the issue of what is to become 
of that great “constitutional anachronism”,3 the House of Lords. 
 
Aside from the removal of the bulk of hereditary peers in 1999, the House of Lords managed to 
survive, mostly unscathed, thirteen years of a Labour Government intent on tugging at the 
threads of the constitution, a Government with a reform agenda that was arguably more radical 
than that of the present Coalition. Even in their eleventh hour, the Labour leadership scrambled 
to pass the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, in one final attempt to remove the 
last element of heredity from the upper chamber. But the proposals to end hereditary by-
elections and to allow for the resignation, suspension and expulsion of peers were all lost in the 
wash-up period before the 2010 general election. Labour’s reforms to the upper House between 
1997 and 2010 were piecemeal, and, it is submitted, demonstrated a distinct lack of 
commitment to any identifiable goals in the arena of second chamber reform. But things look set 
to change under the Coalition Government which, if we are to believe the rhetoric, is determined 
to succeed where others have failed in bringing wholesale reform to the House of Lords. 
 
                                                          
1
 The Alternative Vote referendum was held on Thursday 5
th
 May 2011. It offered the electorate the choice of 
retaining the first-past-the-post electoral system, or instead adopting the alternative vote system. Turnout for 
the referendum was 42.2%. 67.9% of voters rejected AV while only 32.1% voted in favour of the change. 
2
 The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 received Royal Assent on 15
th
 September 2011 
3
 Oliver, D. ‘The Modernization of the United Kingdom Parliament?’ in Jowell J. and Oliver, D. The Changing 
Constitution (6
th
 edn Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.174 
9 
 
Despite extensive reviewing of options for reform, including three government White Papers,4 a 
Royal Commission report,5 the report of the Select Committee on Public Administration,6 and 
the range of options forwarded by the Joint Committee of both Houses, 7  no significant changes 
have been implemented to either the powers or the composition of the Lords since the removal 
of the hereditary peers in 1999, with the exception, of course, of the removal of the Appellate 
Committee under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.8 In March 2007 the House of Commons 
voted in favour of either a wholly elected House, or one which contained a majority of elected 
members,9 and a White Paper was published in 2008 with a view to advancing this position.10 
Yet the current House lives on in a “curious kind of limbo, stigmatised as an interim institution 
and threatened with imminent extinction.”11 Labour’s pledges to bring about sweeping reforms 
to the House of Lords in all three of its election manifestos between 1997 and 2005 proved to be 
of little worth, despite the “clear electoral authority”12 that stemmed from three successive 
election victories.  
 
More than twelve years after the House of Lords Act received Royal Assent there is still no 
definitive answer to that much recited question: what should be done with the House of Lords? 
The Government appears to believe that it now has the solution. But throughout the discussions 
that have taken place amongst academics and politicians alike, one issue seems to have been 
largely overlooked. Could it not be possible that the House of Lords, despite its idiosyncrasies, 
does not actually require fundamental, wholesale reform? Might it not be the case that the issue 
of Lords reform could be better resolved with steady, evolutionary, pragmatic reform to build 
on what is considered by many to be a highly effective second chamber and a valuable 
component in the legislative framework of the United Kingdom?   
 
During the debates which followed the 2010 Queen’s Speech, one Conservative peer quipped 
that his party and the Liberal Democrats, despite previous political animosity, had found 
themselves, as a result of the inconclusive general election result, “chained together like 
                                                          
4
 The House of Lords: Completing the Reform Cm 5291 (2002); The House of Lords: Reform Cm 7027 (2007); An 
Elected Second Chamber: Further Reform of the House of Lords Cm 7438 (2008) 
5
Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future Cm 4534 (2000) 
6
 Public Administration Select Committee, The Second Chamber: Continuing the Reform (Fifth Report of Session 
2001-2002) HC 494 (2002) 
7
Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform, House of Lords Reform: First Report (First Report of Session 2002-
2003) HL 17 (2002) 
8
 The judicial functions of which were assumed by the newly created Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. 
9
 Hansard HC cols.1389–1488 (6
th
 March 2007) and cols.1524–1638 (7
th
 March 2007) 
10
 An Elected Second Chamber: Further Reform of the House of Lords Cm 7438 (2008) 
11
 Bogdanor, V. The New British Constitution (Oregon: Hart 2009), p.145  
12
 Brazier, R. Constitutional Reform: Reshaping the British Political System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p.65 
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suffragettes.”13 And although the string of playful witticisms that ensued were greeted with 
laughter in the chamber, the remarks of Earl Ferrers, for some the symbol of steady continuity, 
while for others the remnant of an embarrassing pre-democratic past, are indicative of the 
inherent tension and instability in the relationship between the Coalition partners. Indeed, 
when Lord Ferrers proceeded in his speech to address the issue of Lords reform, this same 
metaphor was used in an altogether more serious context. In drawing their lordships’ attention 
to the passage in the Queen’s Speech pertaining to “a second House which is wholly or partially 
elected”,14 he remarked that “one does not have to be a genius to realise from which end of the 
suffragette's chain that idea came.”15 
 
This is evidently more than just a resentful jibe at the party with which Lord Ferrers has found 
himself reluctantly sharing power. What had previously been regarded by the Conservative 
parliamentary party as a ‘third term issue’ is now at the forefront of Nick Clegg’s reform agenda. 
The working group assembled under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister tasked 
itself with the production of a draft bill by December 2010, and despite the predictable delay in 
the publication of their proposals, the House of Lords Reform Draft Bill and accompanying 
White Paper were put before the House of Commons on 17th May 2011.16 Due to the outcome of 
the last general election, reform of the upper House is therefore well and truly back on the 
political agenda. But during the aforementioned speech, Lord Ferrers posed one very pertinent 
question which, it is submitted, deserves some consideration. He asked the House to consider 
“why we always have to use up energy and parliamentary time in changing things which are 
working well - time which could be better addressed to the subjects which are not working 
well.”17 But to what extent is this actually case? Does the House of Lords already function as an 
effective chamber of Parliament, or is major constitutional upheaval an uncomfortable 
necessity?  
 
The metaphorical ‘chain’ to which Lord Ferrers referred, the chain which holds together two 
parties that once appeared so ideologically opposed, is what has come to be known as the 
‘Coalition Agreement.’18 This document commits the Coalition partners to a far-reaching 
programme of constitutional reform, and amidst the talk of fixed-term parliaments and electoral 
change nestles a single paragraph committing the Government to “bring forward proposals for a 
                                                          
13
 Earl Ferrers, Hansard HL col.9 (25
th
 May 2010) 
14
 Ibid. at col.11 
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Hansard HC col.155 (17
th
 May 2011) 
17
 Earl Ferrers, fn.13, col.11 
18
 HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (London: Cabinet Office, 2010) 
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wholly or mainly elected upper chamber on the basis of proportional representation.”19 In the 
meantime, “Lords appointments will be made with the objective of creating a second chamber 
that is reflective of the share of the vote secured by the political parties in the last general 
election.”20 The Conservative Party manifesto at the 2010 general election had committed the 
Tories to a similar goal, although in slightly more ambiguous terms. They pledged themselves to 
“work to build a consensus for a mainly-elected second chamber...recognising that an effective 
and efficient second chamber should play an important role in our democracy.”21 But one does 
not have to be a cynic to be unconvinced about the party’s dedication, particularly that of 
backbench MPs and peers, to this reform. Nonetheless, reform is on the horizon, and it has taken 
a radical shape. The Deputy Prime Minister has indicated that he would be quite willing to use 
the Parliament Act procedure to force through his plans for Lords reform should they be 
obstructed in the upper House.22 One need look no further than the judgement of the current 
President of the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Attorney General for evidence of the constitutional 
and legal uncertainty surrounding such a move.23  As Lord Ferrers was quick to remind the 
Government, it is the “intricate weave of the constitution”24 that allows flexibility, pragmatism 
and the ability to evolve over time. We must, so Lord Ferrers argues, “be careful not to snap the 
thread.”25 
 
Already these constitutional threads appear to be fraying. The Deputy Prime Minister’s plans for 
an elected senate may be in their infancy, but other aspects of the Government’s strategy have 
provoked considerable hostility in and out of the chamber. A recent report by University College 
London’s Constitution Unit has indicated that the Government’s stated objective of achieving 
proportionality between the parties in the House of Lords in relation to general election vote 
                                                          
19
 Ibid. at p.27 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 The Conservative Party, Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010 (April 
2010) 
22
 See Chapman, J. ‘Nick Clegg pledges to push through reform of the House of Lords’ Daily Mail (19
th
 
December 2011) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2076082/Nick-Clegg-pledges-push-reform-House-
Lords.html> accessed 16
th
 January 2012; Wintour, P. ‘Nick Clegg claims PM’s backing for Bill to create elected 
Lords’ Guardian (18
th
 December 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/dec/18/nick-clegg-promises-
reform-lords> accessed 16
th
 January 2012 
23
 R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] EWCA Civ 126, [2005] QB 579 at paras.41 and 98-100. The Court of 
Appeal judgement, to which Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers contributed, was handed down by Lord Woolf CJ. 
The Court suggested that the Parliament Acts could not be used to abolish the House of Lords, or to 
fundamentally alter the relationship between the House of Lords and the House of Commons. It concluded 
that there were some constitutional changes that were so fundamental that they could not be implemented 
using the 1911 Act. While this view was rejected by the House of Lords on appeal, there remains some 
ambiguity, as evidenced by the judgement of Lord Carswell. See R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 
56, [2006] 1 AC 262 at para.178.  
24
 Earl Ferrers, fn.13, col.8 
25
 Ibid. 
12 
 
shares is already having a serious impact on the functioning of the House. 26 The report notes 
that from taking office David Cameron created an unprecedented 117 new peers in less than a 
year. To satisfy the objectives of the ‘Coalition Agreement’ a further 269 peers would have to be 
appointed, taking the size of the chamber to 1062 which, the report suggests, “risks rendering 
the House of Lords completely unable to do its job.”27 The influx of members not only has 
implications in terms of costs, but it also places considerable pressure on the House’s limited 
resources. The report notes that “peers are faced with working in overcrowded conditions, with 
limited access to computers and telephones, and little or no space for staff”,28 which is “far from 
conducive to effective working.”29 Further, “many more peers are seeking to contribute to 
debates, ask questions, and become members of committees”,30 creating a “more fractious 
atmosphere in the chamber, and growing frustration amongst members who cannot contribute 
effectively.”31 It would appear from this analysis that the Government’s approach to the House 
of Lords is already having a negative impact on its ability to function as an effective chamber of 
Parliament.  
 
But this is just the beginning. The proposals contained within the Draft Bill arguably amount to 
the effective abolition of the House of Lords and its replacement with an elected (or at least 
predominantly elected) senate, a view espoused on multiple occasions in recent debates in the 
House.32 The fundamental question is whether these plans will enhance the ability of the upper 
House to function as an effective chamber of Parliament, or cause irreparable damage to the 
performance of an age-old institution. In other words, is this reform really necessary? Or could 
it be the case that, as the recently-ennobled Lord Hennessy has suggested, the answer lies in 
“organic reform”,33 reform grounded in evolutionary rather than revolutionary principles? 
 
In order to answer these questions, I shall begin in Chapter I by examining the proposals 
contained within the 2011 White Paper, along with data on the current composition of the 
House, before proceeding to address the questions of why the House of Lords has proved so 
difficult to reform, and indeed, whether the United Kingdom actually needs a second chamber at 
all. I shall end Chapter I by introducing the comparative element of this study, and provide a 
brief introduction to the second chambers in other comparable democracies, which shall be 
                                                          
26
 Russell, M. House Full: Time to get a grip on Lords Appointments (London: Constitution Unit, 2011), p.3 
27
 Ibid. at p.9 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 See, for example, Baroness Boothroyd, Hansard HL col.1172 (21
st
 June 2011) 
33
 Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, Hansard HL col.1194 (21
st
 June 2011) 
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used to develop the analysis offered in relation to the House of Lords. In Chapter II I shall 
present a case study of the way in which the House of Lords has interacted with a 
constitutionally significant piece of legislation. The Parliamentary Voting Systems and 
Constituencies Act 2011 is arguably one of the most constitutionally significant pieces of 
legislation that will be passed by the present Government, and will therefore form the focus of 
this case study. This will not only allow me to draw comparisons between the way in which the 
House of Lords and House of Commons deal with scrutiny and amendment of legislation, but 
also help me to draw conclusions on whether the House, as currently composed, adequately 
performs the functions attributed to it. The analysis from this case study, along with 
comparative data on second chambers within other bicameral legislatures, will then inform the 
analysis provided in Chapters III and IV. In Chapter III I shall examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current composition of the House of Lords, before moving on to examine 
both the advantages and the pitfalls of both a wholly elected House, and a House consisting of 
both appointed and elected members. In Chapter IV I shall examine the powers of the House of 
Lords, and draw on a variety of comparative data to determine whether any change is necessary 
to the balance of power between the two chambers of Parliament. I shall then conclude as to 
whether the present Government’s plans to introduce direct election to the upper House are 
desirable, or whether there is an alternative, more beneficial option for reform of the second 
chamber. 
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CHAPTER I: REFORMING THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
The Coalition Proposals 
On 17th May 2011, the Government published its proposals for a smaller, reformed House of 
Lords. The proposals contained in the House of Lords Reform Draft Bill and accompanying 
White Paper set out in detail options for how a reformed House of Lords might look.34 In the 
foreword the Government states its belief that, “in a modern democracy it is important that 
those who make the laws of the land should be elected by those to whom those laws apply.”35 It 
states that “the House of Lords performs its work well but lacks sufficient democratic 
authority”,36 and sets out its plan to “strengthen Parliament”37 through the creation of a wholly 
or mainly elected second chamber. Reactions to the proposals were hostile in both chambers of 
Parliament,38 and the media reaction has been equally unenthusiastic.39  Nonetheless, the Draft 
Bill proceeded to pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, 
composed of 13 peers and 13 Members of the House of Commons. The Committee is due to 
report in March 2012, and a Government Bill will then be introduced with the intention of 
holding the first elections to the reformed House in 2015. 
 
The 2011 White Paper proposes a reformed chamber of 300 members, wholly or mainly elected 
in line with the terms of the Coalition Agreement.40 The accompanying Draft Bill sets out the 
Government’s proposals for an 80% elected House, with the remaining 20% of members 
appointed by a statutory Appointments Commission.41 The reformed House would therefore 
contain 240 elected members and 60 appointed members. Representation for the Church of 
England would be maintained, with a maximum of 12 Church of England Bishops sitting as ex-
                                                          
34
 House of Lords Reform Draft Bill, Cm 8077 (2011) 
35
 Ibid. at p.5 
36
 Ibid.  
37
 Ibid. at p.6 
38
 Hansard HC cols.155-175 (17
th
 May 2011); Hansard HL cols.1268-1289 (17
th
 May 2011) 
39
 See for example, Blackburn, D. ‘Clegg’s great rejuvenator falls a little flat’ The Spectator (17
th
 May 2011) 
<http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/6952318/cleggs-great-rejuvenator-falls-a-little-flat.thtml> accessed 
2nd June 2011; Editorial, ‘The country is weary of Mr Clegg’s tinkering’ The Telegraph (17
th
 May 2011) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/8519750/The-country-is-weary-of-Mr-Cleggs-
tinkering.html> accessed 2
nd
 June 2011; White, M. ‘Lords reform: not worth the fuss?’ The Guardian (18
th
 May 
2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2011/may/18/lords-reform-not-worth-the-fuss> accessed 2
nd
 
June 2011.  
40
 House of Lords Reform Draft Bill, fn.34, p.11 paras.12-23 
41
 Ibid. Clause 1 of the Draft Bill 
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officio members.42 The White Paper also states that the Prime Minister should be allowed to 
appoint a limited number of people to serve as Ministers, who would be members of the 
reformed House only for the duration of their appointment. The Draft Bill makes provision for 
such arrangements to be implemented via secondary legislation.43 Under the proposals, 
members would serve a single, non-renewable term of three normal election cycles which, 
following the implementation of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, means that members 
would serve for a total of 15 years.44 The White Paper states the Government’s belief that 
“serving a single term, with no prospect of re-election would enhance the independence of 
members of the reformed House”45 and “reinforce the distinct role for members of the House of 
Lords, which is different from that of MPs.”46 Elections would take place at the same time as 
general elections to the House of Commons47 “in order to maximise voter turnout and to provide 
the least disruption to the work of Parliament”48, but would be staggered so that only a third of 
seats are contested at each election,49 ensuring that “members of the reformed House would 
never collectively have a more recent mandate than MPs”,50 and making it less likely that one 
party would gain an overall majority. Elections to the reformed House would use a system of 
proportional representation, and the Draft Bill favours the adoption of the Single Transferable 
Vote.51 The appointed, independent members would be nominated by a statutory Appointments 
Commission and recommended by the Prime Minister for appointment by the Queen.52 Thus, 20 
members would be appointed at the time of each election to the reformed House, with the same 
term as elected members.53 
 
The proposals envisage that the reformed House of Lords would have the same core functions 
as the current House, scrutinising legislation and holding the Government to account.54 No 
changes are proposed to the formal constitutional powers and privileges of the House, or to the 
existing constitutional relationship between the two Houses of Parliament.55 The link between 
                                                          
42
 Ibid. at p.22 paras.91-103 and Part 4 of the Draft Bill 
43
 Ibid. at p.19 paras.67-68 and Part 5 of the Draft Bill 
44
 Ibid. at p.13 paras.24-25 and Clauses 6 and 19 of the Draft Bill 
45
 Ibid. at p.13 para.24 
46
 Ibid.  
47
 Ibid. at p.13 paras.26-27 and Clause 4 of the Draft Bill 
48
 Ibid. at para.26 
49
 Ibid. at para.25 and Clause 4 of the Draft Bill 
50
 Ibid. at para.25 
51
 Ibid. at pp.13-16 paras.28-47 and Clause 7 of the Draft Bill 
52
 Ibid. at pp.18-19 paras.55-66 and Part 3 of the Draft Bill 
53
 Ibid.  
54
 Ibid. at p.10 paras.2-6 
55
 Ibid. at p.11 paras.7-11 and Clause 2 of the Draft Bill 
16 
 
the peerage and membership of the second chamber would be broken,56 and members would 
receive a salary and allowances, as well as a pension administered by the Independent 
Parliamentary Standards Authority.57 They would be subject to a disqualification regime similar 
to that which applies to members of the House of Commons,58 and the franchise for general 
elections would be extended so that members of the reformed House could vote in elections to 
the lower House.59  However, members of the reformed House would be disqualified from 
standing for election to the House of Commons until the second general election after the end of 
their term as a member of the upper House.60  
 
The move to a smaller, mainly elected second chamber would not take place in one step. It is 
proposed that reform be implemented in three phases, during which some existing peers would 
remain as transitional members.61 The White Paper sets out a range of options to realise this 
aim, with a view to ensuring that the House continues to work effectively until the transition is 
complete.62 The option proposed in the Draft Bill is to reduce the number of current members in 
parallel with the introduction of new elected and appointed members over the course of three 
elections,63 providing a “gradual handover from the old to the reformed House.”64 The first 
transitional period would begin with the first election to the reformed House. At the next 
general election, 80 members would be elected to the House and 20 would be appointed, while 
two thirds of existing peers would be selected to remain as transitional members. It would be 
for the existing House of Lords to determine the procedure for selecting members to sit in the 
transitional periods.65 At the time of the second election, a further 80 elected members and 20 
appointed members would be introduced to the House, and half of the existing peers selected to 
remain for the first transitional period would remain for the second transitional period. At the 
time of the third election, the remaining transitional members would leave, and a further 80 
elected members and 20 appointed members would join the House.  The transition to a 
reformed House would then be complete.  
 
However, the plans set out in the Draft Bill are not set in stone, and much of what is contained in 
the White Paper is left up for debate. The size of the reformed chamber, for example, is not 
                                                          
56
 Ibid. at p.13 para.23 
57
 Ibid. at pp.23-26 paras.104-128 and Clause 59 of the Draft Bill 
58
 Ibid. at pp.27-28 paras.140-145 and Part 7 of the Draft Bill 
59
 Ibid. at p.17 paras.50-51 
60
 Ibid. at p.28 paras.146-150 and Clause 55 of the Draft Bill 
61
 Ibid. at pp.19-21 paras.69-86 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 Ibid. Clause 1 of the Draft Bill 
64
 Ibid. at p.20 para.71 
65
 Ibid. at para.72 
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entirely fixed, as the Deputy Prime Minister made clear when introducing the draft bill to the 
House of Commons: 
“Three hundred is the number that we judge to be right, but this is an art and not a science. In 
the vast majority of bicameral systems, the second Chamber is significantly smaller. That 
arrangement helps to maintain a clear distinction between the two Houses. We are confident 
that 300 full-time Members can cover the work comfortably. We are, however, open to 
alternative views on that.”66 
 
The Draft Bill sets out proposals for an 80% elected House, but the White Paper makes clear 
that the Government is open to considering a wholly elected House if that option is supported 
during the period in which the Draft Bill is scrutinised.67 Similarly, the Bill expresses a 
preference for the use of the Single Transferable Vote in elections to the reformed House, but 
again, the Government is willing to consider the use of other proportional systems, another 
point recognised by the Deputy Prime Minister in the House: 
“I know that some Members prefer a party list system, including Opposition members of the 
cross-party committee I chaired. We are willing to have this debate, and have not ruled out a 
list-based system in the White Paper.”68 
  
Although the Draft Bill sets out one option for the transitional period, the Government also 
remains open to views on the exact process of transition, and the White Paper contains details 
of two further options.69  The Government clearly hopes that by maintaining a degree of 
ambiguity over the precise shape of reform, it will be possible to achieve some form of 
consensus and ensure that these proposals do not meet the same fate as those which preceded 
them. As the Deputy Prime Minister made clear to the House of Commons: 
 “Although we know what we want to achieve, we are open minded about how we get there. 
Clearly, our fixed goal is greater democratic legitimacy for the other place, but we will be 
pragmatic in order to achieve that.”70  
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The Current Composition of the House of Lords 
 
The House of Lords has long been regarded as something of a peculiarity,71 and very little has 
changed in the composition of the House since the passage of the House of Lords Act 1999.72 As 
of 10th January 2012 there were a total of 787 members entitled to sit and vote in the House of 
Lords.73 However, the total membership of the House holds the potential to rise to 826, since 
there are a further 39 members who could potentially return to the chamber. These include 13 
members of the senior judiciary who are disqualified by virtue of section 137(3) of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, all of whom are entitled to return to the House upon their 
retirement from judicial office. A further 22 members are currently on “leave of absence” under 
section 23 of the Standing Orders of the House, including Baroness Ashton of Upholland, the 
current European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs. In addition, Baroness Ludford 
is presently disqualified as a Member of the European Parliament, and three peers are 
temporarily suspended from the House.   
 
The vast majority of peers currently entitled to sit and vote are life peers appointed under either 
the Life Peerages Act 1958 or the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876. Of the 672 life peers, 235 sit 
on the Labour benches, while the Conservatives have 170 and the Liberal Democrats  have 87. 
There are 154 life peers on the crossbenches, and a further 26 represent minor parties or are 
non-affiliated. A further 90 hereditary peers retain their seats by virtue of the House of Lords 
Act 1999, of whom 48 are Conservative, 4 are Labour, 4 are Liberal Democrats, and 32 sit on the 
crossbenches. Two other hereditary peers sit as ex-officio members by virtue of being royal 
office-holders. The remaining ‘hereditaries’ are, upon their death, replaced in a by-election, with 
their hereditary counterparts within their respective groups serving as electors. The exception 
to this is where the deceased peer was one of the fifteen chosen by the whole House to continue 
as a Committee Chairman or Deputy Speaker, in which case the whole House chooses the 
replacement.  
 
In addition, 26 Bishops of the Church of England, including the Archbishops of Canterbury and 
York, sit by virtue of their ecclesiastical offices as Lords Spiritual, and retain the right to sit and 
vote until they retire rather than for life.74 The two Archbishops, along with the Bishops of 
Durham, London and Winchester are automatically entitled to a seat in the House of Lords. The 
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remaining 21 take their seats in order of seniority, which is determined by length of service as 
an English diocesan Bishop. This means that upon the retirement of a Lord Spiritual, his seat in 
the House of Lords is not granted to his successor in the diocese, but to the next most senior 
Bishop within the Church of England.75  
 
Table 1: Composition of the House of Lords, as of 10th January 2012 
 
AFFILIATION LIFE PEERS HEREDITARY PEERS BISHOPS TOTAL 
Conservative 
Labour 
Liberal Democrat 
Crossbench 
Bishops 
Other 
 
Total 
170 
235 
87 
154 
- 
26 
 
672 
48 
4 
4 
32 
- 
2 
 
90 
- 
- 
- 
- 
25 
- 
 
25 
218 
239 
91 
186 
25 
28 
 
787 
Source: House of Lords Website. Excludes members on Leave of Absence and those who are temporarily 
suspended or disqualified. 
 
 
Given the unusual composition of the second chamber, it is unsurprising that the House of Lords 
is so often derided by its more critical commentators as an unrepresentative and undemocratic 
feudal relic which is out of place in a modern democracy.76 How then has the House, an 
institution “unscathed by democracy”,77 managed to survive into the twenty-first century? Why 
have successive attempts at wholesale reform78 throughout the last century invariably met with 
failure? The famous preamble to the 1911 Parliament Act sought to pave the way for second 
chamber constituted on a ‘popular rather than hereditary basis’, yet hereditary peers continued 
to dominate the House until 1999. Even in 2012, the House remains almost entirely appointed, 
with no claim to direct democratic legitimacy. As Shell asks, why has reform been “so long 
delayed and introduced with such caution?”79 
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Why is the House of Lords so Difficult to Reform? 
 
Russell and Sandford have suggested that dissatisfaction with the second chamber is a common 
phenomenon across many bicameral legislatures.80 Indeed, they are often criticised for having 
“too little power, or on the other hand for having too much; for being too democratic, or not 
democratic enough; for being sidelined and irrelevant, or for being a carbon copy of the lower 
house.”81 But despite the apparent hostility felt towards upper houses across the legislative 
spectrum, very little seems to be achieved in the way of comprehensive reform. Russell and 
Sandford suggest that there are a number of key barriers to reform of the second chamber 
which are common to many bicameral legislatures.82 One such factor is the inherent rigidity 
within the constitutional arrangements of some countries. Particularly in those countries with 
written constitutions, there is a significant danger that the onerous procedures that have to be 
negotiated to implement constitutional change will suffocate the impetus for reform.83 In 
Australia, for example, constitutional amendments must be approved by referendum with a 
majority in four of the six states as well as an overall majority. As Uhr notes, this ‘double 
majority’ is “not easy to obtain, which helps explain why only eight of 44 Australian proposals 
for constitutional change have been successful.”84 Similarly in Canada constitutional 
amendments must be approved by the provincial legislatures. Given that, as Docherty observes, 
“the provinces are far from united on what to do about the Senate”,85 this acts as a major 
obstacle to constitutional change.86  
 
The United Kingdom, however, does not have a written constitution, and the passage of 
constitutional bills is not impeded by the sorts of constitutional safeguards which operate in 
other comparable democracies.87 Russell and Sandford therefore conclude that “the UK does not 
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suffer from the constitutional rigidity which applies in many other states and indeed has already 
embarked on an ambitious programme of constitutional reform.”88  
 
Another factor considered by Russell and Sandford is the tendency of second chamber reform to 
be swallowed up in the wider constitutional debate, and progress to be hampered by a failure to 
reach a consensus on broader, often unrelated, constitutional issues.89 As Docherty notes, the 
last major attempt at Senate reform in Canada90 “failed not just because some citizens were 
opposed to the Senate model proposed, but because most citizens were opposed to other parts 
of the larger constitutional reform package.”91 Once again though, this fails to offer an 
explanation for inaction in the United Kingdom. As Russell and Sandford explain, “with no 
tradition of grand constitutional design, House of Lords reform is presented as a discrete issue 
and debates are impressively self-contained by comparison.”92 In implementing reform of the 
House of Lords in 1999 the Labour government even managed to separate the expulsion of the 
hereditary peers from the issue of the long-term future of the House, thereby ensuring that their 
goal of ending hereditary entitlement could be realised, and not impeded by an ability to reach a 
consensus on the precise shape that the reformed House should take.   It can thus be seen that, 
“reform of the Lords has not been linked to other elements of the programme or made 
contingent on other reforms”,93 and as such this does not offer an explanation for the failure of 
successive governments to implement wholesale reform of the upper House. 
 
A factor which may have been influential in obstructing second chamber reform within the 
United Kingdom is the reluctance of those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo to 
consent to such reform. In many countries, the members of the second chamber themselves can 
act as a significant barrier to reform, since in many legislatures they will exercise a significant 
degree of control over the passage of reforming legislation.94 Indeed, in the United Kingdom, any 
bill to reform the House of Lords will be considered by the House itself, and though as a result of 
the Parliament Acts the House has only a suspensory veto, it can cause costly delays to both the 
Bill and other aspects of the Government’s programme. One has only to consider the results of 
the votes held in the House of Lords in 2003 and 2007 to appreciate the hostility felt in the 
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chamber to this particular parliamentary reform.95 Political parties can also have good reason to 
seek to preserve the status quo. Michael Laver observes that party political control over both 
the nomination and voting process make the Irish Seanad a convenient stopover for career 
politicians or for those who have been unsuccessful in elections to the Dáil.96 In short, the 
principal reason for a lack political interest in reform of the Irish upper chamber is that the 
present arrangements are “really rather cosy for the political establishment.”97 Similar 
observations could be made of the British upper House. As Russell and Sandford note, the House 
of Lords currently acts as “a pasture for retired politicians as well as a prize for loyal party 
service to those who have not otherwise won seats in Parliament.”98 This is a considerable 
resource for the political parties, and may well have dissuaded them from a vigorous pursuit of 
second chamber reform in recent years.  
 
Invariably the dominant vested interest is of course the Government itself, which in many 
legislatures enjoys considerable powers of patronage over the upper house. This is indeed the 
case in the United Kingdom where the Prime Minister retains control over the frequency and 
number of appointments to the upper House, and is able to control the party balance within the 
chamber.  In the case of second chambers such as the British House of Lords or the Canadian 
Senate, the greatest problem to be remedied by future reform is the lack of perceived legitimacy 
inherent in their unelected memberships. As Russell and Sandford note, “the obvious direction 
for reform in these cases is thus to boost the effectiveness of the chamber through enhanced 
powers, a more legitimate membership, or an end to the stranglehold the parties of government 
have over its membership.”99 It is not difficult to discern how this might not appeal to a 
government of any political persuasion. On the other hand, retaining an almost exclusively 
appointed House whose membership is controlled by the Prime Minister and which, due to its 
own sense of illegitimacy, is reluctant to frequently frustrate the will of the House of Commons, 
is undoubtedly beneficial to any governing party which seeks the safe passage of its legislative 
agenda through Parliament, and may well have impeded second chamber reform in the United 
Kingdom.100 
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One final constraint on second chamber reform recognised by Russell and Sandford is public 
opinion. Reform of the second chamber is rarely seen as a high priority amongst the electorate, 
who instead tend to be more concerned with economic and social policies, and are reluctant to 
support a government that will spend a great deal of time and money on something which will 
make very little difference to their day-to-day lives.101 The lack of enthusiasm amongst the 
public for second chamber reform certainly does little to spur on any radical change amongst 
the political classes, who are of course preoccupied with what they perceive to be vote-winning 
policies. Further, in cases where the government does seek change, public opinion can act as a 
major obstacle to second chamber reform. John Uhr notes that in Australia “voters rarely 
endorse proposals for constitutional reform because they suspect that sponsoring governments 
generally want to consolidate and centralise power.”102 As Russell and Sandford conclude, 
“public opinion will act as a constraint on government action which seeks to weaken an effective 
upper house.”103  
 
Shell identifies a number of further factors that have delayed reform to the House of Lords in 
recent years.104 One such reason, so Shell argues, is that since the passing of the 1911 Act, the 
House of Lords has not posed a serious threat to any government. Rather than fully utilising its 
remaining powers under the 1949 Act, the House, according to Shell, has “accepted a junior role 
and developed conventions designed to avoid any prolonged confrontation with the 
government or the Commons.”105 The continued prevalence of the Salisbury Convention coupled 
with the ‘legislative last resort’ of the Parliament Act procedure, have heralded an era of what 
Shell labels “de facto unicameralism”,106 whereby the House of Lords respects the democratic 
legitimacy of the lower House and, though not ashamed to make the government think again 
from time to time, is careful not to challenge the authority of the elected House in a fundamental 
manner. The extent to which this is an accurate characterisation of the current House of Lords 
will be a subject of further discussion in Chapter III. 
 
Much like the constitution itself, the ability of the House of Lords to evolve and adapt 
incrementally over time may also have ensured its survival. Shell suggests that what has 
enabled the House to survive “in its essentially unreformed state”107 has been “its capacity to 
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make modest changes, which have cumulatively altered it a great deal.”108 The House’s 
acceptance of the Salisbury Convention, the introduction of Life Peers (including the first female 
peers) in 1958, the introduction of the right to disclaim a peerage in 1963, the introduction of 
expenses, and the development of a valuable network of committees are all examples of this 
capacity to evolve. The House has, so Shell contends, “metamorphosed from being a gentleman’s 
club of part-time aristocrats to being a largely professional House.”109 The ability of the House to 
move with the times and adapt to meet specific challenges may well have mollified the pressure 
for radical, more comprehensive reform. Governments must also be mindful of the cost involved 
with such reform, not only in terms of parliamentary time, but also in terms of the costs to party 
cohesion. Indeed, along with the problem of depriving more pressing social issues of 
parliamentary time, “the capacity to precipitate intra party dissent has been another 
disincentive to party leaders to instigate major reform”,110 reform that lacks the political 
urgency to be deemed worthwhile.  
 
The final saving grace for the House of Lords has been its usefulness within the political and 
legislative system. As will be explored further in Chapter III, the effectiveness of the House in 
providing expert, largely non-partisan scrutiny of legislation, not to mention the work of its 
internationally-regarded committee  network, has allowed the House to become regarded by 
some as an indispensable component within the legislative framework of the country.111 Indeed, 
as Norton notes, the House ‘adds value’ to the political process in a way that could not easily be 
emulated.112 Successive governments have likely been reluctant to deprive themselves and the 
country of what could be regarded as a rather valuable asset. But this prompts a further 
question that must be considered. Is a second chamber really a necessity in the United 
Kingdom? 
 
 
Do We Need a Second Chamber? 
 
As Mughan and Patterson note, second chambers remain “essentially contested institutions.”113 
Indeed, there are those who regard the existence of a second chamber as “a useless complexity 
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which hinders and upsets the course of good government in a state.”114 The hostility felt 
towards the bicameral model is nicely summarised by the oft-quoted observation of French 
constitutionalist Abbe Sieyes that “if a second chamber dissents from the first it is mischievous; 
if it agrees it is superfluous.”115 However, the proposals put forward by the Coalition 
Government offer little support to those in the United Kingdom who favour the outright 
abolition of the House of Lords and the move to a unicameral parliament. In fact, no attempt has 
been made to advocate such a change since the early 1980s when the left was “temporarily 
ascendant”116 within the Labour Party. Michael Foot’s ill-fated 1983 Labour Manifesto, 
immortalised by Sir Gerald Kaufman as “the longest suicide note in history”,117 was the last 
occasion on which abolitionism would be official policy of any of the major political parties. 
Furthermore, outright abolition was rejected in the House of Commons in the votes of 2007, and 
rejected decisively at that.118 But given the aforementioned hostility shown towards the House 
of Lords by many academic and political commentators, why is there such a lack of enthusiasm 
for its outright abolition and the creation of a unicameral legislature? 
 
The simple answer is that, despite the antipathy felt by many for the House of Lords, there is a 
general recognition that it, like so many second chambers across the world, performs functions 
that are vital to the health of both our democracy and our legislative system. As Massicotte 
identifies, while not uncommon, the majority of countries today do not have a second 
chamber.119 Indeed, of the 192 countries belonging to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, some 59% 
have unicameral parliaments, while only 41% are bicameral.120 But in the British context, it 
would seem that the second chamber could not easily be discarded. Bagehot famously stated 
that “with a perfect lower House it is certain that an upper House would be scarcely of any 
value.”121 But as Shell contends, “now, as then, and throughout history, no first chamber can be 
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considered so virtuous.”122 It has historically been recognised that a second chamber cannot be 
viewed in isolation, and must instead be examined in relation to the first chamber which makes 
up the bicameral structure.123 Churchill once compared bicameralism to the motor car, 
remarking that “if you have a motor car...you have to have a break. There ought to be a break...it 
prevents an accident through going too fast.”124 George Washington preferred the analogy of 
pouring hot liquid into a saucer to cool. In the same way, he explained, “we pour legislation into 
the senatorial saucer to cool it.”125 But whichever one’s chosen analogy or metaphor, second 
chambers can perform a number of vital functions.   
 
Patterson and Mughan described the two central functions of a second chamber as 
‘representation’ and ‘redundancy’.126 The representative function pertains to the ability of 
second chambers to represent different interests to those represented in the first chamber. As 
Loewenberg and Patterson note, “bicameralism originated in the essentially pre-democratic 
view that the representation of the nation required both an upper and lower house, in the class-
conscious sense of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’”.127 But although the House of Lords does still contain 92 
hereditary peers, the idea of class representation is no longer utilised as a justification for the 
bicameral system, and as Russell notes, the representative function of second chambers around 
the world is today concentrated more on the protection of minority interests, reflecting 
territorial, ethnic or linguistic divisions.128 The House of Lords performs its representative 
function in a slightly more traditional sense, whereby the custom of appointing members who 
have reached the senior levels of their professions has resulted in a chamber well placed to 
represent the arts, science, literature, academia and business. As Russell notes, “the chamber to 
some extent represents ‘the great and the good’, who bring a different perspective to policy 
making than the elected members of the lower house.”129 The distinctive party balance within 
the House of Lords is also fundamental in representing different interests. Since no party has a 
majority within the chamber, which also contains nearly 200 independents, the House has a 
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different political dynamic to that of the Commons, introducing “an element of consensus 
politics into what may be an otherwise majoritarian system.”130  
 
The second key function identified by Patterson and Mughan, that of ‘redundancy’, refers to the 
degree of delay and duplication provided for by the existence of a second chamber. As both 
Churchill and Washington acknowledged, a second chamber can act as an important component 
in the checks and balances on government, a chamber of second thoughts preventing the 
implementation of rash decisions and ill-considered policies. Russell notes that the 
consideration of legislation in a less politically-charged atmosphere allows for deliberation of 
issues that may have been missed in the lower house, and may prevent the government from 
passing a bill too hastily.131 As Russell argues: 
 “the consideration of a bill by a second group of legislators, with different territorial, political 
or cultural perspectives, may increase the chance of flaws being ironed out before it reaches 
the statute book.”132  
Some second chambers around the world have the power to veto legislation,133 while others, 
like the House of Lords, have only the power to delay or introduce amendments that frustrate 
the intentions of the government. But even where, as in the United Kingdom, the lower House 
retains the right to override amendments made by the second chamber, the public and media 
attention attracted by the dispute between the two chambers can be enough to obtain 
concessions, and the fear of enhanced scrutiny will often prevent the government from 
attempting to pass overly contentious measures.134 Thus, the redundancy function, performed 
by second chambers in general, and performed specifically by the House of Lords, is something 
that could not easily be cast aside.  
 
Russell has identified two further functions performed by second chambers.135 One obvious 
benefit of having a second chamber of parliament is that it provides an additional body of 
people to share the parliamentary workload.136  In many countries, including the United 
Kingdom, senior ministers are predominantly selected from the first chamber, and it is there 
that most major legislation is initiated. As shall be demonstrated in Chapter II, debate often 
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centres on the fundamental principles of a bill, and often declines into party-political point 
scoring. Large sections of legislation are not debated, and ministers are reluctant to concede 
amendments for fear of them being regarded as political defeats.137  Second chambers tend to 
have far more time to spend providing detailed scrutiny of legislation. In the case of the House 
of Lords, peers are not burdened with constituency duties, and because they are appointed, are 
less responsive to media and electoral pressure.138 A second chamber is also able to take on 
work neglected by the first chamber. For example, the House of Lords has developed numerous 
specialist committees to cover areas not adequately scrutinised by the Commons committee 
network,139  and are often able to debate issues thought too politically sensitive to be addressed 
in the lower House. As Russell notes, in recent years the Canadian and Spanish Senates as well 
as the House of Lords have all carried out detailed investigations into euthanasia, while the 
House of Lords has also reported on life imprisonment for murder and the legalisation of 
cannabis for medical use, topics which are “more difficult for the more politicised members of 
the lower houses to take up.”140 
 
Finally since, as in the United Kingdom, it is quite common for the governing party not to have a 
majority in the second chamber, and due to the fact that it is customary for party discipline to be 
greatly reduced from that of the first chamber, an upper house can facilitate greater 
independence from the will of the executive, strengthening the control of parliament over 
government.141 For example, in the United Kingdom the majority of government ministers are 
drawn from the House of Commons, while members of the Lords tend to be towards the end of 
their political careers and less inclined towards accepting government posts. Ambitious career-
politicians are few and far between in the upper House. The continuity of membership and the 
method of appointment mean that members are not dependent on party or government for 
their continued existence, and the prevalence of non-party-aligned experts who are “less 
controllable”142 by parties than lower house members, enhances the independence of the 
chamber from the executive. As such, the upper house acts as an important check on 
government, providing “an important counterbalance in an otherwise executive-dominated 
parliament.” 143 
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It can therefore be seen that, while there is much criticism of the continued existence of the 
House of Lords in its current form, the continued existence of a second chamber is in fact 
considered desirable for the effective operation of the legislative system in this country. Indeed 
Shell goes so far as to suggests that, with the rise of the professional career politician, the 
increasing control of the party over its candidates, the prevalence of adversarial, partisan 
politics, and the increasing tension between the role of the House of Commons in maintaining a 
government whilst also holding it to account, the lower house has neither the quality of 
membership nor the political will to adequately hold the government to account.144 It is likely 
that those who favour reform of the House of Lords are also aware of the deficiencies of the 
House of Commons, which would account for their reluctance to reduce the United Kingdom to a 
unicameral parliament. 
 
What will be Achieved by Wholesale Reform? 
 
Arend Lijphart proposed that a two-chamber parliament could be classified as an example of 
‘strong bicameralism’ when it exhibited two fundamental characteristics: significant powers, 
and a composition distinct from that of the lower house.145 A useful and effective upper 
chamber, according to Lijphart’s analysis, would therefore require powers relatively equal to 
those of the lower house.146 Further, in a country with a strong party system such as the United 
Kingdom, a distinct composition would necessitate a different party political balance within the 
chamber to that of the lower house, though in other instances factors such as regional affiliation 
and state representation might provide the distinctive character.147 If only one of these two 
criteria is met then the parliament in question will exhibit ‘weak bicameralism’, and if neither is 
satisfied then the parliament is classified as an illustration of ‘insignificant bicameralism’, and is 
judged to make “little or no impact on the work of the legislature.”148 Lipjhart classified the 
United Kingdom parliament as ‘weakly bicameral’, in that despite the distinct composition of the 
upper House, the balance of power between the House of Lords and the House of Commons was 
deemed to be “extremely asymmetrical.”149 
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Russell has revised Lijphart’s criteria to fit the British context, and in so doing added a third 
characteristic: perceived legitimacy.150 Russell contends that it is in fact perceived illegitimacy 
that prevents the House of Lords from making full use of its formal powers, and prevents the 
Westminster parliament from being classified as ‘strongly bicameral.’151 For a reformed upper 
chamber to be effective therefore it must exhibit all three characteristics: adequate powers, 
distinct composition and perceived legitimacy. The requirement of adequate powers does not 
necessarily mean that “anything less than a total veto will be ineffective.”152 It simply means that 
the upper house must have the necessary bargaining power to make an impact on government 
policy and legislation, the ability to make the lower house think again. As Russell notes: 
 “there is no simple measure of what are ‘adequate’ powers. At times the threat of a short delay, 
during which the media and the public may focus on a controversial policy, will be influential 
enough.”153  
 
There are also various ways in which a second chamber can be distinct in its composition, 
although in the modern context this is often taken as synonymous with control by a different 
party to that of the lower chamber.154 Russell suggests that where both chambers are controlled 
by the same party the upper house is unlikely to make use of its powers, with the exception of 
cases where territorial or other interests override party allegiance, but opposition control can 
also be problematic in that it can lead to legislative gridlock.155 As such, often the most effective 
contributions are made by second chambers where there is no majority party, which is 
sometimes achieved in elected second chambers by use of a system of proportional 
representation.156 In order to make use of the powers it has available to it, the upper house must 
also have the perceived legitimacy to carry public support. This is usually achieved via election, 
but as shall be discussed further, it is possible that there may be other routes to legitimacy. 
 
Russell’s criteria provide a benchmark by which the qualities of the House of Lords can be 
measured. By weaving Russell’s analysis into this study it will be possible to determine not only 
whether the current House is performing satisfactorily, but also whether the reforms currently 
contemplated by the Government are in fact necessary.  
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Second Chambers Overseas 
 
In order to further inform the analysis offered, it will be useful to place the House of Lords in a 
comparative context. Rather than examining the British second chamber in isolation, much can 
be gained by identifying the similarities and differences between our own upper House and 
those in other comparable bicameral legislatures. It is possible that an analysis of second 
chambers overseas may also help us to identify the optimal path for reform of the House of 
Lords.  Drawing on Russell’s study of second chambers overseas,157 along with other notable 
comparative works,158 it will be possible to identify a range of general trends and patterns that 
are commons across bicameral parliaments. Particular focus will be placed on two key 
comparators, the elected Australian Senate and the appointed Canadian Senate. 
 
The Canadian Senate is a useful comparator since it is, as Russell notes, “the closest in 
composition to the British House of Lords and very similar to the new, transitional, UK upper 
house.”159  But it also appears to rival the House of Lords as an object of criticism. As Docherty 
remarks, “to say the Canadian Senate is a much maligned body would be at best a cliché and 
more objectively an understatement.”160 The Senate is principally seen as a reflective, 
conservative body, originally conceived as a chamber of ‘sober second thought’ from what was 
(and still is) considered to be the more radical lower house.161 As Docherty notes, the initial 
objective or purpose of the Senate was to “represent two distinct segments of Canadian society, 
regions and propertied interests.”162 However, as Russell observes, the original property 
qualifications that applied to Senate membership – ownership of property worth $4,000 and 
assets of at least $4,000 - are now “relatively meaningless.”163 However, regional interests have 
had a “constant role”164 for the Canadian upper house.  
 
The original chamber had 72 members, 24 each for Ontario and Quebec, with a further 24 split 
equally between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. As Russell notes, “the institution thus 
conformed roughly to the classic model of a federal upper house.”165 A further 6 seats were 
given to each of the western provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba 
                                                          
157
 Russell, M. Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
158
 Particularly Patterson, S.C. and Mughan, A. Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World (Columbus 
OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999) 
159
 Russell, Reforming the House of Lords, fn.157, p.52 
160
 Docherty, The Canadian Senate, fn.85, p.27  
161
 Ibid. at p.28 
162
 Ibid.  
163
 Russell, Reforming the House of Lords, fn.157, p.53  
164
 Docherty, The Canadian Senate, fn.85, p.28 
165
 Russell, Reforming the House of Lords, fn.157, p.53  
32 
 
in 1915, and when Prince Edward Island entered confederation it received 4 seats.166 Six seats 
were granted to Newfoundland when it joined the confederation in 1949, and the subsequent 
entry of other provinces eventually resulted in the present total of 105 seats. However, any 
principle of equal representation has long since been abandoned.167 Members of the senate 
must also be at least 30 years old,168 compared with 18 years old for membership of the House 
of Commons which, as Docherty notes, acts as a “reminder that Senators were to have worked 
and served in some capacity prior to sitting in the senate”169 and consequently “have a greater 
and more contemplative world view.”170 
 
Appointments to the Canadian Senate are made by the Governor General of Canada, but are in 
practice controlled by the Prime Minister. As Docherty remarks, “the appointment process to 
the Canadian Senate is straightforward. The Prime Minister chooses you and you accept or 
decline.”171 Appointments were for life until 1965 when a retirement age of 75 was introduced, 
and Senators tend to enter Parliament at a later age than members of the lower house. Indeed, 
“many members of the Senate enter the chamber at a time when most Canadians are thinking 
about retiring from working life”,172 and given that the average age of entry is 63, Senators will 
serve an average of 12 years before they reach retirement age.173  
 
Unlike in Britain, there is no tradition of appointing members from opposition parties, and very 
few independents are appointed.174 Indeed, almost 95% of appointments to the Senate are of 
the same political affiliation as the Prime Minister, with the remaining 5% of seats going to 
independent members almost as often as opposition parties,175 providing support to the 
“conventional wisdom that appointments are used first and foremost as a political reward for 
party faithful, both elected and those who toil behind the scenes.”176 Further, because ministers 
must be members of the Canadian Parliament, appointment to the Senate has become a safe 
means for Prime Ministers to bring unelected members into government.177 Appointment to the 
Senate has also been used frequently in recent years to make up for the lack of broad-based 
representation in the House of Commons, by appointing people on the basis of other non-
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territorial considerations such as occupation, gender, religion and ethnicity,178 and the Senate 
also offers representation for areas that are often perceived as being neglected in the political 
system, such as the arts, education and culture.179 However, as will be discussed later, in the 
light of such considerations it becomes “questionable”180 whether the Senate truly does 
represent the regions of Canada and fulfil its functions as a territorial chamber. 
 
The powers of the Canadian Senate are, in formal terms, quite considerable. Indeed, 
“constitutionally, the Canadian Senate is one of the most powerful in the world.”181 In fact the 
Canadian Senate has the power to block almost any measure, with the major exception that it 
holds only a six month delaying power over legislation which amends the constitution.182 
However, although the Canadian Senate may, due to its full veto, appear to be strong, it is “in 
practice one of the weakest legislative bodies because it has so little credibility.”183 Because of 
their perceived lack of legitimacy, along with the low esteem with which they are held by the 
Canadian electorate and the control exercised by the executive over the appointment system, 
Senators tend to confine themselves to detailed legislative scrutiny. Very rarely does the Senate 
fully flex its legislative muscles.184 The Canadian Senate will therefore be a useful comparator 
for our purposes, since it shares a number of characteristics with the House of Lords. Though it 
has far greater formal powers, it rarely uses them, “largely because it is seen as undemocratic 
for an appointed house to challenge the will of an elected one”.185 In addition, Prime Ministerial 
control over the appointments system and the use of political patronage mean that the Senate 
has “little respect amongst Canadians”,186 while its work is either ridiculed or ignored by the 
political media.187 The similarities between the Canadian Senate and the House of Lords should 
make it a useful comparator.  
 
The Australian federation was formed when the six self-governing British colonies of 
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania came 
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together in 1901. The Australian Senate initially had a total of 36 members with equal 
representation for each of the six states, and was elected under the first-past-the-post system,188 
although this changed to a preferential voting system in 1919.189 Each state formed one large 
constituency for elections to the Senate, and due to the majoritarian voting system, generally 
returned members who all represented the same party, resulting in a majority for the 
government in the upper house.190 However, in 1946 the Labor Government introduced a 
system of proportional representation for the Senate, and at the same time increased its size to 
60 members, with 10 members representing each state.191 The Senate was enlarged again in 
1983, giving each state a total of 12 representatives and, along with the addition of two seats 
each for the Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory, now contains a total of 76 
members.192 
 
Senators representing the six Australian states serve fixed six-year terms, with six members 
elected from each state every three years. The four members representing the two territories 
serve fixed three-year terms, and are renewed at each election. Elections to the lower house are 
held every three years, and governments try to ensure that elections to the Senate are held on 
the same day, to prevent them being used as a mid-term opinion poll and a means by which 
voters can register their frustration with the incumbent government.193 While the House of 
Representatives is elected under the alternative vote system,  Senator are chosen by a form of 
the Single Transferable Vote with each state or territory acting as a multi-member constituency, 
which allows independent members and smaller parties to gain seats, something they have little 
chance of doing in the lower house.194 Indeed, the adoption of proportional representation has 
not only meant that governments rarely win a Senate majority, but has created a form of 
“divided government”195 in which “a government with an unmistakable governing majority in 
the House of Representatives must satisfy dissenting parties and interests in the Senate.”196  
 
The Senate is virtually equal in legislative power with the House of Representatives and has a 
reputation as one of the most powerful parliamentary upper houses, much of which stems from 
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its ability to veto government legislation.197 However, while the Senate does largely succeed in 
executing its functions of review, holding the government to account and ensuring the minority 
interests are properly represented it has, as will be discussed later, “never really performed as a 
‘states house’”198 and has instead evolved as a highly partisan body, in which the predominant 
influence on members is party rather than territorial affiliation.199 Nonetheless, the Australian 
Senate is, in comparative terms at least, generally offered as a successful example of a directly 
elected second chamber,200 and should thus offer some valuable lessons for those who seek to 
introduce direct election to the House of Lords.  
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CHAPTER II: THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN ACTION 
 
The Role of the Upper House 
In the previous chapter the functions performed by second chambers were considered in the 
context of providing a justification for the retention of a bicameral structure in the United 
Kingdom. However, the identification of the role and functions that we wish our second 
chamber to perform is also crucial in order to properly determine the appropriate composition 
of the chamber. As Archer notes, “discussion of how a second chamber should be composed 
requires first some clarification of its intended functions.”201 Indeed Lipsey remarks that, when 
deciding on the shape of future reform to the House of Lords, we must ask ourselves the 
following: “What do we want it to do? Who do we want to sit in it? I put these questions in this 
order because this is the order in which, logically, they must be answered.”202 Lord Rooker made 
precisely the same point in debate in the House of Lords. All three major parties fought the 2010 
general election promising to bring about a wholly or mainly elected second chamber, but as 
Lord Rooker noted: 
 “the manifesto lines of the parties are obsessed with composition. Not one asked what we are 
for, what we do and how we do it. The functions and powers of the second Chamber should be 
known before starting on the composition.”203 
 
The classic statement of the functions of a second chamber within the British constitutional 
framework was given by the Bryce Commission Report in 1918. This report suggested four key 
functions that should be performed:  
(1) the examination and revision of Commons bills;  
(2) the initiation of comparatively non-controversial bills;  
(3) the interposition of so much delay (and no more) in the passage of a Bill into law as 
may be needed to enable the opinion of the nation to be adequately expressed upon it, 
and  
(4) the discussion and debate of important questions of general policy, particularly 
those for which sufficient time cannot be provided in the first chamber. 204 
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The role of the House of Lords was addressed again by the Wakeham Commission, which 
identified both the functions that the House did perform, and those that it should.205 The Report 
concluded that the second chamber should:  
(1) bring a range of different perspectives to bear on proposed legislation and the 
development of public policy;  
(2) be broadly representative of British society;  
(3) play a vital role as one of the checks and balances within the unwritten British 
constitution, holding the government to account, and if necessary, forcing the House of 
Commons to think again, and  
(4) provide a voice for the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.206  
 
The Coalition Government also appears to be mindful of the inextricable link between functions 
and composition, and has set out in detail what it perceives to be the critical functions of the 
House of Lords.207 The White Paper makes a number of statements on the roles fulfilled by the 
House of Lords, which it suggests should remain unchanged in the reformed House.208 These 
functions can be summarised in the following way: 
(1) The careful consideration and scrutiny of legislation, including the ability to delay 
and ask the government to think again and, in some cases, offer alternative 
amendments for further consideration. 
 
(2) Scrutinising the work of government and holding it to account for its decisions and 
activities by asking oral and written questions, responding to Government 
statements and debating key issues 
 
(3) Conducting inquiries into matters of public policy via House of Lords Select 
Committees and publishing their findings to Parliament 
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It is with these roles and functions in mind that one must consider the most appropriate method 
of composition for the second chamber. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to consider 
how well the current House of Lords, as presently constituted, actually performs these 
functions. The 2011 White Paper indicates that the primary purpose of the second chamber 
should be to scrutinise legislation and hold the government to account.209 But just how well 
does the House of Lords currently fulfil this task? In order to answer this question, it will be 
useful to examine the way in which the House of Lords has interacted with a major piece of 
legislation. The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act completed its passage 
through the House of Lords in February 2011, and is arguably one of the most constitutionally 
significant pieces of legislation that will be passed by this Coalition Government. As such, it will 
make an appropriate case study. 
 
The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 
 
The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill210 was introduced to the House of 
Commons on 22nd July 2010,211 and had its Second Reading on 6th September 2010.212 The 
purpose of the Bill was to provide for the 2015 general election to be fought under the 
Alternative Vote (AV) electoral system, provided that such a change was approved in a 
referendum to be held on 5th May 2011. The Bill also provided for a proposed reduction in the 
size of the House of Commons from 650 members to 600 members. Under the provisions of the 
Bill, the introduction of AV would be prevented until boundary changes had taken place. 
However the boundary changes provided for in the Bill would take effect at the next general 
election irrespective of the referendum result.213 After the division on the Second Reading, the 
House of Commons divided on the Programme Motion, which was passed by 324 votes to 
272.214 The Programme Motion allowed for five days in Committee and two days for 
consideration and Third Reading.215 As a constitutional Bill, the committee stage was taken on 
the floor of the House of Commons.  Day 1 of the Committee stage took place on 12th October,216 
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and there were three more days taken on 18th, 19th and 20th October.217 The final day was 25th 
October.218 Report Stage took place on 1st and 2nd November219 and was followed by Third 
Reading.220 From Second Reading to Report, the House of Commons spent 8 days and an 
approximate total of 48 hours scrutinising the Bill.  
 
Amendment and Scrutiny in the House of Commons 
 
As Gay and White note, “no major changes were made during the passage of the Bill in the 
Commons.”221 However, the text of the referendum question was amended and provision was 
made for the combination of polls on 5th May 2011. One recurring criticism throughout the 
passage of the Bill centred on the lack of pre-legislative scrutiny and the speed with which the 
Bill was timetabled through Parliament. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 
published a brief report on 2nd August 2010 in which it suggested that the timetable for the Bill 
meant that the Committee had been denied an adequate opportunity to scrutinise the Bill before 
Second Reading.222 The Committee published its substantive report on the Bill on 11 October 
2010 in which it again criticised the government for the lack of pre-legislative scrutiny of the 
Bill:  
“The Parliamentary Voting Systems and Constituencies Bill seeks fundamentally to change the political 
establishment in the UK. We regret that it is being pushed through Parliament in a manner that limits both 
legislative and external scrutiny of its impact, and may consequently undermine the Government’s intention 
to restore the public’s faith in Parliament.”223 
 
The Chair of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee voiced further concern during 
the Bill’s Second Reading, criticising the Government for the lack of pre-legislative scrutiny: 
“this is not some small order or statutory instrument, but potentially the biggest Bill that the 
House will consider in five years, and my Committee has been given just two sessions in which 
to consider it.”224 Nonetheless, the Bill passed its Second Reading by 328 votes to 269.225 
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The Referendum Question 
 
Perhaps the most significant amendment made to the Bill in the House of Commons was in 
relation to the wording of the referendum question. On 30 September 2010 the Electoral 
Commission published its report on the intelligibility of the proposed referendum question.226 
The report concluded that, while most people taking part in the research found the 
Government’s proposed question to be clear and understandable, some people, particularly 
those with lower levels of education and literacy, found the question difficult to understand. 
This, the report suggested, was because of the structure, length and language used in the 
proposed question.227  The Commission recommended a redrafted question that would be 
easier for all sections of the public to understand.228 During Committee Stage, Caroline Lucas 
(Green Party) spoke to an amendment to offer voters a two-question referendum. They would 
first have a choice between retaining first-past-the-post or changing to a different system, and 
then a choice between AV, the Single Transferable Vote system and the Additional Member 
System as the new system, citing the New Zealand ‘preferendum’ of 1993 as a precedent.229 This 
amendment was grouped with a number of government amendments to change the wording of 
the question as recommended by the Electoral Commission, sponsored by the Deputy Prime 
Minister and members of the Political and Constitutional Affairs Committee. The Green Party 
amendment was lost by 346 votes to 17,230 while the government amendments were passed 
without a division,231 and the question was thus brought into line with the Electoral 
Commission’s recommendations.  
 
Technical Government Amendments 
 
A number of technical government amendments were agreed relating to the counting officers 
and conduct of the referendum. The Government tabled a number of amendments to Schedule 1 
relating to the designation of counting officers for the referendum, and a further government 
amendment defined the voting areas for the referendum. Other government amendments 
allowed for the fees to be paid to counting officers to be reduced if they failed to meet a suitable 
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standard of performance. These were agreed without a division.232 A Government amendment 
clarifying the role of the Electoral Commission in providing information about voting systems 
was also agreed without a division.233 Government amendments to the rules for the conduct of 
the referendum were also agreed. The key amendment was to change the deadline for issuing 
the notice of poll from 16 days to 15 days before the referendum date. This, and other minor 
technical changes relating to the combination of polls on 5th May 2011 were passed.234 
Government amendments to adjust forms issued in connection with the referendum were also 
agreed.235 These were all minor, technical amendments to the Bill, which were passed willingly 
by the House.236 
A number of technical government amendments to Schedule 6, which makes amendments to the 
Parliamentary Election Rules to allow for a change to the Alternative Vote System were agreed 
without a division. These included the procedures that would be followed if there was a tie 
under AV.237 A series of minor amendments were moved to clarify responsibility for electoral 
law and were added without a division,238 as was a Government amendment regarding the new 
redistribution rules to clarify the definition of local authority boundaries.239 
The Government added a new clause 19 to the Bill, which made clear that the costs of covering 
and reporting on the referendum in the media were not to be referendum expenses for the 
purposes of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. This clause was added 
without a division.240 The Government also added new clause 20 and new Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 
5 on the combination of polls. The new clause and schedules allowed for the referendum to be 
combined with other elections or local referendums that could take place on 5th May 2011. 
Aside from a number of minor technical government amendments that were agreed at Report 
Stage,241 the House of Commons made no other changes to the substance of the Bill, which 
passed its Third Reading by 321 votes to 264 on 2nd November.242  
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Government Timetabling: A Lack of Proper Scrutiny? 
 
There was, however, general criticism of the way in which the Bill was handled in the Commons. 
On 11th October the Scottish Affairs Committee published the written evidence it had received 
on the date for the referendum. On the first day of Committee in the House of Commons, the 
Chair of the Committee, Ian Davidson, suggested that “a strong view had been expressed by civic 
Scotland that is hostile to the proposals in the main.”243 He argued that the Government had not 
had sufficient chance to take these views into account due to the speed with which the 
legislation was being timetabled, and even expressed the view that “should the measures go 
through without due consideration it would be only right, in those circumstances, that another 
place should intervene to send some of them back.”244 Similar views were expressed by the 
Welsh Affairs Committee, which published its report, The Implications for Wales of the 
Government’s Proposals for Constitutional Reform, on 25th October 2010. The report expressed 
the following sentiment: 
“we are disappointed at the pace at which the whole package of constitutional reforms is being 
legislated and implemented. The provisions of the Bill will have profound consequences for the 
UK Parliament and for Wales in particular. We are equally disappointed that the Government 
has decided to timetable the Bill through the House of Commons without adequate opportunity 
for fuller scrutiny.”245 
 
When the second programme motion was put to the House of Commons on the first day of the 
Committee Stage, a number of members put forward the argument that more time was needed 
for such an important constitutional measure,246 but the programme motion was passed by 323 
votes to 256.247 On the second day of Committee there was not an opportunity to debate the 
amendments to clause 6 relating to a turnout threshold for the referendum. Instead the 
Government moved Eleanor Laing’s (Conservative) amendment for a 50% turnout threshold. 
This was rejected without a division.248 On the third day of Committee a series of points of order 
complained of the failure to find time for a debate on a threshold in the referendum.249 
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Conservative backbencher Bill Cash gave the following account of the previous night’s 
proceedings: 
“We saw the cynical adoption of amendments with which the Coalition Government clearly 
disagree merely to induce a negative vote. No opportunity was given for my amendments or 
those of other honourable members to be debated or voted on in Committee.”250  
 
A subsequent programme motion was introduced on 19th October  which “removed the internal 
knife on Day 3 allowing debate on Clause 9 to run on to Day 4.”251 However, this meant that by 
the end of Day 4, a number of amendments on the boundary review had not been debated. 
There was no time to debate amendments on public inquiries in clause 10,252 and clauses 11 to 
17 were added to the Bill without debate.253 On 1st November a fourth programme motion was 
introduced, which allowed for consideration of amendments relating to boundaries, the 
combination of polls, and referendum thresholds on the first and second days of Report stage.254 
Labour’s Chris Bryant indicated that the Opposition would oppose the motion: 
“We believe it is inappropriate not to allow any specific time for votes, because it is the right of 
this House not only to debate but to vote on such matters; we believe that it is inappropriate in 
particular to have so little time tomorrow, when we will be dealing with 28 pages of 
Government amendments, not a single one of which is the result of discussions in Committee”255 
 
Nonetheless, the programme motion was passed by 320 votes to 241,256 and no further time 
was allocated for the discussion of these amendments. Not only was the Bill not afforded the 
appropriate level of pre-legislative scrutiny for a fundamental constitutional measure of this 
kind, but it was timetabled through the House in such a way as to make detailed scrutiny and 
amendment of the Bill’s provisions almost impossible. Clauses were left undebated, and 
fundamental amendments from both opposition and government backbench members were not 
afforded time for debate. The only amendments passed by the House of Commons were those 
moved by the Government, and thanks to the Government’s majority in the chamber, coupled 
with the effectiveness of the whips, all non-government amendments to the Bill that were 
pressed to a division were defeated. 
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Amendment and Scrutiny in the House of Lords 
 
The Bill received its Second Reading in the House of Lords on 15th and 16th November 2010,257 
and proceeded to a Committee of the whole House. Many peers were critical of the haste with 
which the Bill had been programmed through the House of Commons, and the lack of pre-
legislative scrutiny. Lord Forsyth of Drumlean noted that “there has always been an 
understanding and a convention that on constitutional matters we should try to proceed with 
consensus and by agreement.”258 The Bill, he contended, was “the product of a political deal and 
that is no basis on which to amend the constitution of our country.”259 Lord Howarth of Newport 
suggested that the way in which the Government had so far handled the Bill demonstrated “an 
unreconstructed attitude on the part of the Executive to Parliament”,260 and expressed dismay 
at the fact that such major constitutional legislation had been programmed in the House of 
Commons in a way that hitherto “would have been unthinkable.”261 Lord Falconer of Thoroton 
speaking for the Opposition said the following: 
“It is an insult to democracy and to the principles that we in this House hold so highly that a 
measure to enact constitutional change of such lasting significance has not been subject to pre-
legislative scrutiny and public consultation.”262 
 
Nonetheless, the Bill, as is customary, passed its Second Reading.263 There then followed a total 
of 17 committee days in the House of Lords, with three days for Report on 7th, 8th and 9th 
February 2011.264 The Bill received its Third Reading on 14th February,265 and after a period of 
ping-pong, received Royal Assent on 16th February 2011. The time spent on the Bill by the 
House of Lords contrasts significantly with the House of Commons. In all the Commons spent 8 
days considering the Bill, a combined total of approximately 48 hours. The Lords on the other 
hand spent 23 days scrutinising the Bill. With 2 days for Second Reading, 17 Committee days, 3 
Report days and a day for Third Reading, the House spent an approximate total of 142 hours 
revising and amending the Bill, almost three times more than was spent in the Commons.266 The 
                                                          
257
 Hansard HL cols.567-662 (15
th
 November 2010); cols.718-772 (16
th
 November 2010) 
258
 Hansard HL col.635 (15
th
 November 2010). Cited in White, I and Gay, O. Parliamentary Voting System and 
Constituencies Bill: Lords Stages, Standard Note 5780, House of Commons Library (15
th
 February 2011), p.6 
259
 Ibid. at col.638 
260
 Hansard HL col.724 (16
th
 November 2010) 
261
 Ibid.  
262
 Hansard HL col.575 (15
th
 November 2010). Cited in White and Gay, fn.258, p.6 
263
 Hansard HL col.772 (16
th
 November 2010) 
264
 Hansard HL cols.13-77 (7
th
 February 2011); cols.127-220 (8
th
 February 2011); cols.230-309 and cols.331-346 
(9
th
 February 2011) 
265
 Hansard HL cols.507-524 (14
th
 February 2011) 
266
 Figures arrived at through scrutiny of Hansard for relevant period. 
45 
 
House sat past eleven o’clock on eight occasions when considering the Bill.267 On 20th December 
2010 the House sat until 1.14am,268 and again on 24th January 2011 the House sat until 1.35am 
on the Bill.269 On 19th January the House sat until 3.03am,270 and attracted great media interest 
on 17th January when it sat continuously for more than 16 hours through the night from 8.39pm 
until 12.52pm the following day.271 
 
The Referendum Date 
 
Time spent scrutinising the Bill is not the only way in which the two Houses can be contrasted. 
A number of fundamental amendments were agreed in the House of Lords of the sort not 
witnessed in the House of Commons. These included a number of significant defeats for the 
Government. On the second Committee day Lord Rooker moved amendment 5 to insert ‘before 
31 October’ instead of 5th May for the referendum date.272 Lord Rooker argued that the Bill 
failed to provide time for a proper public information campaign regarding the issues addressed 
by the referendum.273 White and Gay note that the impact of this amendment was not entirely 
clear, since it would not prevent the poll from being held on 5th May, it simply allowed for 
alternatives.274 Lord Rooker explained his amendment as “a contingency measure”275 that would 
“not alter the Bill in any way or force any change”,276 but rather would give the Government the 
option of holding the referendum at a later date if necessary. The Government opposed the 
amendment,277 but when the House divided, the amendment was passed by 199 votes to 195. 
The Government was defeated by 4 votes.278 
 
 
The Case of the Isle of Wight 
 
Equally significant was the amendment moved by Lord Fowler concerning the Isle of Wight. 
Lord Fowler’s amendment sought to preserve the Isle of Wight as either a single constituency or 
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two constituencies. This issue had been raised in the House of Commons by the MP for Isle of 
Wight, Andrew Turner. At Second Reading he condemned the Government for its lack of 
consultation on this matter: 
“The Deputy Prime Minister has singularly failed to explain why Isle of Wight residents have 
not received similar consideration to Scottish island constituents. Like the Scottish islands, we 
are physically separate from the mainland, but our uniqueness is ignored. There has been no 
consultation and no explanation.”279 
 
At Report stage on 1st November, Mr Turner moved an amendment to preserve the Isle of Wight 
as a single constituency.280 However, as Lord Fowler describes, he was unable to secure any 
change to the Bill: 
“You might think that his amendment would have been carefully considered in the other place, 
but you would be absolutely wrong. Due to the timetabling arrangements in the other place, 
which perhaps underlines a little the debate that has gone before, he was allowed no time at all 
in Committee, four minutes on Report and no opportunity to bring the proposition to a vote.”281 
 
Though Lord Fowler received support from several peers in the debate which followed,282 the 
Government made it clear that it was not about to change its position.283 But when the House 
divided the amendment was passed by 196 votes to 122.284 When the Lords amendments were 
sent back to the Commons on 15th February, an amendment was moved by the Government to 
create two constituencies in the Isle of Wight, which was accepted by the House of Commons.285 
An important change to the Bill was therefore secured through political pressure from the 
House of Lords. 
 
Constituency Boundaries 
 
The Isle of Wight was not the only topic on which the Government suffered a major defeat. On 
9th February Lord Pannick moved an amendment to allow the Boundary Commission to deviate 
by up to a 7.5% from the average number of electors when creating constituencies in areas with 
special geographical considerations.286 Similar amendments had been tabled in the House of 
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Commons, but with little success. On Report in the Commons Chris Bryant, speaking on an 
Opposition amendment, contended that: 
“there are more instances than are allowed for in the Bill where the Boundary Commission 
should be allowed to exercise a degree of discretion, because this country is made up not just of 
statistics on a map but of living communities with distinct historical, cultural and political 
identities that need their discrete representation in the House.”287 
The amendment would have allowed the Commission to vary the rule by up to 10%. Several 
speakers rose to support the amendment288 but it was opposed by the Government and, 
predictably, was defeated on division by 326 votes to 254.289 Lord Pannick’s amendment was 
also opposed by the Government on the basis that it would increase judicial review challenges 
and cause difficulties for the commissions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.290 However, 
the amendment was pressed to a division and was passed by 275 votes to 257.291 This 
represented another major defeat for the Government on an issue that had been raised in the 
Commons, but on which members of the elected chamber had failed to secure any amendment.  
A Referendum Threshold 
A further defeat was inflicted on the Government when Lord Rooker moved an amendment on 
the first day of Report to the effect that the result of the referendum would not be binding on 
the Government unless 40% of the electorate had voted.292 Lord Rooker argued that his 
amendment would do no more than allow the Government time to reconsider should the 
turnout be less than 40%, since the move to AV would still be allowed should the Government 
wish to press ahead. The only difference would be that the result of the referendum would not 
bind the Government.293 Lord Wallace, speaking for the Government, opposed the amendment 
on the basis that it would result in a lack of clarity: 
“the amendment offers no indication of what kind of process might be followed where less than 
40 per cent of the electorate voted... Is it really the case that we want to replace the current 
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provisions in the Bill, which provide both clarity and certainty, with provisions that could leave 
us with no clear resolution for the two years following on from the referendum?”294 
The issue of a threshold for the referendum was another topic that was neglected somewhat by 
the House of Commons. Bill Cash (Conservative) had moved an amendment on the last day of 
Report to the effect that a turnout of 40% was needed for the result of the referendum to be 
valid.295 However, this crucial issue was afforded less than an hour’s debate in the Commons, 
after which the amendment was defeated by 549 votes to 31.296 In the House of Lords however, 
Lord Rooker’s amendment was passed by 219 votes to 218, and the Government was defeated 
by just 1 vote.297  
The Impact of Lords Amendments 
When the Lords amendments were sent to the Commons on 15th February, the Government 
resisted Lord Rooker’s amendment on the 40% threshold. The Minister moved an amendment 
to remove it, which was won by 317 votes to 247.298 However, Lord Pannick’s amendment 
regarding the 7.5% deviation was not separately voted on. Both amendments were voted on 
together, and sent back to the House of Lords. Lord Pannick asked the House to insist on his 
amendment, but the Lords narrowly agreed to remove the 7.5% deviation by 242 votes to 
241.299 However, the House did insist on its amendment for a 40% threshold.300 The Bill was 
sent back to the Commons who again insisted on the removal of the threshold.301 The Bill was 
once again shuttled back to the Lords, who withdrew their insistence on the 40% threshold and 
allowed the Bill to pass.302 
However, as will be discussed later, one cannot measure the impact of the House of Lords by 
defeats in the division lobby alone. Equally important are concessions extracted after debate 
and discussion. Towards the end of the Committee stage, the Leader of the House, Lord 
Strathclyde, announced that an agreement had been reached through the ‘usual channels’ that 
the Bill would complete its Committee stage on 2nd February, but that the Government would 
bring forward a package of concessions on Report.303 This was the result of an announcement by 
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Baroness d’Souza, the convenor of the crossbench peers, that she would force a division on her 
amendment on public inquiries on that day. The crossbenches were concerned by suggestions 
that guillotine procedures could be introduced to the Lords if the scrutiny of the Bill could not 
be brought to an end. Baroness d’Souza spoke to her amendment, but withdrew it in 
anticipation of the Government concessions.304 Two sets of amendments were then passed at 
Report stage. Lord Wallace moved an amendment on the second day of Report which made 
provision for public hearings, which was accepted by the House.305 The following day Lord 
McNally moved a Government new clause to create a review of the reduction in the number of 
MPs, which was accepted without a division.306 Valuable concessions were therefore extracted 
from the Government without the need to press for a division. In anticipation of hostility from 
the crossbenches, and out of concern for the timetable of the Bill, the Government moved 
amendments themselves which made notable improvements to the content of the legislation.  
Amendment by Consensus 
Various technical Government amendments were passed throughout the Committee stage 
relating to the combination of polls,307 the regulation of loans to participants,308 and the 
definition of ‘registration officer’ for the purposes of the Bill.309 At Third Reading Lord Phillips of 
Sudbury moved an uncontroversial amendment relating to encouraging turnout, which was also 
agreed without a division.310 However, some more fundamental changes to the Bill were agreed 
by consensus. On the 12th day of Committee Lord Tyler moved an amendment to add existing 
constituency boundaries to the list of factors that the Boundary Commission may take into 
account when determining new constituency boundaries.311 The amendment received the 
support of the Opposition and the Government. Lord Falconer of Thoroton, speaking for the 
Labour Party, expressed support for Lord Tyler’s amendment.312 Speaking for the Government, 
Lord Wallace said that the Government were “content to accept”313 the amendment on the basis 
that it: 
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“will allow for the merits of existing boundaries to be taken into account where appropriate, 
thereby ensuring that the boundary commissioners do not have to start with a blank page.”314 
The amendment was therefore accepted without a division.315 This sort of amendment by 
consensus was not seen during the Commons stages of the Bill.  
The City of London 
Another area in which the Government was persuaded to concede was in relation to the City of 
London. At Committee stage, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville moved an amendment to 
recognise the special position of the City of London,316 which was later withdrawn on the basis 
of an agreement by the Government spokesman, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, to meet with Lord 
Brooke to discuss the position of the City.317 Lord Brooke moved a further amendment on 
Report to prevent the City of London from being divided into two constituencies.318 The 
Government was unable to accept the amendment, but Lord Wallace indicated that the 
Government was prepared to accept the principle of the amendment, and would consider the 
issue for Third Reading.319 The amendment was once again withdrawn.320 At Third Reading 
Lord Brooke moved a further amendment to add a reference to the City of London into the new 
Rules for Redistribution.321 The amendment would, as Lord Brooke explained, “make the City of 
London as an entity a factor for the Boundary Commission to take into account in any future 
review.”322 In response Lord Wallace said that the Government would accept the amendment, 
which would provide “the best way of including the boundaries of the City in the commission's 
considerations”,323 and the amendment was passed without a division.324  
Further Areas of Debate 
In addition to the various amendments made to Bill, the House of Lords found time to debate 
wider topics that were not fully addressed in the House of Commons. On two occasions the 
House debated the issue of voters with disabilities and access to polls for disabled people, both 
in response to amendments tabled by Lord Low of Dalston, the Chairman of the Royal National 
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Institute of Blind People.325 There were a series of debates on improving electoral registration 
among specific groups, most notable of which was the debate on the registration of black and 
minority ethnic voters prompted by an amendment moved by Lord Boateng.326 There were also 
debates on such matters as the use of the cross on the ballot paper,327 and the extension of the 
franchise for general elections to members of the Lords.328 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock moved 
amendments to allow prisoners serving sentences of less than four years to vote in the 
referendum,329 and to allow EU Citizens resident in the UK to vote,330 while Baroness Hayter of 
Kentish Town prompted a debate on the extension of the franchise to 16 and 17 year olds.331 
The ability of the House to find time for the debate of wider issues contrasts significantly with 
the approach of the House of Commons, where focus rested on passing the technical 
government amendments necessary for the Bill to be implemented. 
Reducing the Number of MPs  
It would be wrong to suggest, however, that the Lords’ scrutiny of the Bill was completely 
comprehensive. The Lords failed to pursue the concerns raised in the Commons over reducing 
the number of MPs without reducing the number of Ministers. This had been raised in the 
Commons by Conservative backbencher Charles Walker, who voiced concerns over the ability of 
the House to hold the government to account due to the number of MPs that hold government 
positions.332  Richard Shepherd (Conservative) also voiced his concern: 
“Clearly, if we reduce the number of Members of the House of Commons, and not the size of the 
Administration, their control over the size of the House of Commons increases. That is the very 
thing that the House is struggling to address in the wider context of constitutional reform.”333 
In Committee Mr Walker moved an amendment to reduce the maximum number of ministerial 
office holders in the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975, but the amendment was 
opposed by the Government.334 The amendment was pressed to a division, but was lost by 293 
votes to 241.335 The Lords did little to pursue this quite cogent argument during the debates on 
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the preferred size of the House of Commons.336 Neither did the House push the Government on 
the issue of holding the referendum on the same day as other elections. In Committee Lord 
Foulkes of Cumnock moved amendments to prevent the poll being held on the same day as 
elections to the Scottish Parliament, the first of which was withdrawn337 and the second of 
which was rejected without a division.338 Nor did the House press the Government on the issue 
of a multi-option referendum, previously raised in the Commons by Caroline Lucas. A number of 
amendments to this effect were introduced and debated, but not formally moved,339 while the 
amendments moved by Lord Rooker and Baroness McDonagh were withdrawn after debate.340 
Nonetheless, fundamental changes were made to the Bill, through both Government defeats in 
the division lobbies and through concessions made in response to the pressures of time. 
Filibustering in the Lords? 
During the passage of the Bill there were suggestions that Labour peers were filibustering, 
deliberately obstructing the passage of Bill through the House for purely political reasons. In 
January, the Leader of the House, Lord Strathclyde, was reportedly considering introducing a 
guillotine motion, an unprecedented move for the House of Lords.341 Lord Strathclyde accused 
Labour members of being “on a go slow”,342 an allegation rebutted by Lord Falconer of 
Thoroton: “this government is trying to ram though this bill through in an arrogant way without 
proper scrutiny. We will do what the Lords are there to do.”343 These accusations were also 
rebutted by Labour members from within the chamber, who retaliated by pointing to the lack of 
participation from Conservative and Liberal Democrat peers. Lord Grocott made the following 
statement: 
“I really find it offensive to hear continual references to filibusters taking place when 
discussions of this significance are before the House. In fact, I would say that there is negligence 
on the part of groups, parties and individuals who do not make a full contribution to this 
debate.”344 
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Later in the debate Lord Solely stated that: 
“What we have seen this afternoon, sadly, is the reverse of a filibuster. A government party-or two parties-
refused to take part in a serious debate about the constitutional matter of a Government taking on 
themselves the power to change the size of Parliament.”345 
The Government’s frustration at the time being taken for the Lords to pass the Bill presumably 
prompted these accusations of foul play, while Opposition peers were inevitably going to point 
to the need for proper and detailed scrutiny of major constitutional legislation. However, 
whether or not the Labour peers were in fact engaged in a filibuster, this episode, it is 
submitted, is indicative of exactly the sort of hostility that could be amplified in an elected 
chamber. The Government, in this case, accused Labour members of the House of Lords of 
obstructing a piece of legislation for purely political reasons, while at the same time proposing 
the move to a mainly elected upper chamber. Surely there is a degree of hypocrisy involved in 
this argument, for such behaviour, as will be discussed later, would surely occur more 
frequently in an elected chamber? If the Government take issue with what they deemed to be 
the overtly partisan, obstructionist behaviour of Labour peers, then perhaps, it is submitted, the 
Government should consider the likely consequences of a second chamber consisting mainly of 
whipped, party politicians.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The interaction of the two Houses of Parliament with the Parliamentary Voting System and 
Constituencies Act demonstrates well the contrasting approaches of the upper and lower 
chambers in the scrutiny of legislation. Not only did the House of Lords spend nearly three 
times the amount of time spent by the House of Commons on scrutinising the Bill, but significant 
changes were implemented that could not have succeeded in the House of Commons. During its 
passage through the Commons, no major changes were implemented to the Bill. The Bill was 
timetabled in such a way as to make detailed debate of fundamental issues an impossibility. 
Many clauses were added to the Bill without debate, and time was not afforded to crucial 
amendments proposed from all sides of the chamber. The only amendments passed by the 
House were those moved by the Government, while all non-Government amendments that were 
pressed to a division were defeated. The whipped Government majority in the House of 
Commons made the level of scrutiny afforded to the Bill entirely inadequate. In contrast, a series 
of major amendments were passed by the House of Lords. Some were forced on the Government 
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by defeat in the division lobbies, while others were the result of concessions extracted in 
anticipation of protracted opposition. Some changes were made by consensus, while in other 
cases the Government was simply persuaded of the merits of the argument. Time was found for 
the debate of wider issues that could not have been found in the House of Commons. It is true 
that some of the defeats inflicted in the House of Lords were reversed by the House of 
Commons, while others were duly accepted, but the House was unabashed in insisting on Lord 
Rooker’s threshold amendment. Nonetheless, when the lower House insisted for a second time, 
the Lords gave way to the will of the democratically elected chamber. The Lords were willing to 
force the Government to think again, without challenging the primacy of the House of Commons. 
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CHAPTER III: THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECOND CHAMBER 
 
There are three fundamental options for the composition of a reformed House of Lords: a 
wholly appointed House, a wholly elected House, or, as the present Government favour, a hybrid 
House containing both appointed and elected members.346 However, all three options have their 
disadvantages. As Phillipson notes: 
“an appointed House is derided as a giant quango, representing rule by an elite, lacking any 
democratic legitimacy and ultimately ineffectual. A wholly elected chamber, on the other hand, 
is objected to on the basis that it would produce a clone of the Commons, that could become its 
rival, thus producing the danger of legislative impasse and destroying the clear line of 
democratic accountability between parliamentary government and the people that is said 
currently to exist... Finally the seemingly obvious compromise, a mixed elected/appointed 
House, is scorned as a “hybrid nonsense” that simply represents a failure to decide the issue one 
way or the other and would be crippled by internal divisions between its elected and appointed 
members and the different degrees of legitimacy each would claim.”347 
Nonetheless the reformed House must adopt one of these forms, and it may well be, as 
Phillipson seems to suggest, that it is simply a case of choosing the least problematic option.348 
But, as previously argued, in deciding on which of these three options is preferable, the intended 
role and functions of the reformed chamber should be a pivotal consideration. Before turning to 
examine the options for reform of the House of Lords, it is worth pausing to first identify the 
inherent strengths of the House of Lords as it is currently composed, and the qualities which 
currently aid it in the performance of its functions.  
 
The Strengths of the Status Quo 
 
Almost every recent attempt at reform of the House of Lords has focused on the need to alter 
the composition of the House, yet the membership of the chamber could also be viewed as its 
greatest strength. As King notes, prior to 1999, the numerical domination of the House by the 
hereditary peers meant that the chamber was “substantially swelled by the vain, the idle, the 
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dim-witted and, more than occasionally, the seriously demented.”349 However, hereditary peers 
now make up only a small proportion of the House’s membership, the majority of which is now 
constituted by life peers, individuals selected on their own personal merits on the basis that 
they have something valuable to offer to the legislative process. Puttnam recognises that one of 
the “great and growing merits of the House of Lords over the past forty years has been the 
wealth of knowledge and experience”350 which life peers have “been able to contribute to public 
life in this country.”351 As Bogdanor observes, the fundamental consequence of the Life Peerages 
Act was “the admission into the Lords not only of party politicians but also of experts from all 
walks of life who were able to make important contributions to the work of the upper House.”352 
Indeed, it has been noted that “today’s House of Lords, consisting almost entirely of appointed 
life peers, is chock-a-block with ex-cabinet ministers, ex-cabinet secretaries, ex-heads of the 
armed services, actual business tycoons, brilliant lawyers, brilliant educators and assorted other 
worthies, some of whom are great and most of whom are certainly good.”353 The appointed 
nature of the chamber allows people from outside of the political profession who have achieved 
recognition for excellence within their chosen field to make a contribution to the legislative 
process. As Brazier notes, “people outside the practice of politics, especially men and women 
rising in their careers, can be inducted into Parliament without having to become professional 
politicians or to embrace the burdens of elections and constituents.”354 
 
Of course, the value of individual expertise, and indeed the combined expertise of the chamber 
as a whole, is a difficult thing to quantify. One can point, for example, to the presence within the 
chamber of four former Chancellors of the Exchequer,355 three former Foreign Secretaries,356 
seven former Home Secretaries,357 one former Prime Minister,358 not to mention two former 
Speakers of the House of Commons,359 and countless other retired cabinet ministers and former 
Secretaries of State. The House boasts a wide range of legal expertise which emanates not only 
from retired members of the senior judiciary, such as former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, Lord 
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Lloyd of Berwick and former President of the Family Division, Baroness Butler-Sloss, but also 
from highly respected practicing barristers such as Lord Pannick and Lord Lester of Herne Hill. 
On the crossbenches sit numerous military chiefs, including eight former Chiefs of the Defence 
Staff,360 a former Chief of the General Staff,361 and a former First Sea Lord,362 as well as other 
notable public servants including four former Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police,363  a 
former Chief Inspector of Prisons,364 and four former Cabinet Secretaries.365  In addition, a 
number of senior and internationally regarded academics can be found on both the 
crossbenches and the party benches, such as the Conservative peer Lord Norton of Louth,366 
Labour peer Lord Desai,367 and the newly ennobled crossbencher Lord Hennessy of 
Nympsfield,368 whilst the Universities themselves are well represented by the many Chancellors 
and Vice-Chancellors that sit in the House.369  
 
Business and industry are well represented, and include well-known tycoons such as Lord Sugar 
and financiers like Lord Turner of Ecchinswell,370 but so too are culture and the arts, with 
members such as the famous composer, Andrew Lloyd Webber, author and broadcaster Melvyn 
Bragg, and the recent addition of Oscar-winning actor and screenwriter Julian Fellowes. The 
House also contains various trade union leaders,371 and representatives of voluntary and 
charitable organisations. In addition to the 26 Church of England Bishops who sit ex officio as 
Lords Spiritual, there are representatives of other religious groups,372 as well as other 
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representatives of the Church of the England who sit on the crossbenches.373 Also of great value 
is the great medical and scientific expertise that can be found in the chamber. The House can 
boast members such as internationally regarded biology and fertility expert Lord Winston, 
world-leading surgeon Lord Darzi of Denham, and Lord Walton of Detchant, who served not 
only as President of the British Medical Association, but is also a former President of the General 
Medical Council and former President of the Royal Society of Medicine. The scientific expertise 
of the House is not limited to medicine, and includes the wider scientific knowledge of leading 
physicists, zoologists and engineers such as Lord May of Oxford,374 Lord Broers375 and Lord Rees 
of Ludlow.376  
 
The concentration of expertise and experience within the House, it can be argued, make it well 
suited to the tasks of detailed revision and scrutiny, the very functions which the Draft Bill 
suggests the House should continue to perform.377 As Lipsey suggests, “the House of Lords 
provides a body of men and women, mostly of some distinction, who have a duty to attend to 
public affairs and who are available to contribute from a largely nonpartisan perspective to 
national debate, and to the resolution of intractable problems.”378 Appointed peers can bring 
with them the expertise that earned them their elevation to the peerage in the first place. They 
do not possess experience in every aspect of public affairs, but can often offer unrivalled 
expertise within their particular field. It is true that members of the House of Lords are part-
time, often having other occupations and professional interests. But when a debate or piece of 
legislation arises concerning their particular field of interest, they are able to come to 
Parliament to make their contribution. As Lipsey remarks:  
“horrible death caused by social service neglect? Send for Lord Laming. Languages in decline in 
our schools? Summon Lord Dearing. What should be done about pensions? What is wrong with 
financial regulation? Lord Turner is your man.”379 
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Indeed, “on almost any topic the House can muster experienced specialists able to speak with 
authority.”380 The House of Lords can therefore “supply the additional dimension of 
contributions from those who have distinguished themselves in the activity under discussion or 
are familiar with the geographical region in question”,381 members whose expertise allows them 
to “ask better questions, to spot inconsistencies and elisions better than the layperson.”382 Due 
to the older average age of a life peer compared to members of the Commons, they will have an 
“accumulated knowledge, usually ending up in a top or near-top job in the field”383 Further, 
appointed peers are not distracted with the “101 tasks that go with being elected: looking after 
constituents, servicing the local press, and generally strutting their stuff.”384 The presence of 
appointed, part-time, expert members provides the House of Lords with a body of individuals 
which are arguably ideally suited to carrying out the functions of detailed scrutiny and revision 
of legislation which form the bulk of the chambers work. As was illustrated in Chapter II, the 
appointed members of the House of Lords, at least in relation to the Parliamentary Voting 
System and Constituencies Act, greatly outperformed the Commons in providing the detailed 
revision and scrutiny necessary to ensure the workability of the legislation in question.   
 
Of course the individuals mentioned above amount to only a small proportion of the House’s 
overall membership and, as previously noted, expertise is a difficult thing to quantify. A recent 
report from University College London’s Constitution Unit provides a useful analysis of the 
existing data on the breadth of experience and expertise in the chamber.385 The report classifies 
the professional background of members of the House of Lords by attributing to each a primary 
and secondary ‘professional area’. The report defines professional area as “the kind of broad 
area often cited when describing the backgrounds of peers”,386 and cites ‘medical and 
healthcare’, ‘legal professions’ and ‘culture, arts and sport’ as examples.387  
 
The data, which is displayed in full in Appendix 2, shows that members of the House of Lords 
have backgrounds in a wide range of professional areas, many of which are well represented in 
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the House.388 The data shows that the legal professions are particularly well represented in the 
Lords, with 67 peers (10% of the House) having a primary or secondary professional 
background in law.389 Russell and Benton’s data on jobs shows further that there are 44 peers 
whose primary or secondary job was as a barrister, along with 31 who are former members of 
the judiciary, and 14 who were solicitors.390 Higher education is also well represented in the 
House of Lords. A total of 76 peers (11% of the House) are categorised by Russell and Benton as 
having “strong professional connections to university life.”391 The data on jobs identifies a total 
of 76 peers whose primary or secondary job was as an academic, while 5 peers have served as 
university vice-chancellors or deans.392 A total of 87 peers have a professional background in 
banking in finance (12% of the House), while 95 have a background in business and commerce 
(14% of the House).393 It is also worth noting that there also 35 peers (5% of the House)with a 
professional background in journalism, media and publishing, while 27 peers (4% of the House) 
have a professional background in medicine and healthcare.394 Russell and Benton’s data on 
specialisms shows that within the category of medicine and health there are peers specialising 
in a wide range of fields, from nursing and surgery to obstetrics and gynaecology, dentistry, 
neurology, epidemiology, gastroenterology and fertility.395 There are 31 peers (4% of the 
House) whose professional background is in religion, while 28 peers (3% of the House) have a 
professional background in the trade unions, and 13 peers (2% of the House) have strong 
connections to the armed forces.396  
 
This is not to suggest that the spread of expertise within the House of Lords is perfect. As 
Russell and Benton state, it is “very difficult to say what the balance between professional areas 
should be in the Lords”,397 or indeed the balance between different jobs and specialisms. Russell 
and Benton do note however, that areas which appear to be “less well represented”398 in the 
House of Lords include architecture and engineering, transport, non-higher education, the 
leisure industry and local authority administration.399 They note that there are very few peers 
with manual trades backgrounds,400 and at the level of jobs, note that many of the scientists in 
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the Lords come from “academic rather than other backgrounds.”401 They point to the “seeming 
lack”402 of surveyors, planners and peers with backgrounds in environmental protection, and 
contend that there are “relatively few”403 former schoolteachers and peers with backgrounds in 
international organisations. Russell and Benton suggest the House lacks peers with 
backgrounds in public health and some scientific and medical specialisms such as psychology.404 
But as they themselves note, it is “a matter of subjective judgement where the most important 
gaps appear or what the most appropriate balance should be.”405  
 
It must be noted also that not every member possesses the sort of invaluable expertise referred 
to in the preceding paragraphs. Due to the system of political patronage that currently operates 
in the United Kingdom, specialist knowledge of a particular area or subject is not a precondition 
of membership of the second chamber. One criticism often made of the House of Lords is the 
number of ex-MPs and other professional politicians that make their way to the House. Indeed 
Russell and Benton recognise that the largest single group in the House is those with a 
background in representative politics.406 A total of 188 peers have a primary or secondary 
background in this area (27% of the House),407 of which 151 served as MPs.408 However, it is 
worth noting two points. Firstly, the fact that 27% of the House are former professional 
politicians means that 73% of the House come from a background other than professional 
politics.  
 
The second point is that many of the peers in this category bring with them their own, very 
useful expertise.  Of the 151 former MPs, 48 previously served as Ministers, 40 served as 
Secretaries of State, and 28 served as shadow spokesmen, while 4 peers also served as Speaker 
or Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons.409 Russell and Benton’s data on specialisms of 
former MPs410 show that such members bring with them the experience and expertise that they 
have amassed during their political careers in the other House, be it in Foreign Affairs, Defence, 
Education or any other area in which they have specialised.411 It may be true that ex-MPs are 
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overrepresented in the House of Lords, but to suggest that a significant number of these do not 
bring with them valuable expertise useful to the House would be quite unfair.  
 
This expertise of the House’s membership also filters into the work of the House’s select 
committee network, the development of which was prompted by Britain’s entry into the 
European Community in 1973. At this point peers took it upon themselves to embark upon 
detailed scrutiny of European legislation through the newly established Select Committee on the 
European Communities. In 1977, a Committee established by the Hansard Society for 
Parliamentary Government was “struck by the relevance and businesslike nature of the results 
of the Lords’ work in this field”,412 while the Report of a Study Group of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association in 1982 noted that the House of Lords provided “the only really deep 
analysis of the issues that is available to the parliamentary representatives of the ten countries 
in the Community”413 and that Lords reports were “far more informative and comprehensive 
than those produced by the Commons committee on European legislation.”414 Bogdanor 
suggests that this superiority can be attributed to the “greater specialist knowledge of peers and 
the comparative absence of partisanship in the House of Lords”,415 with members being chosen 
for their specialist expertise, rather than for party political considerations, and concludes that 
the Committee has “proved to be perhaps the most effective in the European Union, precisely 
perhaps because the Lords is not an elected chamber.”416  
 
The scrutiny offered by the House of Lords does not stop at European matters. Influential and 
well-respected committees have been established across a range of subject areas, utilising the 
expertise available in the House. The Science and Technology Select Committee, the Delegated 
Powers and Deregulation Committee, and the Select Committee on the Constitution are just 
examples of the specialist scrutiny offered by the House. By way of example, the Science and 
Technology Committee contains not only the aforementioned scientific expertise of Lords 
Winston, Broers and Rees, but is also chaired by Lord Krebs, a world leading zoologist, former 
Chairman of the Food Standards Agency, and current Principal of Jesus College, Oxford. Other 
members include a former Chairman of the National Rivers Authority,417 a former President of 
the Royal Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists,418 a former Chief Inspector of Schools,419 
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a former President of the Royal Agricultural Society and Royal Geographical Society,420  and a 
former Chair of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee.421 
 
 In addition, select committees in the Lords are not restricted to particular departments, and are 
able to consider broader issues that straddle departmental boundaries, thereby “helping to 
secure joined-up government.”422 The prevalence of specialist expertise has, so Bogdanor 
argues, allowed the Lords to become a “forum for informed public debate”,423 considering issues 
over a longer time period than can be permitted in the House of Commons.  It has been 
demonstrated that this is also a characteristic of the chamber as a whole when exercising its 
scrutinising and revising functions. As was shown in Chapter II, the House of Lords spent more 
than three times longer than the Commons scrutinising the Parliamentary Voting System and 
Constituencies Bill, while also finding time for wider topics of debate such as access to polls for 
disabled voters and improving electoral registration among black and minority ethnic groups, 
as prompted by members with specialist knowledge of these areas. 
 
One final attribute of the present House of Lords is its relative independence from party and 
government control. King likens the House to a sort of “august body”424 where “issues of the day 
can be debated at a high level and relatively free from the party-political constraints that often 
inhibit members of the lower house.”425 Indeed, it is often said that the quality of debate in the 
Lords is far higher than that of the Commons. This, of course, is difficult to prove, but as Brazier 
notes, debates in the Lords are certainly of a “different quality – much less party political, joined 
by experts from many walks of life, not in general constrained by worries about whether a 
particular speech or point might upset the Whips, or might help or hinder the speaker’s hopes 
for ministerial office.”426 The party-aligned members of the House of Lords, many of which have 
had long political careers and are coming to the end of their professional lives, are far less afraid 
of defying the party line, and backbench rebellions are not uncommon. The power of the whips, 
and thus the grip of the parties over members of the House of Lords is significantly weaker than 
over members of the House of Commons, since members fear neither the consequences of 
defying the party line, nor the impact it  could have on their career prospects.  
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As Norton argues, the appointed nature of the House’s membership means that it is able to “look 
at measures from a different perspective”427 to that of the elected House of Commons since “the 
experience and expertise of members, and the absence of election, helps reduce the impact of 
party considerations.”428 He notes that members of the House of Commons are elected on the 
basis of competition between parties and therefore operate in a highly partisan environment. 
This has the result that any expertise possessed by members of the Commons may be “washed 
out by the imperatives of party need.”429 Members of the Lords, so Norton contends, operate in a 
far less partisan environment because “the effect of experience and expertise is to limit the 
impact of unthinking party loyalty: members are less likely to go along with their party if they 
know that what it proposes runs counter to their own knowledge (or the knowledge of 
members they recognise as experts in their field).”430  
 
Peers sit for life and cannot be expelled, and parties in the Lords have little in the way of 
sanctions to deploy against disobedient members. Peers do not receive a salary and so “have no 
paymaster to whom they feel beholden.”431 Since members choose for themselves how much 
time they wish to dedicate to the business of the House, “parties are thus dependent on their 
members to attend, but members are not usually dependent on their parties.”432  It is true that 
when the House does divide, members tend to vote along party lines,433 but less than 2% of 
amendments achieved in the House are as a result of a division.434 Most change is achieved 
through agreement,435 and it is up to the government to persuade the other parties or the 
crossbenchers through reasoned argument that they have the stronger case.436 
 
The presence of a sizeable crossbench element entirely independent from party considerations 
does much, not only to facilitate the House’s role as a check on government, but also to prevent 
the rise of the sort of adversarial, partisan politics which dominates the House of Commons. 
Given their numbers, the crossbenchers have the potential to hold the balance of power in the 
House when the politically-aligned members of the House are in disagreement. Russell and 
Sciara have shown however, that a combination of low Crossbench turnout in the division 
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lobbies coupled with the fact that members in the group do not always vote in the same way, 
mans that the Crossbenchers hold the balance of power in the Lords far less often than their size 
would suggest, and that it is in fact the opposition parties, and in particular the Liberal 
Democrats that are responsible for most government defeats in the House of Lords.437 But as 
Russell and Sciara have also argued, the Crossbenchers have a wider, more subtle influence 
which cannot be measured solely by performance in the division lobbies.438 The specialist 
expertise of crossbench members allows them to influence other members of the House, be it 
through proposing amendments to legislation or making speeches on areas in which they are 
highly regarded, and due to the fact that they make “daunting opponents”439 for government 
ministers, are often able to extract concessions from behind the scenes.440 They also often act as 
what Russell and Sciara refer to as “honest brokers”,441 helping to resolve difficult policy 
conflicts, as Lord Weatherill did in 1998 when he proposed the famous amendment to retain the 
92 hereditary peers in the House of Lords Reform Act.  
 
Russell and Sciara note that crossbench peers can also act as ‘catalysts’ on controversial policy 
issues by tackling subjects which the parties may not feel able to approach, as Lord Joffe did 
when he sparked nationwide debate with his private member’s bill on voluntary euthanasia in 
2005.442 Finally, the Crossbenchers are sometimes seen as “a jury to whom politicians in the 
chamber appeal.”443  Due to their overall neutrality, the Crossbenchers are sometimes seen as 
“an audience worth courting by all political sides of the House”,444 and consequently can appear 
to sit in judgement on the arguments made by the opposing sides. This ensures that issues are 
debated on their merits, and amendments made with the intention of improving the legislation 
in question rather than to score political points. As Russell and Sciara note, the presence of the 
Crossbenchers can be seen as “crucial to the well-known ‘less partisan atmosphere’ and 
(sometimes disputed) high quality of debate that exists in the House of Lords in comparison 
with the Commons.”445 
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It is unsurprising then that Brazier describes the House as “one which contributes usefully to 
the shape of legislation and to discussions of the issues of the day.”446 As Pearce contends: 
“the virtues of a good second chamber are those of intelligent contradiction, of debate 
continued beyond the lines of party militias. It requires bright specialist knowledge in all the 
key fields of life and work. The life peer system has done this and not done it at all badly.”447 
 
The Weakness of the Status Quo 
 
As Lord Bingham of Cornhill asks, given the qualities of the House of Lords that have thus far 
been identified, “why should any question arise about its continuation into the indefinite future 
in very much the form which it now enjoys?”448 The answer provided by the former Senior Law 
Lord is that the House of Lords, for nearly two centuries, has been perceived as subject to a 
“disabling lack of democratic legitimacy.”449 The fundamental weakness in the current 
composition of the House of Lords is the inherent lack of direct democratic legitimacy in its 
almost exclusively appointed membership, a situation with “few parallels anywhere in the 
world.”450 The 2011 White Paper states that “the House of Lords plays an important role in our 
legislature and, as a second chamber, is a vital part of our constitutional arrangements.”451 But 
the foreword makes abundantly clear that although “the House of Lords performs its work 
well... [it] lacks sufficient democratic authority.”452  
 
As Brazier has noted, despite the great virtues of the House as it is currently composed, “critics 
of the House of Lords will no doubt come back to the central question of how appropriate it is in 
a democracy to have a chamber which is dominated by appointed life peers, supplemented by 
92 hereditaries.”453 Those who favour reform will always point to the fact that the House of 
Lords is unelected, and as a result of what they perceive to be its illegitimate membership, is 
unaccountable, unrepresentative and undemocratic. The House, as it was composed before 
1999, lacked democratic legitimacy. King suggests that the present chamber is “not a whit more 
democratic in its composition than its hereditary-dominated predecessor.”454  
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Brazier suggests that “no modern state seeking to create a new legislature would devise 
anything as odd as a House most of whose members sat on the basis of the unrestricted 
patronage of the Head of Government.”455 The House does not pretend to be in any way 
representative of society at large. Rather than a microcosm of the British people, the chamber is 
dominated by wealthy and well-educated professionals, most of whom are white, middle- and 
upper--class men. It is clear from the discussion in the previous section that there are a number 
of key advantages to having a second chamber composed almost entirely of appointed 
members, but as King notes, “in the age of rampant democracy, almost no one outside the 
existing House of Lords advocates one.”456 Bogdanor makes the point that one of the great 
difficulties in making a second chamber more representative and democratic is identifying a 
principle of representation different from that used as the basis for elections to the House of 
Commons.457 The House of Lords, so he argues, has “succeeded in evading this problem since it 
does not claim to embody any principle of democratic representation at all.”458 Unfortunately 
this lack of democratic legitimacy is becoming increasingly problematic since, as Bogdanor 
notes, “only an elected chamber, so it is increasingly coming to be argued, can provide an upper 
house fit for the conditions of the twenty-first century.”459  
 
Phillipson suggests that the House’s lack of democratic legitimacy is problematic not just as a 
matter of principle, but also because it means that the often worthwhile and commendable 
legislative work carried out by the chamber goes to waste because it is simply overridden or 
even ignored by the House of Commons.460 The House’s lack of legitimacy, it is argued, 
undermines the value of its work. Phillipson contends that, until both the government and the 
public view the position and powers of the House as “justifiable in a democracy”,461 it will lack 
the “confidence and extra-parliamentary support to oppose the government effectively.”462  
 
This lack of democratic legitimacy is the fundamental principle relied upon by those who seek 
wholesale reform of the House of Lords. The proposals contained within the coalition’s White 
Paper and Draft Bill aim to create a House based on democratic principles, one that no longer 
looks out of place in modern Britain.463 However, one must also confront the consequences of 
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this injection of democratic legitimacy, and its implications for the functioning of the second 
chamber.   
 
The Problem with an Elected House 
 
The Government’s proposals favour a hybrid chamber. The Draft Bill and accompanying White 
Paper set out plans for an 80% elected House, with a 20% independently appointed element. 
However, as noted above, the Government have made it clear that they are open to considering 
the possibility of a wholly elected chamber if that is what is supported as the Draft Bill is 
scrutinised. If, as the Draft Bill progresses through its pre-legislative scrutiny, a consensus 
emerges in favour of a wholly elected House, then it is quite possible that the Government’s 
plans could be revised and a wholly elected House could be back on the agenda. The Deputy 
Prime Minister made this quite clear to the House of Commons when introducing the Draft Bill: 
“The White Paper includes the case for a 100%-elected House of Lords. The 80:20 split is the 
more complicated option, and so has been put into the draft Bill in order to illustrate it in 
legislative terms. The 100% option would be easy to substitute into the draft Bill should that be 
where we end up.”464 
The Second Chamber Paradox 
 
Phillipson suggests that the arguments in favour of a wholly elected House are straightforward: 
“that a democratic mandate should be the only way to political power in a democracy and that 
the greater legitimacy and so potency such a House would have would give it a much more 
prominent voice in the policy-making process.”465 This sentiment is echoed in the foreword to 
the Government White Paper, which states that “in a modern democracy it is important that 
those who make the laws of the land should be elected by those to whom those laws apply.”466 
However, it is also necessary to consider the pitfalls of a wholly elected second chamber. 
Rodney Brazier outlines what he describes as the ‘second chamber paradox’ in the following 
terms: 
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“A reconstituted second chamber could not be elected by the same method and at the same 
time as the House of Commons, because it would then be a pointless duplicate of that House; 
but if it were elected by a different method and at different times that could result in a 
chamber with a political make-up different from that of the Commons, thus making conflict 
between the two Houses inevitable. If the second chamber were to be elected by proportional 
representation, the objection that is currently made that the House of Lords has no political 
legitimacy would disappear; but if it were so elected the new House would have greater 
political authority and be more representative than the Commons which is merely elected by 
the first-past-the-post method.”467   
 
This paradox is expanded by Ian McLean, who likens attempts to introduce an elected second 
chamber to “steering round Scylla and Charybdis”,468 the former being a House elected at the 
same time and by the same system as the Commons, and the latter a House elected at a different 
time or by a different system, or both. As McLean notes, “as Scylla would be a clone of the 
Commons, it would have no point”,469 while Charybdis, if elected by some form of proportional 
representation, “could always claim greater popular legitimacy than the Commons.”470 If not 
elected under a proportional system, “it could make the claim whenever its last election was 
more recent than the last general election.”471 
 
To some extent these problems are circumvented by the way in which the Coalition proposals 
have been formulated. The Draft Bill envisages members of the reformed second chamber being 
elected at the same time as general elections to the House of Commons in order to maximise 
voter turnout and ensure the least possible disruption to the Government’s legislative 
programme.472 Thus, the danger of the second chamber ever having a more recent collective 
mandate than the House of Commons is averted. However, the Draft Bill favours the use of the 
Single Transferable Vote system for elections to the reformed chamber.473 Though it is likely 
therefore, that no party would have a majority in the reformed House, this system of 
proportional representation could indeed render the second chamber more representative of 
the electorate than the House of Commons which, following the May 2011 referendum, looks 
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certain to retain the first-past-the-post system for the foreseeable future. 474  Significant strain 
might be placed on the relationship between the two Houses if the upper House were to reflect 
more accurately the votes cast by the electorate at the general election. However, this threat is 
eluded by the intention of the Government to stagger elections to the reformed chamber, 
whereby only a third of members would be elected at each general election.475 Thus, although 
members of the reformed chamber might be able to point to the fact that they were elected by a 
more representative electoral system, they would also have to accept that only a third of 
members at any one time had a mandate as recent as that held by members of the House of 
Commons. These measures go a considerable way to reducing the likelihood that the reformed 
House of Lords would be able to claim greater democratic legitimacy than the House of 
Commons, and help to ensure that the lower House would be able to retain its primacy.  
 
A Threat to Commons’ Supremacy? 
 
This does not mean, however, that an elected second chamber, whether wholly elected or only 
predominantly elected, could not pose a considerable threat to the legislative agenda of the 
lower chamber, nor does it remove entirely the possibility of conflict between the two Houses. 
Bogdanor suggests that it would be “a fallacy”476 to assume that the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 
1949 have been the “sole factor in establishing the supremacy of the House of Commons in the 
constitution.”477 He contends that the “comparative lack of influence of the House of Lords 
depends at least as much upon its lack of legitimacy as upon the statutory restrictions on its 
powers.”478 The powers left to the House of Lords under the Parliament Acts are considerable. 
Not only has the House been reluctant to make excessive use of the delaying power it retains 
over primary legislation and the absolute veto over secondary legislation, it has also voluntarily 
restricted its own powers through the acceptance of the Salisbury Convention. According to 
Bogdanor’s argument, the House of Lords does not seek to exercise its theoretical powers, not 
only because it is not regarded as democratically legitimate by the electorate, but also because it 
does not perceive itself to be democratically legitimate.479 In any conflict between the two 
Houses the House of Commons can always point to the upper chambers lack of legitimacy, and 
the Lords will often (although not always) bow to the will of the elected chamber.  
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But a wholly elected second chamber constituted under the Single Transferable Vote system 
could be perceived by the people and by its own members to be both representative and 
legitimate, and “whatever its theoretical powers, be in a stronger position to challenge the 
Commons by using powers which hitherto have been in desuetude.”480 It would seem 
reasonable to suppose that a more democratic and representative chamber might be more likely 
to make use of the powers it retains, and thus more likely to challenge the will of the House of 
Commons, than is the current House of Lords.  
 
One has only to consider the difference in the behaviour of the House of Lords since the removal 
of the hereditary peers in 1999. With the expulsion of all but 92 hereditary peers, the 
membership of the chamber was no longer dominated by individuals who received the right to 
sit and vote merely by the accident of birth, and was instead comprised of individuals 
specifically chosen for life peerages in recognition of their experience and expertise, or 
hereditary peers elected to remain and represent their hereditary colleagues. Further, with the 
removal of the in-built Conservative bias, a vote to defeat government legislation could not be 
carried by one party alone. Thus the House has, in the post-1999 era, begun to perceive itself as 
a more legitimate body, and has been far less hesitant in opposing the will of the House of 
Commons.  As Bogdanor notes, there have been far more “government defeats in the post-1999 
period than before, and around 40% of these defeats have been accepted by the government, 
which has not sought to overturn them in the Commons.”481 This has been demonstrated further 
by Russell, who contends that since 1999, not only has the number of defeats risen, but also 
“peers are backing down less in confrontations with government and established conventions 
are under pressure.”482  
 
Russell demonstrates that not only was the number of defeats per year inflicted by the House of 
Lords in both the 2001-5 Parliament and the 2005-10 Parliament “significantly higher than in 
those preceding”,483 but also the number of bills per Parliament where the House of Lords 
insisted on its amendments increased significantly. Between 2001 and 2005, for example, there 
were seventeen instances where the House of Lords insisted on at least one amendment to a 
bill, including two cases where the Lords insisted four times.484 Russell indicates that there is 
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also evidence to suggest that some important conventions may be breaking down.485 By 
convention the House of Lords does not make use of its full veto over secondary legislation, and 
indeed has not done so since 1968.486 However, in 2000 the Lords defeated the secondary 
legislation on arrangements for the London Mayoral elections, and then used its veto again in 
2007 in relation to the Manchester ‘supercasino’.487 Some of the conventions relating to primary 
legislation may also be under pressure. As Russell notes, in 2004 the House “unprecedentedly 
voted at second reading to send the Constitutional Reform Bill to a specially convened select 
committee”,488 causing costly delay to the bill, and has “twice used a wrecking tactic at second 
reading to completely block a bill, in 2000 and 2007, both times on limiting access to trial by 
jury.”489  
 
All of this points quite markedly to an increased collective assertiveness in the House of Lords. 
In a survey of members of the House of Lords in 2007, Russell found that 86% believed that 
peers’ confidence to demand policy change had increased since reform, while 76% agreed that 
the 1999 reform had increased the legitimacy of the House of Lords.490 This view was shared by 
a majority of MPs when surveyed in 2004. In fact, 57% of MPs believed the House of Lords to be 
more legitimate post-reform, an opinion held by 75% of Labour MPs.491 As Russell notes, there 
have even been instances of Labour MPs actively encouraging the House of Lords to obstruct the 
government, such as in 2003 when former Health Secretary Frank Dobson wrote to members of 
the Lords urging them to oppose foundation hospitals, and in 2005 when former Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook claimed that the rebellion of Labour MPs in the Commons had prompted 
Lords to challenge the government on its anti-terrorist legislation.492  
 
Support for this increased assertiveness is not limited to Westminster. A 2005 poll found that 
around two-thirds of the public believed that if a bill had little public support, it was justified for 
the House of Lords to obstruct it.493 As Russell concludes, bolstered by the views of the public, 
peers appear to be far more comfortable in asserting themselves, even in defiance of the 
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democratically elected chamber.494 If an entirely appointed House lacking any democratic 
mandate perceives itself to be more legitimate, and more able to frustrate the will of the elected 
House simply by the removal of the hereditary component of its membership, one can only 
imagine what effect an injection of direct democratic legitimacy will have on the relationship 
between the two Houses.  
 
It is unsurprising therefore that Bogdanor has questioned whether the Salisbury Convention 
could be maintained in a wholly or mainly elected chamber.495 Peers accept the so-called ‘self-
denying ordinance’ because they appreciate the fact that they lack the democratic legitimacy 
enjoyed by members of the House of Commons. But one must consider whether elected 
members of a reformed second chamber would consider themselves bound by its terms when 
they themselves will enjoy ample democratic legitimacy?   
 
The inherent danger of an elected House, whether entirely elected or merely predominantly 
elected, is that the increase in democratic legitimacy will result in a greater willingness to 
challenge the supremacy of the House of Commons and make use of its considerable powers to 
obstruct the political agenda of the Government more frequently, with the potential for 
legislative impasse. As Bogdanor notes, “the post-1999 House of Lords, feeling itself to be more 
legitimate than the pre-1999 House, has used its power much more than its predecessor did.”496 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that members of a wholly or largely elected upper house 
“might well say that they are more legitimate than their largely appointed predecessors.”497 The 
suspensory veto over primary legislation and the absolute veto over secondary legislation could 
be utilised far more frequently, and as Bogdanor contends, the Salisbury Convention “might well 
not survive an elected House.”498 An elected House would be a more legitimate House, which in 
turn would almost definitely be a stronger House. Even if the primacy of the lower House is 
maintained, the reformed upper chamber could well be “a more formidable body than the 
current House of Lords, and a thorn in the side of the government’s legislative programme.”499  
 
However, the difficulties imposed by a more democratically legitimate, and thus more assertive 
second chamber are not entirely without solution. It is true that, as Scully notes, the legitimacy 
                                                          
494
 Ibid. at p.877. See also Russell, M. and Sciara, M. The House of Lords in 2005: A More Representative and 
Assertive Chamber (London: Constitution Unit, 2006) and Russell, M. and Sciara, M. The House of Lords in 
2006: Negotiating a Stronger Second Chamber (London: Constitution Unit, 2007) 
495
 Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, fn.352, p.166 
496
 Ibid.  
497
 Ibid.  
498
 Ibid. 
499
 Ibid. at p.169 
74 
 
conferred by a democratic mandate does tend to “make parliamentarians less abashed about 
utilising the powers available to them”,500 but this need not necessarily provoke a form of 
constitutional crisis hitherto unknown in the United Kingdom. Second chambers in other 
democracies are able to exercise greater legislative powers than the House of Lords whilst also 
possessing the democratic legitimacy conferred by direct election without creating legislative 
gridlock or a breakdown in the constitutional relationship between the two chambers. In 
Australia, for example, where the Senate has the power to veto legislation, deadlock provisions 
exist to enable governments “in the final instance to use their lower house numbers to resolve 
protracted inter-house disagreements.”501 In certain circumstances, a double dissolution may be 
triggered. As Russell explains:  
 
“A bill must be amended or rejected by the Senate, and the Senate’s proposals rejected by the 
lower house. After this, three months must elapse before the Senate restates its position and 
this is rejected again in the lower house. At this point the Prime Minister may request that the 
Governor-General dissolve both chambers and call elections. If the dispute persists after the 
elections the final decision on the bill may be taken by a joint sitting. In such a sitting lower 
house members outnumber Senators by two to one; thus the bill is likely to pass.”502   
 
This is, of course, a drastic measure, with serious political consequences. The governing party 
could find itself forced out of power, not to mention the costs and political upheaval of holding 
an election. However, the use of a joint committee or joint session of both houses is a common 
method of adjudication, operating in some form in Japan, Russia, South Africa, India, 
Switzerland and the USA.503 In France the Commission Mixte Paritaire may be called if, after 
having been considered twice by both chambers, agreement on the bill in question cannot be 
reached.504 The Committee, comprising members from both chambers, must formulate a 
compromise position, which is then voted on by both houses, though if the proposal fails the 
lower house has the deciding vote. In Germany the Bundesrat retains an absolute veto on 
legislation concerning the states. Where there is disagreement over a bill for which Bundesrat 
approval is essential, the mediation committee – the Vermittlungsausschuss – must devise a 
proposal that is acceptable to the upper house.505 The committee may be called twice, but if its 
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proposals are rejected a second time the bill falls, creating “a powerful incentive for government 
and the lower house to compromise.”506   
 
Of course in the United Kingdom, in the event of irresolvable dispute between the two 
chambers, the Commons may (following one year’s delay) bypass the Lords by means of the 
Parliament Acts. As Phillipson notes, three quarters of bicameral legislatures around the world 
have wholly or mainly elected second chambers, while very few suffer from legislative gridlock, 
and those that do, such as Australia and the USA, have systems in which the two houses have 
equal powers, or no mechanism for one to override the other.507 As for the issue of maintaining 
the Salisbury Convention and other customs governing the relationship between the two 
Houses, this too could quite readily be resolved. Codification of such conventions was 
considered by the Joint Committee on Conventions in 2006. The Committee rejected legislation 
or any other form of codification which would turn conventions into rules on the basis that such 
a move would remove crucial flexibility.508 In the debates which followed, members of both 
Houses questioned the contention that the relationship and conventions identified by the 
Committee could apply to a differently composed second chamber, and expressed concern over 
whether certain conventions could survive in a reformed second chamber which included an 
elected element.509  
 
But as Phillipson notes, should the government wish to further secure the future supremacy of 
the House of Commons, the maintenance of such conventions could be achieved through some 
form of codification.510 For example, should the government wish to secure the future of the 
Salisbury Convention, it could, as Phillipson suggests, be set out in the preamble to the statute 
establishing the new chamber, or could be included in the statute itself and rendered “a non-
justiciable duty upon the Lords.”511 Either way, it would be unfair to suggest that a more 
legitimate and thus more assertive second chamber would provoke some form of constitutional 
crisis to which there is no solution. The codification of important conventions would be a 
possibility, while the primacy of the House of Commons would be assured by means of the 
Parliament Acts.  
 
                                                          
506
 Ibid. 
507
 Phillipson, “‘The greatest quango of them all”’, fn.347, p.375 
508
 Joint Committee on Conventions, Conventions of the UK Parliament (Report of Session 2005-2006) HL 265 
509
 See Hansard HL cols.573-638 (16
th
 January 2007) and Hansard HC cols.808-87 (7
th
 January 2007) 
510
 Phillipson, ‘“The Greatest Quango of them all”’, fn.347, p.375 
511
 Ibid.  
76 
 
However, the Parliament Act procedure is lengthy and allows peers to impose considerable 
delay to both the legislation in question and indeed the whole legislative programme of the 
government. Invoking the Parliament Act procedure has long been viewed as a last resort, with 
governments often preferring to concede amendments and secure a compromise than forcing 
the bill in question through.512 The powers of the Lords to amend and delay remain, despite the 
Parliament Acts, quite considerable, and will no doubt be utilised further by a more legitimately 
constituted house. This point was acknowledged by the former Liberal Democrat leader, Lord 
Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon in a recent debate in the House of Lords. When speaking of the 
provisions of the Draft Bill he accepted that “of course this will change the balance between us 
and the other chamber.”513 This change to the balance of power between the two Houses, Lord 
Ashdown argued, “will not challenge the primacy”514 of the House of Commons, but it may well 
“challenge the absolute supremacy”515 of the lower chamber.516 
 
Quality of the Candidates: A Loss of Expertise? 
 
A fundamental question over a wholly or mainly elected second chamber is who exactly is going 
to stand for election? It has been noted that a key strength of the current House of Lords is the 
independent expertise and specialist experience possessed by many of its members, who have 
achieved great success and recognition in their professional lives. But one must consider 
whether such people would be likely to seek election to the reformed House. Brazier contends 
that, “people earning their living, or living and working away from London, are not going to be 
attracted to Parliament if they have to commit themselves to being there regularly”,517 while the 
“paraphernalia of elections and the demands of constituents would scarcely be added 
incentive.”518 The Government propose that members of the reformed House will not have 
constituency duties, as indicated in the White Paper.519 But as Lord Sewel remarked in debate, 
“Who is going to stop them? Is a Minister going to be ordered not to reply to letters? Is a 
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candidate going to stand for election and say, “Vote for me, but I won't help you”?”520 Of course 
it would be possible to stipulate in statute that members of the second chamber are not to have 
constituency duties, but as Viscount Younger of Leckie stated in debate: 
“Constituents would vote in a senator for reasons beyond the fulfilment of duties in the House 
of Lords as we know them today. Even if senators were not expected to do so, and even if they 
stated that laws or conventions did not permit them to do so, they would additionally and 
rapidly be drawn into regular communication with electors who would seek advice and require 
answers to problems and concerns in return for their votes...”521 
 
Lipsey suggests that it is “implausible”522 that the House of Lords would still attract the same 
“talent and experience”523 if it were elected, since its members (excluding the ex-MPs) are 
“people who rejected a political career with campaigning at its centre; they are hardly likely to 
fancy flocking to the hustings now.”524 Much of the expertise for which the House is known is a 
direct consequence of the age of its members, many of whom have had long professional 
careers. Such people, Lipsey contends, are unlikely to submit themselves to the electoral 
process.525  As Lipsey remarks, “knocking on doors is hardly a pastime for your average 
sextarian or septarian.”526  
 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill suggests that it is equally difficult to see how a significant 
independent element could be maintained in a wholly elected House.527 Lord Bingham contends 
that it is “all but inconceivable”528 that the sorts of people that currently sit on the crossbenches; 
retired judges, military commanders, scientists and diplomats, lawyers and academics, many of 
whom are “of mature age”529 and “independent of any political allegiance”,530 would “seek or 
earn the support of any political party or be willing to engage in the contest of an election 
without it.”531 The success (or lack thereof) of independent candidates at recent general 
elections to the House of Commons gives some idea of the likely prospect of a significant 
independent presence in a wholly elected upper House. There are currently 186 politically-
                                                          
520
 Lord Sewel, Hansard HL col.1210 (21
st
 June 2011) 
521
 Viscount Younger of Leckie, Hansard HL col.1226 (21
st
 June 2011) 
522
 Lipsey, ‘What the House of Lords is Really For?’, fn.378, p.403 
523
 Ibid.  
524
 Ibid.  
525
 Ibid. 
526
 Ibid.  
527
 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, ‘The House of Lords: its future?’, fn.397, p.268 
528
 Ibid.  
529
 Ibid. 
530
 Ibid. 
531
 Ibid. 
78 
 
unaffiliated members sitting on the crossbenches of the House of Lords, which accounts for 
around 24% of those currently entitled to sit and vote.532 The House of Commons on the other 
hand has just one independent member.533 
 
This view is shared by Shell, who acknowledges that direct election of “whatever kind, is still 
unlikely to bring into membership of the second chamber more than a handful of ‘the great and 
the good’, the kind of people that currently sit on the crossbenches in the present House of 
Lords.”534 Those who have “achieved distinction in other pursuits”,535 so Archer argues, “are 
unlikely to devote themselves to electioneering.”536 This view is supported by Mitchell who 
contends that direct election cannot produce “the kind of members best suited to the 
hardworking, detailed, revising role of a complimentary chamber”,537 a view corroborated by 
the interaction of the House of Commons with the Parliamentary Voting and Constituencies Act 
2011, as examined in Chapter II. The danger is that the House might instead consist of what 
King rather bluntly refers to as “a miscellaneous assemblage of party hacks, clapped-out retired 
or defeated MPs, has-beens, never were’s and never-could-possibly-be’s.”538  
 
Of course it is very difficult to accurately predict the likely candidates for election to a reformed 
House, and there is little in the way of empirical evidence to which one can refer. However, the 
Wakeham Commission did conclude that “total reliance on direct election would in practice be 
incompatible with securing membership for people with relevant experience of and expertise in 
other walks of life”539 and consequently would be “unlikely to produce members with the ability 
to speak directly for the voluntary sector, the professions, cultural and sporting interests, and a 
whole range of other important aspects of British society.”540 Direct election would, according to 
the Wakeham Commission, ensure that members of the second chamber would “almost 
certainly come from a narrow class of people”541 and would, in practice, mean that “British 
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public life was dominated even more than it is already by professional politicians.”542 This, 
according to Puttnam, would “damage and disfigure our political culture”543 and, as Lord 
Bingham concludes, result in the loss of the House’s “greatest strength and the feature which 
distinguishes it most sharply from the Commons.544 
 
It is true that, by advocating non-renewable terms and eliminating the prospect of immediate 
election to the Commons, the Coalition proposals do reduce the likelihood of attracting people 
who wish to serve their political apprenticeships, “the kind of candidates who typically seek 
election to the House of Commons, who if successful may try to build a political base in the 
reformed House of Lords with that intention.”545 But given that their career path will be limited, 
it has been argued, elected members of the reformed second chamber would be unlikely to be of 
a high calibre precisely because they will only serve a single 15-year term in a House with 
limited powers and no prospect of transferring to the Commons (at least until a period of time 
has passed). Lipsey remarks that “it used famously to be said that many backbench Labour MPs 
were those who had failed to get on the General Council of the TUC, failed to get on their Union’s 
Executive and failed to get on the National Executive of the Labour Party.”546 Elected members 
of the reformed chamber would, he suggests, be those who had “failed to make the Commons, 
failed to make the European Parliament, failed (if Scots or Welsh) to make the Parliament or 
Assembly, and failed to get on their local council.”547 This argument is supported by Bogdanor 
who also suggests that, given the likelihood that the ablest people would still wish to stand for 
the Commons, there is no evidence to suggest that an elected second chamber would “yield a 
pool of hitherto untapped talent sufficient to generate a house able to perform functions of 
scrutiny and review effectively.”548 
 
The Government suggest that long, non-renewable terms will allow for the same level of 
independence from party and government that characterises the current membership of the 
House.549 But this argument is also somewhat problematic. Members of a wholly elected House 
would mostly owe their election to their political parties, who in turn would be sure to select 
the most loyal and obedient candidates. Bogdanor contends that there is consequently a 
significant risk of replicating the battle lines and tight party discipline of the House of Commons, 
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along with the whipped, adversarial style of politics.550 Indeed he suggests that the constraints 
of party discipline may be even stronger than in the House of Commons if the candidates, as the 
Government propose, were to be elected in large, multi-member constituencies where personal 
contact between voter and candidate would be limited.551  
 
Of course, in answer to this argument it could be pointed out that, in line with the research 
conducted by Russell, wholly elected second chambers in other comparable democracies do 
tend to adopt a far more deliberative and considered approach to the scrutiny of legislation than 
their respective first chambers.552 They tend to be, on the whole, less partisan in nature and 
demonstrate a greater concern for constitutional and human rights issues.553 Thanks to their 
longer terms of office, the greater average age of their members, and their (usually) weaker 
powers over legislation when compared with the first chamber,  second chambers overseas 
promote a much less confrontational atmosphere and, as a result, a reduction in party 
discipline.554 Consequently, elected second chambers do still tend to be “mature and 
deliberative chambers with a less adversarial atmosphere.”555  
 
However, as Phillipson contends, this argument fails to take account of the “unique 
constitutional arrangements and political culture of the United Kingdom.”556 Phillipson points to 
the fact that the United Kingdom’s constitution offers no judicial protection against 
“unambiguous legislation that abrogates fundamental human rights”,557 nor are there any 
parliamentary safeguards against such legislation. The UK Parliament is therefore unusual 
amongst other western democracies, many of which have requirements for special majorities or 
referenda before such legislation can be allowed to pass. This, Phillipson argues, combined with 
the general political culture of the United Kingdom whereby the “untrammelled ability of the 
government of the day to respond to events in whatever way it sees fit appears to remain its 
most valued attribute”,558 leaves us with a political order that “represents the principle of 
unbridled majoritarianism”559, making the inclusion of independent members in the upper 
house “of peculiar, compelling importance.”560 
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Of course Phillipson’s objection could easily be dealt with by the inclusion of a minority 
appointed element within the reformed second chamber, as will be discussed later. However 
there is an additional problem. It has been demonstrated that despite the general trends of 
deliberation and non-partisanship identified by Russell, direct election to the second chamber 
can bring with it tight party control over both the electoral process and the way in which 
members of the second chamber carry out their functions. Research conducted by Farrell and 
McAllister into the Australian Senate – for many the archetypal elected second chamber -  
confirms the strong discipline that the major parties in Australia exercise over the Senate, 
particularly through domination of the electoral process and the selection of increasingly party-
oriented candidates.561 They conclude that the pivotal consideration for Australian Senators 
when exercising their functions is party affiliation, despite the Senate’s perceived origins as a 
‘State’s house’.562 In fact, Senate candidates were found to be more party-oriented than their 
lower house counterparts, which, as Farrell and McAllister conclude, has serious implications, 
both in terms of the ability of the second chamber to amend and oppose government legislation, 
and the ability of Parliament as a whole to act as a check on the executive.563 It is quite possible 
that this situation could be reproduced in the United Kingdom’s reformed second chamber.  
 
If we return to Lijphart’s criteria, as revised by Russell, the inherent problem with an entirely 
elected chamber is that it could tip the balance too far in favour of legitimacy at the expense of 
distinctiveness. Phillipson contends that such a move would strike a bad balance between 
Russell’s criteria since, though such a House would have very strong legitimacy, its 
distinctiveness would be “almost entirely lost.”564 The use of a proportional electoral system 
such as the Single Transferable Vote, along with staggered elections would ensure that the 
reformed House would not merely be a duplicate of the House of Commons in terms of political 
balance, but it could become a duplicate in terms of character and ethos. The dangers involved 
with a wholly elected chamber are twofold. Not only would direct election to the upper house 
risk the loss of the deliberative, non-partisan atmosphere of the chamber and the relative 
independence of its members from party control, but it would also risk the loss of the distinctive 
expertise and experience that characterises the present chamber.  
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It is not possible to conclusively prove that either of these two dangers would actually be 
realised should the chamber become wholly elected, but it is clear that a significant bulk of 
academic opinion consider it to be a real and significant possibility. Phillipson concludes that, in 
democratising the House of Lords, we could find ourselves with “an elected chamber full of 
whipped professional politicians nodding legislation through without the searching, 
independent-minded and detailed scrutiny which the current House rightly prides itself on.”565  
The chosen method of composition for the second chamber, so Phillipson argues, must 
guarantee the presence of members who will instil a “particularly strong culture of mature, 
objective, and long-termist scrutiny of the wisdom and necessity of any changes, in a chamber 
insulated from to an extent from the short-term political considerations which generally drive 
governments and political parties.”566 It seems unlikely that this could be realised through direct 
election alone. 
 
The Problem with a Mixed House 
 
Of course, although a wholly elected House is still a distinct possibility, the proposals set out in 
the Draft Bill favour a hybrid House, with 80% of its members directly elected, but retaining a 
20% appointed element. This has a number of advantages over an entirely elected House. The 
inclusion of an appointed element will ensure that a degree of independent expertise is retained 
in the chamber, and will mean the sorts of individuals that currently occupy the crossbenches 
would take a fifth of the seats in the reformed House. Further, the fact that only 80% of the 
House would be elected would, along with the lengthy terms in office and staggered elections, 
go some way to ensuring that the reformed House would not consider itself to be more 
democratic and representative than the wholly elected House of Commons, ensuring the 
continued primacy of the lower House.  
 
However, many of the criticisms levelled at the notion of a wholly elected chamber apply with 
equal force to a mixed House. It was noted above that a directly elected second chamber would 
be likely to develop a heightened sense of its own legitimacy, and prove to be a greater 
challenge to the House of Commons, much as the current House became more assertive with the 
removal of the hereditary peers in 1999. There seems to be little reason to believe that the 
inclusion of a 20% appointed element would make the reformed House much less of an obstacle 
to the government’s legislative programme. The problem of finding suitable candidates to stand 
for elections to the reformed House is also just as much an issue for the mixed House as it is for 
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the wholly elected House, and the arguments voiced above relating to the possible loss of 
expertise and the danger of more partisan House apply with equal weight. It was demonstrated 
earlier in this chapter that only 27% of members of the present House have a primary or 
secondary background in representative politics. Thus 73% of members have some form of 
experience or expertise in a profession or subject area other than professional politics. The 
retention of a 20% independently appointed element in a reformed House does not therefore 
escape the loss of expertise argument. However, there are a number of further difficulties posed 
by a hybrid House. 
 
Varying Degrees of Legitimacy 
 
One obstacle to the Government’s proposals for a mixed House has been voiced by Vernon 
Bogdanor:  
 
“A mixed chamber would, by definition, contain members enjoying different degrees of 
democratic legitimacy. The danger then is that any vote carried by a group with a lesser 
degree of democratic legitimacy will be seen as less valid than a vote carried by a group with 
greater democratic legitimacy... In a new second chamber composed of an elected element and 
a nominated element, votes carried by the latter would be regarded as carrying less weight 
than those carried by former. Who elected you? would be the cry directed at the hapless 
nominated members whenever they carried a vote against their elected colleagues.”567 
  
Bogdanor’s prediction is, as Phillipson argues, unlikely to occur in reality since, if the 
elected members constitute a majority in the House, the appointed element would rarely, 
if ever, be able to defeat the elected members.568 Indeed, the coalition proposals favour 
the inclusion of 60 appointed members, who of course, could not alone defeat the 240 
elected members. But although a majority of elected members might mean that the 
nominated members could never single-handedly defeat the elected members, the 
problem does not disappear. This was observed by Lord Butler: “let us envisage that on a 
controversial issue the government of the day and the opposition parties are in conflict, 
but one side has a small majority, which is overturned by the votes of the minority of 
appointed members. If we have accepted election as a necessary precondition for 
legitimacy, where is legitimacy then?”569 If the Government believe that a direct 
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democratic mandate from the people is required for the House to possess the requisite 
level of legitimacy, then it is quite possible that a vote carried by the appointed element 
could be viewed as an illegitimate vote. However, as Russell has suggested, since there are 
few examples of second chambers with a mixed composition operating overseas, it is 
“difficult to predict the dynamics of a house with mixed membership.”570  As such, any 
predictions as to the likely relationship between appointed and elected members in a 
reformed house are little more than speculation. Further, as Phillipson notes, “if a mixed 
House had been approved by both Houses of Parliament on a free vote, and so had 
received all-party endorsement, it would be difficult for elected members to carp at the 
presence of the non-elected members which Parliament itself had agreed should be 
there.”571 Nonetheless, since we have no evidence on which to base an accurate 
prediction, divisions over the perceived legitimacy of non-elected members remains a 
possibility.  
 
The Strathclyde Paradox 
 
A fundamental objection to a mixed House can be seen as an extension of the so-called 
‘Strathclyde paradox’, named after the then Leader of the Conservative Party in the Lords and 
current Leader of the House, Lord Strathclyde. The argument, in its simplest form, goes as 
follows: “If election is so good, why should the public not elect all our political members? If it is 
bad, why elect any at all?”572 Phillipson dismisses this argument as a piece of “school-boy 
logic”573 since it “rests upon the false premise that electing members is straightforwardly either 
good or bad.”574 In fact, election has both advantages and disadvantages. Election is positive, so 
Phillipson argues, in that it provides legitimacy for the House to assert itself against the House 
of Commons,575 but one might not want all of the chambers’ members to be elected, since the 
reformed House should also have a distinct composition from that of the Commons, be relatively 
independent from party control, and have the necessary expertise to carry out its work.576  
 
But there is some strength in Lord Strathclyde’s argument. As noted earlier, in order to 
determine the most desirable method of composition for the House, it is important to bear in 
mind the functions it is to perform. If the primary task of the reformed House is to be the 
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detailed scrutiny and revision for which the current House is often praised, then it would 
logically follow that the composition of the House should be tailored to fit that purpose. The 
inclusion of an appointed element in the coalition proposals appears to resemble an 
acknowledgement on the part of the Government that elected members alone might not be best 
placed to perform the role currently assigned to the House of Lords, and that the presence of an 
appointed element is desirable to ensure that the House is equipped to continue with its 
scrutinising and revising functions. This is evident from the following statement in the coalition 
White Paper: 
“Many people, however, value the contribution to Parliament from independent, non party-
political voices. The wisdom and experience of people who are preeminent in their field and 
have done great things can be of benefit to Parliament’s consideration of legislation. These 
people would not consider seeking elected office and would not see themselves as 
politicians.”577   
 
As Phillipson acknowledges, a wholly elected House would “preclude the appointment of 
members who would add expertise, independence, and thus distinctive value to the House.”578 
But if independent, expert members are the best people to perform the functions of the House of 
Lords, why include any elected members at all? The obvious reply would be that, as previously 
discussed, while the membership of an all-appointed chamber is markedly different from that of 
the Commons, fulfilling Russell’s criterion of distinct composition, it lacks sufficient democratic 
legitimacy to fully utilise its powers. The fact that no one party has a majority in the House of 
Lords and the presence of the independent crossbench element, along with the experience and 
expertise of both politically aligned and non-aligned members, provides the chamber with 
ample distinctiveness, but with no elected members, so it is argued, the House is prevented 
from having sufficient democratic legitimacy to assert itself against the will of the House of 
Commons.  Such a House apparently fails Russell’s final requirement of perceived legitimacy. But 
is this actually the case? 
 
It has been argued that, given the scrutinising and revising functions attributed to the House, 
there is in fact another route to legitimacy that does not involve direct election. This argument 
suggests that, while appointed members may not have the legitimacy that stems from a direct 
democratic mandate, they do have another form of legitimacy; “the legitimacy of expertise, of 
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experience and...even the legitimacy of age”,579 all of which are “not only useful in an amending 
and examining Chamber, but essential if the role assigned to it is to be discharged effectively.”580 
As Lord Lang recently contended, “democratic legitimacy is not bestowed simply by ticking the 
directly elected box; it is achieved by time, by custom and practice, by function, by performance 
and popular acceptance.”581  
 
This argument was utilised by a number of peers in opposition to the Government’s Draft Bill in 
recent debates on Lords reform. Baroness Boothroyd contended that, while members of the 
House are not directly elected, “nor are the monarchy, the judiciary, the chiefs of the armed 
services, the Prime Minister, his deputy Mr Clegg or – let us face it – the Cabinet directly 
accountable.”582 The “democratic imperative”583 of direct election, so Lord Lawson contended, 
“no more applies to the method of selecting members of the second chamber in this country 
than it does to selecting either the judiciary or, indeed, the very important members of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the independent Bank of England, whose legitimacy is not in 
dispute.”584 Indeed, “newspaper proprietors and editors, and even columnists or TV 
commentators”585 have no democratic legitimacy and yet are, Lord Reay argued, “important 
players in our democracy.”586 Appointed members, Lord Howarth argued, derive their 
legitimacy from a similar source: 
“Elections are not the only source of legitimacy. Judges, academics and faith leaders have 
legitimacy. The legitimacy of the House of Lords derives from the quality of the advice that it 
offers through debates, amendments, the work of Select Committees and so forth. The quality of 
that advice derives from the expert knowledge and experience of the Members of the 
House...”587 
 
 This form of legitimacy, so some peers argue, is sufficient to enable the House to carry out the 
functions of revision and scrutiny which it is expected to perform. This is precisely the 
argument made by Lipsey, who rests his argument on the idea that “the kind of things the Lords 
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revises are not the great and political issues underlying bills.”588 Rather, they are the “fine detail, 
in which neither the electorate nor its representatives in the Commons take much interest.”589 
As Lord Howarth argued in debate: 
 
“The House of Lords is no more than an advisory chamber. Its role is revision and scrutiny, 
which is what the Government want it to be. Of course there are, from time to time, 
impassioned and prolonged debates between the two Houses...but ultimately the appointed 
House of Lords always defers to the democratic authority of the elected House of Commons.”590 
 
 Such arguments are founded on the idea that, because the House of Lords is not the legislative 
coequal of the House of Commons, it can only legislate where it persuades the Commons to 
agree with it, and cannot in the end prevail against the elected House. If one were to accept this 
as a true reflection of the role currently played by the House of Lords, one might indeed argue 
that the sort of direct legitimacy that is derived only from election is not required for such a 
task. Of course, if the Government had stated an intention to place the upper House on a more 
equal footing with the House of Commons, if we were to expect the reformed House to challenge 
fundamental policy decisions and frustrate the legislative agenda of the lower House in a way 
hitherto unseen, then the argument for direct democratic legitimacy would indeed be stronger. 
But the Draft Bill seems to suggest that what is expected of the second chamber is that it 
continue to perform the same role that it does at present, carefully revising and scrutinising the 
fine detail of legislation, occasionally requiring the Commons to think again, but ultimately 
bowing to the will of the elected House.  Would it not be fair to argue that a reduced form of 
legitimacy is sufficient for such a purpose? Appointed members might rely on their wisdom, 
experience and expertise to rationalise their existence, since these are the essential 
characteristics required to perform the functions of revision and scrutiny.  
 
Lipsey contends that the legitimacy of expertise could be quite enough to enable the House to 
carry out its revising function, and for its members to act as a check on the actions of the 
Government. He suggests that, “because the Lords do not owe their elevation to party alone, 
they well be less inclined to pull their punches in their party’s interest.”591 Further, because they 
tend to “come from dense networks of professional connections, Lords will be tipped off about 
matters that may escape the Commons.”592 Lipsey continues: 
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 “If you were a health minister, whose questioning would you fear – that of the member for 
Sarum South or Robert Winston, a world expert on fertility? If culture, the member for 
Puddletown East, or David Puttnam and Melvyn Bragg? The weight of the critics adds weight 
to the criticism, and ensures that ministers and the government take it seriously.”593  
 
Phillipson rejects this argument on the basis that it seeks to “deliberately misstate the role of 
the House.”594 He rejects the comparison with the judiciary and other regulatory bodies on the 
basis that, while judges, for example, are unelected, and thus derive legitimacy through other 
means: “independence, integrity, expertise in the law”,595 the comparison, so Phillipson argues, 
fails to take account of the inherent differences between the role of the judiciary and the role of 
a chamber of Parliament:  
“in comparison with the legally unlimited power wielded by Parliament, the judicial branch 
exercises only a relatively narrow band of power, which is ultimately either given to it by 
Parliament (in the case of statutory interpretation) or confined to issues that Parliament has 
acquiesced in leaving in judicial hands (the common law)... In making their decisions, judges 
are not called upon to exercise their own unconfined judgement, still less their party-political 
views. They are not asked to decide, de novo, what they think desirable for society. The House of 
Lords as a legislative body is, precisely, asked to do this...  ”596 
 
Phillipson asserts that the characterisation of the House of Lords as a form of “advisory Council 
of wise men and women, to which the Commons listens if it wishes to but can readily ignore”,597 
is a “blatant misrepresentation of the reality of relationships between the Houses.”598 It is 
certainly true that such a characterisation is difficult to reconcile with statistics on government 
defeats in the Lords. In the 2008-9 session, the government was defeated in 25 out of 89 
divisions in the House of Lords (28%), while in 2009-10 the government lost 14 out of 43 
divisions (33%).599 Though it is true that the House of Lords can be legally overridden by virtue 
of the Parliament Acts and, in practice, does often give way when the Commons reject its 
amendments, in many cases “they do not back down upon such disagreement and pressure of 
time then forces the government to accept the Lords’ amendments.”600 As Baroness Quinn put it 
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to the House, if the chamber were a “purely advisory body”,601 the question of legitimacy might 
be less problematic, but in practice the House not only amends legislation but has, on occasion, 
“stopped legislation in its tracks.” The House of Lords thus exercises “direct political power”,602 
the legitimacy for which, so Phillipson contends, can be derived only from election.603  
 
It is not difficult, however, to find examples of unelected bodies exercising such power in other 
comparable democracies. As Oliver points out, in many countries, other bodies outside of 
Parliament have the right to refuse to consent to legislation, or even set aside legislation passed 
by Parliament.604 For example, Supreme Courts in many countries have the power to strike 
down or disapply legislation which they deem to be unconstitutional. Constitutional councils 
such as the French Counseil d’Etat may pronounce on the constitutionality or workability of 
legislation, thereby influencing the validity of laws.605 Given that France is an example of a 
country with an elected second chamber one might, as Oliver does, infer that such elected 
bodies are not suited to the performance of these functions, thereby necessitating the presence 
of additional institutions which must contribute to the legislative process.606 As Oliver observes, 
“consent-refusing activity carried out by such independent, unelected, expert bodies is a central 
part of the democratic arrangements in those countries: democracy there is not taken to mean 
that elected legislators in the Parliament are entitled to pass, on bare majorities of those present 
and voting, any law they wish, regardless of its compatibility with the constitution, human rights 
or international obligations.”607 But thanks to the prevalence of the Diceyan doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom, it would be impossible for external 
institutions to fulfil such a role in this country. At the root of the problem, so Oliver argues, is the 
way in which we conceptualise second chambers.608  
 
This theory does offer a partial response to Phillipson’s argument, but of course, it has to be 
recognised that constitutional courts such as the Counseil d’Etat may only strike down or refuse 
to assent to legislation on the basis that it fails to comply with the constitution. The powers 
possessed by the House of Lords are far broader, since they may oppose the government and 
force change to legislation on any political issue at all.  
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But perhaps the problem is not the way in which we conceptualise second chambers, but the 
way in which we view the concept of legitimacy. As Russell has argued, a dichotomous view of 
legitimacy, whereby unelected chambers are considered illegitimate and elected chambers are 
legitimate is “too simplistic.”609 As previously discussed, there has been, since 1999, a noticeable 
change in the behaviour of the House of Lords whereby it has proven more willing to assert 
itself against the will of the elected lower House. Furthermore, it has been noted that the House 
of Lords is now perceived by members of both chambers of Parliament to be more legitimate 
than it was, and enjoys a degree of public support despite its unelected basis.  
 
This can be seen also in the way in which governments now attempt to anticipate and 
accommodate the opinions of the Lords. Russell outlines the way in which the government’s 
own procedures now “explicitly anticipate and seek to avoid conflict with the Lords”610 by 
requiring ministers to provide the Cabinet’s Legislative Programme Committee with a ‘Lord’s 
Handling Strategy’ outlining plans for dealing with any likely points of contention in the upper 
House before a proposed bill can be approved for introduction to Parliament.611 Civil servants 
are now “encouraged to make early contact with the Government Chief Whip’s staff in the Lords 
to devise a joint strategy”,612 which may involve “holding concessions in reserve for discussion 
in the Lords.”613 As Russell notes, this procedure can, “in extremis”,614 mean that “if a minister 
cannot convince colleagues that a measure will be passed by the upper house, it may even fail to 
be introduced to Parliament.”615 In addition, ministers now often hold open consultation 
meetings in the Lords on bills before they are formally debated.616  The fact that the government 
has “changed its internal process for approving bills to anticipate the Lords’ response, and is 
facilitating early discussion with peers to avoid legislative conflict”617 points not only to an 
increase in the House’s assertiveness, but also to a heightened sense of its legitimacy, not only in 
the eyes of its own members, but also in those of the government. 
 
Phillipson argues, however, that although even a very small increase in the House’s legitimacy 
can result in a more assertive stance, the fact remains that “without a strong democratic 
mandate, and thus an arguable claim to legitimacy”,618 the House is likely to defer to the 
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Commons in the long run.619 However, Russell and Sciara’s studies of the House’s behaviour 
over recent years demonstrate that not only is the frequency and severity of government 
defeats in the House of Lords “on an upward trajectory”,620 the defeats in question are also 
having a lasting policy impact.621 Indeed, “far from being routinely reversed in the House of 
Commons, many Lords defeats are substantially accepted. Furthermore many of these are on 
key policy issues.”622 Their results show that defeats in the Lords do often ‘stick’, and that it 
would be incorrect to suggest that the vast majority are overturned in the House of Commons. 
Russell and Sciara find that, in fact, roughly six out of ten Lords defeats result in some kind of 
lasting policy change, and around four out of ten could be considered to be resolved more in the 
Lords’ favour than that of the government.623 Of course, defeats in the House are merely “the 
most visible sign”624 of the chamber’s impact on government policy. As Russell and Sciara 
conclude, “it is well established that proposals made by non-government actors in the Lords are 
often adopted by government by agreement, often after some degree of compromise,”625 as was 
witnessed in Chapter II in relation to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act. 
But if the House is able to “exert influence through defeats, with government unable or 
unwilling to overturn its policy interventions, its negotiating power is clearly relatively 
strong.”626 
 
It would seem then that “despite its continuing unelected basis, the House of Lords has a 
growing role in the policy process.”627 Furthermore, support for the House in utilising its still 
considerable powers has clearly strengthened since the removal of the bulk of hereditary peers 
in 1999. As Russell’s research shows: 
“despite the continued unelected basis of the House of Lords there is significant support for its 
right to block government legislation, even amongst Labour MPs. A comfortable majority of the 
public support the Lords’ right to block measures that are unpopular, or on which Labour MPs 
have rebelled. In making this judgement the public show no interest in whether the measures 
were in the government’s manifesto.”628 
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It would appear therefore that the House of Lords is now perceived by members of both 
chambers of Parliament, as well as by members of the public, as a more legitimate chamber than 
it was prior to 1999, regardless of its unelected basis. As Russell argues, though the House of 
Lords may not “equal the legitimacy of the Commons”,629 and continues to “use its powers with 
caution”,630 it does have certain important features that are lacking in the Commons.631 The 
House of Lords has a “more proportional party balance”,632 in contrast to the inherent over-
representation of the governing party in the House of Commons, and benefits from the presence 
of numerous “‘experts’ and independent members”633 within its membership.634 As Russell 
argues, “in this ‘anti-political’ age, interventions by such a chamber to constrain single-party 
governments will often have public support.”635 Russell concludes therefore that legitimacy is 
better understood as a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable, in that “it is a matter of 
more or less legitimacy, not of absolutes.”636 But she also goes further to state that “legitimacy 
can be influenced by other factors aside from democratic election”,637 which may include party 
balance, or the presence of independent, expert members.638  
 
As noted at the outset, Russell’s requirement of perceived legitimacy requires that the second 
chamber be seen to have enough legitimacy, and carry the appropriate level of public support, 
to properly utilise its powers.639 Since 1999, the House of Lords has come to perceive itself as a 
more legitimate body, and has not only asserted itself against the government with increasing 
frequency, but has found itself in a position where its ability to defeat the government has a 
lasting and meaningful impact on government policy. It would seem that Shell’s characterisation 
of the United Kingdom as a system of “de facto unicameralism”640 (referenced in Chapter I) is in 
fact quite inaccurate. This is attributable not only to the removal of the hereditary peers, and 
with them, the inbuilt Conservative bias of the House, but also to the fact that this has led to the 
creation of a more proportional party balance which, rather ironically, reflects the share of 
general election votes more closely than the House of Commons.  
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The continued presence of independent, expert members has also contributed to the House’s 
perception of its own legitimacy. Phillipson is certainly correct in that the House of Lords does 
not possess the legitimacy of the House of Commons, the legitimacy that stems only from direct 
election. But this does not mean that the House is, as a consequence, illegitimate per se. Rather, 
it is submitted, the House of Lords possesses a different form of legitimacy, a lesser legitimacy, 
but one which has allowed the House to flex its political muscles with increasing frequency and, 
in recent years, have a growing influence in the legislative process. This legitimacy, it would 
appear, is sufficient to satisfy the public and many members of the lower House, who also 
recognise the increase in the House’s legitimacy, and support the House in its interventions.   
 
Strengthening the House’s Legitimacy 
 
This perceived legitimacy, it is submitted, could easily be strengthened further without the 
introduction of directly elected members and without the implementation of the sort of far-
reaching reform currently contemplated by the coalition Government. The most indefensible 
aspect of the current membership of the House of Lords is, it is submitted, not the fact that 
members of the House are appointed, but rather the way in which they are appointed. The 
power of the Prime Minister and, to a lesser extent, party leaders, over the composition of the 
chamber is highly problematic for the House’s perceived legitimacy. Parallels can be drawn here 
between our own House of Lords and the Canadian Senate. As Docherty observes, the Canadian 
Senate remains the “whipping post of democratic institutions”641 not just because it is 
appointed, or because it does a poor job of representing regional interests, but also because it is 
viewed by many as a kind of “legislative hall of shame.”642 The Senate is, as Docherty notes, “a 
Valhalla for retiring politicians.”643 MPs retire there while their party is in power, while 
appointment also serves as a “useful reward”644 for the party faithful, “those who perform 
loyally in the trenches.”645 What Docherty describes as the “carte blanche power to appoint”646 
serves as a useful political tool for the Prime Minister to reward the efforts of those who “toil 
behind the scenes”,647 and ensures that the Senate remains a chamber of “former lower house 
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legislators and partisan loyalists.”648As long as it remains such, Docherty predicts, “there is little 
to suggest it will improve its public image.”649 
 
Does this not provide a useful lesson for the United Kingdom? As Russell argues, “the Canadian 
experience serves to underline the importance which fair and transparent appointment 
procedures could have in gaining credibility for an appointed house.”650 As she points out, there 
is no tradition in Canada of making appointments to the Senate from outside of the governing 
party, and seats are “almost invariably given as a prize for long party service.”651 Many Senators 
have formerly been party organisers, fundraisers or donors, and Senate seats are frequently left 
vacant for long periods to encourage competition amongst candidates that they may work 
harder or commit more funds to the party.652 Russell suggests that the United Kingdom does not 
suffer from the same use of political patronage by Prime Minsters for purely political ends that 
has plagued appointments to the Canadian Senate, and notes that “this form of behaviour by a 
British Prime Minister would be seen as quite unacceptable even within our existing 
conventions.”653 Though many former members of our lower House do find themselves 
ennobled and continuing their contribution to Parliament from the red benches of the House of 
Lords, the appointment of members of other political persuasions, as well as independent 
experts to sit on the crossbenches, has remained customary. Nonetheless, we have seen only 
recently from the current Prime Minister how political patronage can be used in an 
unprecedented way to fundamentally alter the party balance in the upper house,654 and we need 
only recall the ‘cash for honours scandal’ of 2006-7 for evidence the inherent dangers of 
unbridled patronage in the United Kingdom.  
 
The use of Prime Ministerial patronage in Canada has only added to the “generally low esteem 
in which the Canadian Senate is held.”655 As Russell concludes, the “perceived abuses of the 
appointment system for cynical political ends”656 has led to a fundamental sense of disdain 
amongst the Canadian public, and to an attitude in the press which “at best ignores, and at worst 
ridicules the Senate.”657 This must surely serve as a stark warning to the United Kingdom of the 
                                                          
648
 Ibid. at p.33 
649
 Ibid.  
650
 Russell, M. An Appointed Upper House: Lessons from Canada (London: Constitution Unit, 1998), p.10  
651
 Ibid. at p.5 
652
 Ibid.  
653
 Ibid. at p.10 
654
 See Russell, M. House Full: Time to get a grip on Lords Appointments (London: Constitution Unit, 2011) 
655
 Russell, An Appointed Upper House, fn.650, p.5 
656
 Ibid. at p.6 
657
 Ibid. 
95 
 
dangers of continuing with Prime Ministerial appointment, be it in a wholly appointed House, 
or, as the Government propose, a House retaining an appointed element. 
 
The Government appears to have acknowledged the importance of ending Prime Ministerial 
patronage, and introducing a more open and fair appointments system, should the reformed 
House retain an appointed element. The White Paper proposes the establishment of an 
Appointments Commission on a statutory basis to make recommendations for appointment to 
the reformed House.658 The Commission would be accountable to Parliament, and its work 
would be overseen by the Joint Committee on the House of Lords Appointment Commission.659 
It would be a body corporate, and all of its powers would be set in statute, but would have 
responsibility for setting its own criteria and process for appointment.660 Commissioners would 
be appointed by the Queen and would serve long, non-renewable terms.661 Ministers and 
members of the Commons would be barred from membership of the Commission, but there 
would be no ban on former or current members of the House of Lords from serving as 
Commissioners.662 
 
The creation of such a body would clearly add some necessary impartiality and transparency to 
the appointment of the non-elected element in the reformed upper House. But if the House were 
to remain an entirely appointed body, the creation of a Statutory Appointments Commission 
could add to the already growing sense of legitimacy in the current chamber.  If legislation were 
passed to create an independent Appointments Commission on a statutory footing, which would 
control all appointments to the House of Lords, the unbridled control of political leaders over 
the membership of the second chamber would be entirely removed. Thus one of the most 
offensive aspects of the appointments process would be brought to an end, and all members, 
without exception, would genuinely be appointed on their own merits, with no scope for the 
misuse of patronage that engulfed the political classes in 2006 and 2007. Such a change could 
also remedy the deficiencies in the breadth of expertise and experience in the House of Lords 
previously identified in this chapter. It has been noted that, while the House of Lords, as 
presently constituted, can boast many members with specialist knowledge and experience in a 
range of subject areas, the balance between different professional backgrounds and subject 
areas is not perfect, and some areas are “less well represented.”663 Such deficiencies could be 
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remedied should the power to appoint members to the upper House be transferred to a 
Statutory Appointments Commission.  
 
Such a body could be tasked with identifying areas in which the chamber lacks sufficient 
expertise or professional areas which are under-represented in the House, and seek to make 
appointments which would broaden the expertise of the chamber and reflect more accurately 
the diversity of the British people, much has the current House of Lords Appointments 
Commission has sought to do in recent years when recommending individuals for appointment 
to the crossbenches.664  By bringing an end to Prime Ministerial patronage, a Statutory 
Appointments Commission could ensure that all members, without exception, are appointed on 
merit. Specialist knowledge of or experience in a particular field could become a prerequisite of 
membership of the second chamber. The current over-representation of those with a 
professional background in representative politics could be ended. Peerages could of course still 
be offered to former members of the lower House, but not necessarily in the same quantity, and 
only where the individual in question has expertise or experience deemed valuable to House, 
never merely in recognition of long or loyal party service.  
 
The removal of powers of patronage from the Prime Minister and allocation of responsibility for 
appointment with a Statutory Commission would not only allow individual members of the 
House of Lords to feel more legitimate, but would provide the House as a whole with a 
heightened sense of legitimacy. This legitimacy would be derived from the fact that its 
continued appointed nature had been approved by the directly elected lower House. If the 
House of Commons passed a bill retaining a wholly appointed House, but amending the 
appointments procedure through the creation of a Statutory Appointments Commission, it 
would signify that the House of Lords had the confidence and approval of the elected 
representatives of the people in the House of Commons, thus providing it with a further boost to 
its legitimacy. Such a bill could, much like the Private Member’s Bill currently before the House 
of Lords in the name of Lord Steel of Aikwood,665 put an end to what have become farcical 
hereditary by-elections, and ensure that the House would in future contain appointed peers 
alone. It could also, as Lord Steel’s bill does, provide for the retirement of members of the upper 
House, as well as the suspension and disqualification of peers. The introduction of such 
incremental changes could make significant improvements to the appointment process, and to 
the House as a whole, without necessitating the kind of radical reform to the composition of the 
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House envisaged by the Government’s Draft Bill. Reforming the appointments process in this 
way could greatly enhance the public image of the House of Lords, making Lords appointments 
more open, fair, impartial and transparent, and could go some way to further increasing the 
perceived legitimacy of the House. This would, in turn, render the chamber more able to fully 
utilise its powers.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In proposing a predominantly elected second chamber, despite the retention of the 20% 
appointed element, the Coalition Government are, it is submitted, tipping the balance too far in 
favour of legitimacy at the expense of independence, expertise and experience. As stated above, 
the fundamental concern when determining the membership and method of composition of the 
second chamber should be the role and functions those members are to perform. The 
Government envisages the reformed House performing the very same functions currently 
performed by the House of Lords. If revision and amendment of legislation and scrutiny of 
government policy is to remain the fundamental purpose of the second chamber, then the 
Government’s first concern, it is submitted, should be recruiting the best people to fulfil this 
role. If the best people to carry out this function are independent, expert, appointed life peers, as 
the Government seems to have acknowledged, then an appointed House should surely be 
retained. The contrast in approaches to the scrutiny and amendment of the 2011 Parliamentary 
Voting System and Constituencies Act by appointed members in the Lords and elected members 
in the Commons, as outlined in Chapter II, would seem to suggest that this is indeed the case. 
The ability of the members of the chamber to perform the duties allocated to them should be the 
fundamental concern when determining the future composition of the chamber.  
 
The argument that the inherent lack of legitimacy in the current House of Lords necessitates the 
introduction of directly elected members neglects the fact that legitimacy is in fact, as Russell 
has argued, a continuous rather than a dichotomous concept.666 It is certainly true that the 
appointed nature of the House of Lords ensures that it will never be able to claim the same 
degree of democratic legitimacy that is possessed by the elected House of Commons. But this 
does not make the House of Lords illegitimate per se.  
 
The legitimacy of the House was strengthened after 1999 by the removal of the hereditary peers 
and the creation of a more proportional party balance. The legitimacy of the House could be 
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increased further still by reforming the appointment process to bring an end to Prime 
Ministerial patronage. Members of the House of Lords also point to their independence, 
experience and expertise as a source of legitimacy. While this legitimacy does not match the 
democratic mandate of members of the lower House, it has proved sufficient to allow the House 
of Lords to assert itself with increasing frequency and severity against the will of the House of 
Commons since the 1999 reforms were implemented. It has placed the House in a position 
where its defeats of the government are not simply reversed as a matter of routine, but instead 
often have a lasting and meaningful impact on government policy. Furthermore, the House is 
perceived as a more legitimate body than it previously was not only by members of both 
parliamentary chambers, but also by the public at large. This ‘lesser’ form of legitimacy has 
proven adequate for the House to carry out its vital functions of scrutiny, amendment and 
review. The House may lack the democratic legitimacy of directly elected members, but one has 
to question the usefulness of democratically legitimate members elected by the people under a 
proportional system if they are unable to adequately carry out the functions of revision, 
amendment and scrutiny which the House of Lords is expected to continue to perform. As Lord 
Luce, perhaps rather bluntly put it to the chamber: 
 
“What if the point of saying, “Hooray, we are democratically legitimate” if, in the process, we 
can no longer so effectively fulfil the function that this Government rightly want this chamber 
to fulfil?”667 
 
Russell’s criterion of perceived legitimacy requires that the House of Lords be seen to have the 
requisite level of legitimacy and public support to utilise its powers. The confidence of the 
House to make use of its powers, and the approval of the public for the House in doing so, has 
increased since 1999. Incremental reform to the appointments process could improve the 
situation even further. As such, it is quite possible that the requirement of perceived legitimacy 
could be satisfied, while still retaining an appointed upper chamber, and without causing 
unnecessary damage to the ability of the House of Lords to perform its functions. This argument, 
it is submitted, should be fully considered by the coalition government before any hasty 
decisions are implemented, and before the membership of the House of Lords is altered in a 
fundamental way.  The inclusion of an elected element would instil greater legitimacy into the 
House of Lords, legitimacy of a strength that could only come from election. If that is what the 
Government believe is required in our second chamber, then they are unlikely to be dissuaded 
from the pursuit of wholesale reform. But such a move would also result in a dramatic 
diminution in the House’s ability to perform its functions. If the Government wishes to retain an 
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efficient and effective revising chamber, and avoid any form of challenge to the supremacy of 
the House of Commons then, it is submitted, the acceptance of a weaker form of legitimacy could 
be a sacrifice worth making. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE POWERS OF THE SECOND CHAMBER 
 
As Brigid Hadfield has made clear, one cannot consider the powers to be assigned to a reformed 
second chamber in isolation from its composition and democratic legitimacy.668 Indeed, as 
Phillipson explains, “broadly speaking, the more legitimate a second chamber is, the greater its 
powers may permissibly be.”669 However, though the proposals contained within the 2011 
White Paper and accompanying Draft Bill aim to radically alter the composition of the upper 
House, no such change is proposed to the formal legal powers of the House of Lords.670 The 
White Paper states the Government’s belief that “the change in composition of the second 
chamber ought not to change the status of that chamber as a House of Parliament or the existing 
constitutional relationship between the two Houses of Parliament.”671 It makes perfectly clear 
that the Government does not intend to amend the Parliament Acts, and that it aims to preserve 
the series of conventions that govern the day-to-day relationship between the two Houses.672 
These conventions, according to the White Paper, “have served the relationship between the 
Houses well and...represent a delicate balance which has evolved over the years.”673  
 
The Government believes that “the powers of the second chamber and, in particular, the way in 
which they are exercised should not be extended and the primacy of the House of Commons 
should be preserved.”674 The White Paper sets out the belief that the present balance between 
the two Houses, as expressed in the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 and the aforementioned 
conventions, “serves the legislative process well, and gives the second chamber the opportunity 
to make a substantive contribution while not at the same time undermining the relationship 
between the Government and the House of Commons.”675 However, no attempt is made in the 
Draft Bill to codify the existing powers of the House of Lords. Rather, Clause 2 accepts that the 
position is largely a matter of convention: 
(1) Nothing in the provisions of this Act about the membership of the House of Lords, or in 
any other provision of this Act— 
(a) affects the status of the House of Lords as one of the two Houses of Parliament, 
(b) affects the primacy of the House of Commons, or 
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(c) otherwise affects the powers, rights, privileges or jurisdiction of either House of 
Parliament, or the conventions governing the relationship between the two Houses. 
 
While the Draft Bill contains proposals for a predominantly elected second chamber with 
a 20% appointed element, the White Paper leaves open the possibility of a wholly elected 
House. Given that the new chamber would be more legitimate, in democratic terms at 
least, than the current, entirely un-elected House, it would, as Phillipson observes, “seem 
paradoxical, to say the least, to accompany such a substantial increase in the House’s 
legitimacy with anything less than at the least a maintenance of its existing powers.”676 
Indeed, Phillipson notes that any diminution in the House’s powers would seem 
“perverse”,677 given that the “whole purpose of reform is to increase the capacity of the 
House to make a contribution to the legislative process and the protection of liberal 
constitutional values and human rights.”678  
 
However, while no diminution in the power of the House is contemplated in the present 
reform package, neither is any attempt to enact a statutory definition of the upper House’s 
powers. As Peter Riddell notes, the legal powers of the House “remain substantial, despite 
the limitations imposed by the 1911 and 1949 Parliament Acts.”679 Indeed, as Dennis 
Carter has remarked, those who demand a more powerful House of Lords “do not seem to 
realise just how much power the House of Lords already possesses.”680 Thus, as Phillipson 
observes, and as discussed in the previous chapter, since the current House rarely 
exercises its legal powers to the full, “a more legitimate House could exercise considerably 
more political muscle without any increase in its legal powers, simply by adopting a less 
self-denying approach to the use of existing powers of delay.”681  
 
However, the problems involved with a more legitimately constituted second chamber, 
and the ensuing dangers of increased assertiveness and potential legislative impasse were 
dealt with in detail in the preceding chapter, as was the likely future of the conventions 
which govern the relationship between the two Houses. Attention will therefore turn to 
some more specific issues relating to the powers of the reformed second chamber. 
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However, before proceeding to examine such issues, it will be useful to place the existing 
powers of the House of Lords in a comparative context.  
 
The Powers of the House of Lords in a Comparative Context 
 
As Russell has noted, “in the majority of cases the powers of the second chamber are less 
than those of the first.”682 Of the 58 second chambers around the world, only the United 
States of America and Bosnia Herzegovina have second chambers with greater powers 
than the lower House, while 15 have roughly equal powers and 41 have fewer powers.683 
Typically “government is not subject to a confidence vote in the upper House”,684 and 
often the second chamber “can only delay, rather than veto, legislation.”685 Further, the 
powers of the second chamber over financial legislation are usually less than over 
ordinary legislation.686 Generally speaking therefore, the House of Lords does tend to fit 
the international mould. However the way that disputes are resolved between the two 
Houses is somewhat less typical. Indeed, the United Kingdom is unusual in that the House 
of Lords’ suspensory veto is defined in terms of the length of time required to pass before 
the House of Commons can overrule the Lords.687 As Russell notes, “while suspensive 
vetos are common overseas it is more usual for the delay to be caused simply by the 
maximum period of time the upper House has to consider legislation.”688   
 
There are some second chambers around the world which are co-equal with the lower 
House. Russell categorises Italy as a ‘symmetrical’ system, in that its upper and lower 
Houses are co-equal in terms of their formal legal powers.689 Indeed, as Patterson and 
Mughan observe, the Italian Senato is “on a par with the lower House in legislative 
powers”,690 and “uniquely plays the same role as the lower House in the confirmation of 
the prime minister and cabinet ministers, and in consideration and approval of financial 
legislation.”691 Bills may be introduced in either of the two chambers, and any bill, 
including the budget, may be amended or even rejected by either chamber. A bill cannot 
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become law until it is agreed by both chambers, and, if agreement cannot be reached, “the 
bill will simply shuttle between them until they do, or until it is dropped.”692 Thus, the two 
chambers have “the same functions, fulfil the same tasks, and exercise the same 
powers.”693 Further, “when dealing with the government, they have the same weapon: the 
vote of no confidence.”694 It is for this reason therefore, that the Italian parliament has 
been described as a case of “perfect bicameralism.”695 Other examples of constitutionally 
coequal second chambers include the US Senate and the Swiss Ständerat.696 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are those countries classified by Russell as ‘extremely 
asymmetrical’, in that the formal powers of the second chamber are subordinate to those 
of the first. Ireland and Spain are two examples. In both cases, the upper chamber has only 
“a very limited period in which it may consider legislation, and any upper House 
amendments or veto may be easily reversed by the lower House”,697 and thus, the only 
inconvenience which can be caused is “a relatively short delay to bills.”698 Indeed, Michael 
Laver concludes that, in the case of Ireland, the legislative powers of the Seanad Éireann 
are “so modest that that they scarcely justify maintaining an entire second house of the 
legislature.”699 The 90-day delaying power of the Irish upper House, which is reduced to 
21 days in the case of money bills, confines the Senate to a position “very much 
subservient to that of the Dáil.”700 Meanwhile, the Spanish Senado “falls among the 
weakest of democratic upper houses.”701 Indeed, though it can “perform an advisory 
function, engage in enquiries and oversight of the executive, and play some role in the 
selection of governmental personnel”,702 its legislative actions can be “overridden by a 
majority vote in the lower house and it can, in any event, only delay legislation.”703  
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The French Sénat is another example of a relatively subordinate chamber, although 
Russell suggests that whilst its powers are “less than ‘moderately symmetrical’ in relation 
to the lower house, its ability to influence legislation is far from insignificant”,704 and it is 
thus more powerful than the Irish and Spanish upper chambers.705 There is no time limit 
within which the Sénat must consider legislation, allowing for more “leisurely and 
considered”706 legislative scrutiny, and the Sénat cannot automatically be overridden by 
the lower House, although the first chamber does have the last word if the mediation 
process between the two chambers is unsuccessful.707 Thus the Sénat has the power to 
cause considerable delay to government bills, affording it substantial bargaining power in 
the legislative process. As Mastias observes, the French upper House, “combining 
persuasion and amendment, negotiation and accommodation, pressure and retreat, 
reflection and imagination...has managed to carve out a place for itself in the new political 
regime.”708 
 
Between these two extremes are those chambers which Russell describes as ‘moderately 
asymmetrical’, in that the formal constitutional powers of such chambers are 
considerable, but are “inferior in some way to the lower House.”709 In Canada and 
Australia for example, there are only minor differences between the respective powers of 
the two chambers, which apply to financial legislation and constitutional amendments. 
The Australian Senate is “overwhelmingly on a par with the House of Representatives 
save for formal constitutional provisions prohibiting the Senate from amending tax or 
budget bills.”710 Indeed, the Senate is “virtually equal in legislative power to the lower 
house, making it one of the most powerful upper houses among Westminster-derived 
parliamentary systems.”711 The Senate’s power to amend or reject ordinary legislation is 
unlimited, and in the event of disagreement the House of Representatives’ only option is 
to invoke the deadlock procedures.712  
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The powers of the Canadian Senate are similarly formidable. As Docherty notes, “the 
Senate has the statutory power to defeat bills sent to it from the lower house”,713 a power 
which “goes beyond merely delaying government legislation to actually sending it back to 
the lower house defeated.”714 However, due to its appointed nature and the 
aforementioned cynicism of the Canadian electorate over the use of political patronage, 
the Senate has generally been reluctant to make use of its potential legislative muscle, and 
has generally contented itself with revising and delaying legislation put forward by the 
House of Commons.715  
 
The indirectly elected German Bundesrat may also be said to have moderately 
asymmetrical powers over draft legislation.716 The Bundesrat is composed of state 
officials who vote en bloc,717 and “may veto legislation adopted by the lower house if state 
interests are paramount.”718 The Bundesrat must give assent to all bills affecting either the 
finances of the Länder, or matters under their control,719 which means that the Bundesrat 
has an absolute veto over approximately half of all bills.720 Indeed, even bills which 
include just one clause falling within the Länder’s influence are subject to the absolute 
veto, so within the realm of state-related legislation the Bundesrat is a powerful chamber 
indeed. It is, as Patzelt describes, a “very federal house.”721 
 
So where does the House of Lords fit within this international spectrum of second 
chambers? Russell concludes that the formal powers of the House of Lords over ordinary 
legislation are moderate by international standards.722 The provisions of the Parliament 
Acts allow the Lords to delay most ordinary government bills by up to a year. This may be 
less formidable than the power of the Italian, Canadian and Australian Senates to block all 
bills completely, and the power of the German Bundesrat to veto around 60% of bills,723 
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but the House of Lords has significantly more power at its disposal than the three month 
suspensory veto of the Irish Seanad and the two month equivalent of the Spanish Senado.  
 
In addition, the House of Lords retains the power to veto delegated legislation, though this 
is rarely used in practice,724 and under the Parliament Acts, the right to veto any attempt 
to extend the life of Parliament beyond five years. In addition, the reduced powers of the 
House of Lords over those pieces of legislation designated as ‘money bills’ by the Speaker 
of the House of Commons, which can only be delayed for a maximum of one month, are 
“relatively common in other second chambers.”725 However, like the Canadian Senate, the 
reluctance of the House of Lords to make frequent and excessive use of its delaying 
powers and absolute veto over delegated legislation stems from its appointed nature and 
reluctance to challenge the primacy of the democratically elected House of Commons. 
Thus while the House of Lords has, in recent years, made “various constructive 
contributions to legislation through deliberation, delay, amendment and compromise,”726 
it has traditionally show both “diligence and restraint in discharging its legislative 
responsibilities.”727 As has previously been demonstrated however, the House of Lords 
has had an increasing impact on government legislation in recent years, and utilises its 
powers far more frequently than it did prior to 1999.  
 
Nonetheless, although the formal legal powers of the House of Lords may not always be 
fully utilised in practice, they do broadly satisfy Russell’s criterion. Russell suggests that in 
order to satisfy the requirement of adequate powers, a second chamber should have 
sufficient means to bargain with government and impact on legislation and policy.728 To 
do so, she concludes, the powers of the chamber should be “moderate to strong.”729 
Russell contends that the power to delay most legislation by a year, and ‘money bills’ by 
one month, is “certainly enough to make government and the Commons think again when 
faced with resistance from the Lords”,730 and that the existing powers of the House of 
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Lords are “already sufficient for it to function as a strong check on government.”731 As was 
seen in Chapter II, the powers available to the Lords were sufficient for them to extract 
valuable concessions from the Government on the Parliamentary Voting Systems and 
Constituencies Act 2011, and press controversial amendments without endangering the 
primacy of the elected House. Furthermore, almost every recent attempt at Lords reform, 
including the Royal Commission report,732 the PASC report,733 and the report of the Joint 
Committee,734 has concluded that the powers of the chamber should not be altered. It is 
certainly defensible then that the Government’s Draft Bill seeks to make no fundamental 
change to the powers of the second chamber. Such a course of action would not only fulfil 
the stated objective of preserving the primacy of the House of Commons, but in a 
comparative context, would also leave the United Kingdom in the ‘middle ground’ in terms 
of the division of power between its upper and lower chambers.  
 
Dealing with Delegated Legislation 
 
However, there are ways in which the powers of the House of Lords appear somewhat 
anomalous, an example of which concerns the House’s powers over secondary legislation. As 
noted above, the House of Lords retains the power to veto all delegated legislation, but due to 
the relatively extreme nature of this power,735 it is rarely if ever used.736 But, the House of Lords 
also has, as Russell notes, “a reputation for outstripping the Commons” in terms of the scrutiny 
it provides for such legislation”:737 
 
“Members of the Lords take part in the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, and the 
chamber spends more time debating delegated legislation than the House of Commons. In 
addition the House of Lords has a powerful committee for scrutiny of Delegated Powers and 
Deregulation, which considers whether new bills delegate powers inappropriately. No single 
committee takes on the equivalent role in the House of Commons.”738  
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It is not, as Russell argues, altogether out of the ordinary for a second chamber to have an 
increased role when it comes to secondary legislation.739  In many other countries the upper 
chamber “takes a greater interest in delegated legislation than the lower house”,740 which can 
result in the upper house being “quite interventionist in this area, and having a direct impact 
much beyond that which applies in the House of Lords.”741 The Australian Senate and the 
German Bundesrat offer examples of this.742  
 
The issue of delegated legislation is not considered at all by the Government’s Draft Bill. 
However, in 2000 the Wakeham Commission put forward an argument for the reform of the 
House’s powers over delegated legislation. The report argued that there had been no serious 
challenge since 1968 to the convention that the House of Lords does not reject Statutory 
Instruments.743 As a consequence, the House’s influence over secondary legislation is 
“paradoxically less than its influence over primary legislation.”744 Because the House’s powers 
in relation to such legislation are “too drastic”745 they are not made use of in practice. Instead, 
the report argued, “the second chamber should be given a tool which it can use to force the 
Government and the House of Commons to take its concerns seriously.”746 There is little point, 
so the report contended, in the second chamber having “a theoretically greater power which it 
does not in reality exercise.”747 Rather, it should have “powers which it can actually exercise, 
and which would require the Government and the House of Commons to take some positive 
action either to meet its concerns or override its reservations.”748 The report therefore 
proposed the following: 
 
 where the second chamber votes against a draft instrument, the draft should 
nevertheless be deemed to be approved if the House of Commons subsequently gives 
(or, as the case may be, reaffirms) its approval within three months; and 
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 where the second chamber votes to annul an instrument, the annulment would not take 
effect for three months and could be overridden by a resolution of the House of 
Commons.749 
 
There are three arguments that can be voiced against such a change. The first is a reiteration of 
the arguments of Phillipson and Bogdanor discussed above, namely that it would seem 
“perverse to reduce the House’s powers at the very time that its legitimacy is being substantially 
increased.”750 A second problem with the Royal Commission’s reasoning is that it offers no 
explanation for why the delaying power of the Lords over delegated legislation should be 
reduced to a mere three months, rather than to a year to match its power over primary 
legislation. As Phillipson asks, “why should delegated legislation attract such an extraordinarily 
emasculated power of delay?”751  
 
Indeed, as the PASC report makes perfectly clear, such a power hardly constitutes a delay at all, 
since the House of Commons would be able to revive delegated legislation in a vote held within 
hours of its rejection by the House of Lords.752 Finally, as Phillipson argues, the argument put 
forward by the Royal Commission appears to be based on the assumption that the customary 
unwillingness of the House of Lords to make use of its powers over delegated legislation would 
be continued in a reformed chamber.753 As Phillipson notes, “there is every reason to suppose 
that the reason for the Lords’ historic reluctance to reject delegated legislation outright was at 
least partly attributable to precisely the same cause as the restraint the House shows towards 
primary legislation, namely the general perception of its lack of legitimacy.”754 Should the 
House’s legitimacy be increased as the Government currently propose, it would not be entirely 
unreasonable to presume that the House’s power over such legislation might be used more 
frequently.  
 
However, there is some strength to the argument forwarded by the Royal Commission. If the 
House of Commons is to be maintained as the supreme chamber, and if the second chamber is to 
remain as the House of Lords currently is, far from its legislative co-equal, it could be argued 
that an absolute veto over delegated legislation is too formidable a power to be retained. 
Indeed, the strength of this argument is increased when one considers the likelihood that this 
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power could be brought into use more frequently if the Government succeed in providing the 
chamber with an injection of democratic legitimacy through the introduction of elected 
members. But reducing the House’s power over secondary legislation does not necessarily 
entail the complete emasculation of the House in relation to such legislation. It is difficult to see 
why the Lords’ power over delegated legislation could not be simply placed on a par with its 
powers over primary legislation. Such a situation exists in Germany, where the Bundesrat has 
the same powers over secondary legislation as it does in relation to ordinary legislation. As 
Russell concludes, “based on the experiences from overseas, there is no reason why the 
functions of the upper House should not be extended to the amendment of statutory 
instruments, and its power over these instruments brought into line with those over ordinary 
legislation.”755  
 
The Second Chamber as a Constitutional Safeguard 
 
Another area in which the House of Lords appears unusual when considered in a comparative 
context is in relation to its powers over legislation amending the constitution or altering 
fundamental human rights. However, this is another issue which is not fully considered in the 
Government’s Draft Bill. As Phillipson notes, “if the House is left as it is, with no special powers 
over Bills altering the basic constitutional arrangements of the state or the protection afforded 
to internationally recognised human rights, this will leave the United Kingdom’s second 
chamber in a glaringly anomalous position compared to nearly all those overseas.”756 Indeed, as 
Russell observes, “even chambers which have relatively weak powers with respect to ordinary 
legislation may have absolute powers of veto over constitutional change.”757 Out of 20 Western 
democracies considered by Russell, aside from the UK, the only countries where the second 
chamber does not have special powers over constitutional measures are “those where other 
safeguards – such as automatic referendums over constitutional change – are built into the 
system.”758 However, the constitutional role of the House of Lords is “limited”,759 and the UK’s 
arrangements have been described as “highly unusual”760 in terms of the role played by the 
upper chamber in constitutional protection. Aside from the ability of the Lords to veto any bill 
which attempts to extend the life of Parliament, the upper House has no significant role in 
relation to constitutional legislation, although the chamber “does see one of its roles as 
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constitutional protection, and at times has taken a particular interest in constitutional 
matters.”761 
 
It is true that in the UK “some limited acknowledgement”762 is given to the significance of 
constitutional legislation in that, by convention, bills considered to be of ‘first-class 
constitutional importance’ take their committee stage on the floor of the House of Commons.763 
However, no special conditions have to be met before such bills are allowed to become law.764 
Aside from the aforementioned power to veto any bill which purports to extend the life of a 
Parliament, the House of Lords’ power over constitutional legislation is no greater than over any 
other type of bill. This is, as Russell notes, “a result of the ill-defined nature of the constitution 
and of constitutional amendment in the British system.”765 In many other countries around the 
world, bills that alter the constitution are subject to a more rigorous legislative process than 
ordinary legislation, which can often involve an enhanced role for the upper chamber.766 This 
could involve a veto over constitutional bills, or could mean that such legislation is subject to 
qualified majority voting or automatic referendums.767  
 
As Russell finds, in many cases “constitutional amendments must pass in both houses, not only 
by the simple majority that applies to ordinary legislation, but by a tougher ‘qualified’ 
majority.”768 In Italy, for example, an absolute majority is necessary to pass legislation that 
amends or alters the constitution,769 and in Germany a two thirds majority of members in both 
Houses is required.770  In Spain, constitutional legislation must be passed by a three fifths 
majority in both chambers of parliament, failing which the bill proceeds to a joint mediation 
committee.771 If at the end of this process, the bill in question has the approval of a two thirds 
majority in the lower house, an absolute majority is required in the Senado.772 Thus, “in stark 
contrast to the chamber’s relatively weak powers over ordinary bills”,773 the Spanish Senate 
effectively retains the power to block constitutional legislation if it so wishes. In addition, a 
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referendum may be triggered if, within 15 days of the constitutional bill in question being 
passed, one tenth of members of either chamber request it.774 Similarly in Italy, other than in 
cases where the bill in question was passed by a two-thirds majority in both Houses, a 
referendum may be called by one-fifth of members of either House, by five regional assemblies, 
or by a petition of 500,000 electors.775   
 
In France the Sénat has greater powers over constitutional bills than over ordinary legislation. 
As noted above, after mediation on ordinary legislation the lower House has the last word, but 
on constitutional bills the Sénat retains an absolute veto.776 Such bills also require approval via 
either a referendum, or by a three-fifths majority in a joint sitting of parliament.777 This 
procedure applies not only to bills which directly amend the constitution, but also to what are 
known as ‘organic’ bills, legislation of a “constitutional nature”778 which does not actually 
require a direct amendment to the constitution.779 Thus, as Russell notes, “in Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain the upper chamber can act as a real block to constitutional change.”780 
 
However, it is true that in some cases the second chamber does not possess such powers over 
constitutional bills. In Canada, the upper House retains an absolute veto over all ordinary 
legislation, but in relation to constitutional bills the Senate is limited to a six month delaying 
power.781 However, as Russell notes, “instead of seeking the provinces’ approval through the 
Senate, this approval is now required directly through the regional assemblies.”782 A similar 
arrangement exists in Australia. Despite having the power to veto all ordinary legislation, the 
Senate is unable to block constitutional change.783 However, this is “compensated by the 
requirement to seek approval by the states”784 through a referendum. In order to pass the bill 
must be supported by at least 50% of those voting in at least four of the six states, and by an 
overall majority of voters.785 It can be seen therefore that, unlike in the United Kingdom, in other 
countries where the upper House does not have special powers over legislation amending or 
altering the constitution, additional safeguards are built into the system to compensate for this. 
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In addition to blocking constitutional amendments, many second chambers have the power to 
challenge the constitutionality of other bills by referring them to the Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that they violate the constitution. In Spain, for example, a bill can be referred to the 
Constitutional Court by the Prime Minister, the Ombudsman, a judge, a regional government or 
parliament, a group of 50 lower house members, or a group of 50 senators.786 As Russell notes, 
“this can be an effective weapon against the government, and create a strong incentive for the 
government to act within the constitution.”787 In Germany, legislation can be referred to the 
Constitutional Court by the Bundesrat, or by individual Länder.788 The Court has “a de facto 
power of amending legislation, and can nullify acts which do not comply with the Basic Law.”789 
In France, legislation may be referred to the Constitutional Council by a group of 60 members of 
the lower House, 60 Senators, or the President of either house,790 a power used frequently by 
the Sénat, which has come to perceive itself as something of a “protector of individual rights and 
freedoms.”791  
 
The Australian upper house also has “a long record of legislative scrutiny on human rights 
grounds, unparalleled in the lower house.”792 Through the Standing Committee on Regulations 
and Ordinances, hailed by Uhr as “a rare and early example of an Australian parliamentary 
institution leading the world”,793 and the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, the Australian Senate 
scrutinises legislation against an extensive set of human rights criteria. As Russell notes, “both 
committees operate in a scrupulously bipartisan way, and have won many victories to protect 
the rights of Australians.”794 
 
The House of Lords has no comparable power in relation to legislation affecting fundamental 
human rights and civil liberties.795 The current House does however have “a significant record 
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in defending human rights”,796 and has been responsible for the introduction of more than 10 
Bills seeking to provide the UK with a Bill of Rights.797 The House of Lords has often “exercised 
its revising function to improve controversial legislation, or raise concerns about civil liberties 
issues”,798 a function aided by the presence in the chamber of legal peers and countless human 
rights experts who provide the house with valuable expertise, which is also enhanced by the 
party political independence of the crossbench element. The House of Lords should then, as 
Reidy argues, “be naturally disposed to play a role in defending human rights.”799 As she notes, 
“the absence of constituency duties means that peers can afford to dedicate more time both to 
duties within the House, such as scrutinising legislative proposals and partaking in 
parliamentary debate, and be available to engage with interest groups outside the House.”800  
 
However, the fact remains that the House of Lords can boast no substantive powers in 
relation to human rights legislation that are comparable with the powers held by the 
second chambers discussed above. Of course the highly regarded Constitution Committee 
of the House of Lords has a significant role to play in examining the constitutional 
implications of public bills which come before the House and investigating issues of wider 
constitutional significance, while the Joint Committee on Human Rights provides detailed 
scrutiny of government bills with significant human rights implications and reports its 
findings and recommendations to both Houses, though neither has any substantive 
powers . But the House already “displays many characteristics and enjoys certain 
functions which make it an appropriate forum in which to defend human rights”,801 and as 
Reidy notes, a reformed second chamber with greater democratic legitimacy such as that 
currently proposed by the present Government, “offers an even greater opportunity to 
build on the experience of the House and create a second chamber which is fully equipped 
to play a pre-eminent role in ensuring that human rights are democratically entrenched in 
parliament.”802  
 
The House is equally anomalous in that it possesses no additional powers in relation to 
legislation amending the constitution.803 As Reidy and Russell note, “such constitutional 
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protection is one of the classic roles of a second chamber.”804 Indeed, a role as 
‘constitutional watchdog’ for the House of Lords could “serve to enhance effective 
parliamentary democracy.”805 
 
The 2011 White Paper and accompanying Draft Bill do not address these arguments at all, 
other than to state the government’s intention to maintain the existing balance of power 
between the two Houses, and to preserve the pre-eminence of the House of Commons.806 
It is difficult, therefore, to deduce their reasons for not considering enhanced powers for 
the upper House in this area. However, an example of the sort of argument voiced in 
opposition to providing the House of Lords with enhanced powers over constitutional and 
human rights legislation can again be found in the report of the Wakeham Commission in 
2000. The Royal Commission rejected proposals to enhance the powers of the House of 
Lords on the basis that doing so would “alter the current balance of power between the 
two chambers and could be exploited to bring the two chambers into conflict.”807 Further, 
such a move would be “inconsistent with the requirements in our [the Commission’s] 
terms of reference ‘to maintain the position of the House of Commons as the pre-eminent 
chamber of Parliament’ and with our view of the overall role that the second chamber 
should play.”808  
 
Phillipson suggests that such arguments are flawed on a number of grounds.809 Firstly, 
increasing the powers of the House of Lords over constitutional legislation would not, he 
argues, be inconsistent with maintaining the House of Commons as the pre-eminent 
House since, in all instances not involving constitutional or human rights issues, the 
Commons “would remain the superior House, able to bypass the Lords opposition after 
the delay of only a year, or, in the case of money bills, a month only.”810 The pre-eminence 
of the House of Commons would therefore be maintained, regardless of the position in 
relation to constitutional and human rights legislation. Secondly, the Royal Commission 
supported the retention of the existing special powers of the House of Lords over 
legislation that attempts to extend the life of a Parliament, as laid down by the Parliament 
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Acts.811 In fact, the Commission sought to strengthen this power, so that the Parliament 
Acts could not be amended to remove this safeguard without the consent of the Lords, by 
using the Parliament Act procedure itself.812 As Phillipson suggests, the retention of this 
power was seen as desirable “presumably because it represents an important democratic 
safeguard.”813 But, Phillipson argues, “once it is accepted that the Lords should have 
special powers to safeguard democracy in this basic manner, then logic suggests 
extending the scope of such powers to cover other matters equally important to the 
maintenance of a liberal democracy.”814 
 
Finally, it is important to consider the wider constitutional context. The United Kingdom, 
as has already been demonstrated, is clearly in an anomalous position when compared 
with other Western democracies.  As Phillipson contends, “there are numerous recent 
examples of Parliament being asked to rush through legislation threatening civil liberties 
in hasty response to short term crises, legislation which, once on the statute book, cannot 
be challenged in the courts.”815  
 
It is at least arguable therefore, that some form of additional safeguard should be put in 
place. This safeguard could take the form of enhanced powers for the second chamber so 
that legislation amending the constitution or altering fundamental human rights receives 
some form of entrenched protection within the legislative process. Of course there are 
some finer details that would need to be considered before such a change could be 
implemented. One would have to determine exactly what form this new power should 
take. It could, as Phillipson notes, take the form of an extended power of delay over such 
legislation, an absolute veto, the need for qualified majorities in both Houses, or perhaps 
the ability of the House to trigger a referendum.816 In addition, some mechanism would 
need to be agreed upon for identifying when such a power would be triggered. The power 
to identify when a piece of legislation contains the requisite “constitutional” content 
might, as Phillipson suggests, be given to the Constitution Committee of the House of 
                                                          
811
 A House for the Future, fn.743, paras.5.13-5.16 
812
 Ibid.  
813
 Phillipson, ‘The Powers of a Reformed Second Chamber’, fn.669, p.36 
814
 Ibid.  
815
 Ibid. Phillipson cites the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Bill 1996, the Criminal Justice 
(Terrorism and Conspiracy) Bill 1998 and the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill 2001 as examples.  
816
 Ibid. at p.39 
117 
 
Lords,817 or perhaps to the Lord Speaker, who could certify bills as ‘constitutional’ in the 
same way that the Speaker of the House of Commons currently designates ‘money’ bills.818  
 
Of course there is the possibility that in some cases a judgement might be deemed 
controversial and may provoke disagreement, but as Phillipson notes, “this is simply a fact 
of life in relation to interpretative judgement, including those made by the courts, and 
does not provide a knock-down argument against such a proposal.”819 Whatever the 
eventual consensus on the particulars of such a power, it is quite clear that so long as the 
second chamber has no enhanced power in relation to constitutional bills and legislation 
affecting fundamental human rights, the United Kingdom will remain in an anomalous 
position compared to other western democracies. It is at least arguable therefore, that if 
the Government wish to increase the democratic legitimacy of the second chamber 
through the introduction of elected members, they should at least consider the possibility 
of providing them with a new role as guardians of the constitution, and protectors of 
fundamental human rights.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Arend Lijphart’s criteria for an effective second chamber, as revised by Russell, require 
that the upper House have adequate powers to bargain with government and make an 
impact upon the legislative process.820 Russell has found that the current powers of the 
House of Lords over ordinary legislation are moderate by international standards, and so, 
broadly speaking, satisfy this criterion. It is defensible therefore that the coalition 
government’s Draft Bill envisages no fundamental change to the formal powers of the 
second chamber both in terms of maintaining the primacy of the House of Commons, and 
in order to protect the “delicate”821 constitutional balance of power that has evolved over 
the centuries.  
 
However, the powers of the House over delegated legislation are so drastic that, as has 
been illustrated, they have fallen into almost complete disuse. This has the paradoxical 
consequence that, though the theoretical powers of the House are greater in relation to 
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such legislation, the House actually exerts less influence over delegated legislation than it 
does over ordinary bills. However, it is also possible that, with the proposed injection of 
democratic legitimacy, a reformed second chamber might break with convention and 
make use of powers which had previously fallen into disuse, with the potential to generate 
conflict between the Houses. It is arguable therefore, that the power to veto delegated 
legislation should be replaced with a power which can be more readily utilised by the 
House whilst preserving the primacy of the elected lower chamber, so that secondary 
legislation can receive appropriate scrutiny and government can be held to account for its 
actions.  
 
Further, the House of Lords remains in a highly anomalous position when considered 
against comparable Western democracies in relation to its powers (or lack thereof) over 
legislation amending the constitution or altering fundamental human rights. It might be 
slightly more difficult to argue for an increase in the House’s powers over such measures 
if it were to remain as an entirely appointed chamber. But if the Government intends to 
press ahead with the introduction of elected members, thereby increasing the democratic 
legitimacy of the House, they should at least consider the possibility of bringing the 
chamber into line with international trends, and provide it with enhanced powers in 
relation to such legislation.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Reforming the House of Lords is, as Lord Wakeham notes, “what Sherlock Holmes would call a 
‘three pipe problem.”822 He notes that “some of the best political minds of the twentieth 
century”823 have failed to draw up a realistic and workable blueprint for a reformed House of 
Lords, such is the complexity of the issue. “If there had been an easy answer”,824 Wakeham 
suggests, “someone would have found it long ago.”825 The Government has put forward its 
blueprint, one which envisages a predominantly elected chamber with a minority appointed 
element, performing the same functions and exercising the same powers as the present House 
of Lords. One cannot dispute that such a chamber would possess a form of democratic 
legitimacy that could never be achieved with an all appointed House. The presence of elected 
members with a direct democratic mandate from the people would equip the House with a 
perceived legitimacy that would satisfy Russell’s criteria for an effective second chamber. 
However, it has been argued that this increase in legitimacy would come at too great a price. 
Even with the retention of a minority appointed element, the Government’s plans, it is 
submitted, tip the balance too far in favour of legitimacy at the expense of the House’s 
distinctive character and its ability to carry out its functions. 
 
In recent debate, Baroness Taylor of Bolton noted that “it is very difficult to mount a theoretical, 
academic defence of an unelected House.”826 The argument advanced in this thesis has rested on 
the premise that the fundamental consideration when determining the desired composition of 
the second chamber is the ability of its members to fulfil the functions attributed to it. Indeed, 
Lord Hope of Craighead goes so far as to suggest that the “only relevant question”827 for us to 
concern ourselves with relates to the functions which a second chamber is designed to perform. 
That question, Lord Hope contends, is “whether the second chamber can add value to the 
process of legislative scrutiny.”828 If, as the 2011 White Paper suggests, the House of Lords is to 
continue as it does now, with the task of revision and scrutiny as its raison d’être, then the 
primary consideration should be ensuring that the House continues to contain the very best 
people to carry out this function. The case study of the 2011 Parliamentary Voting System and 
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Constituencies Act illustrates how the appointed members of the House of Lords outperform 
their elected counterparts in the House of Commons in terms of the scrutiny and amendment 
they afford to legislation. In providing for the retention of an appointed element within the 
membership of the reformed House, the Government appear to have acknowledged that 
appointed members are able to provide the expertise, experience and independence of mind 
that could not be guaranteed in a wholly elected chamber, and would not necessarily be 
possessed by directly elected members. But these qualities, it is argued, are the very qualities 
that are essential for the House to effectively carry out its revising functions.   
 
The fundamental objection to an all-appointed House, it has been seen, lies in its inherent lack of 
direct democratic legitimacy. An appointed House, so the argument goes, can boast a distinctive 
membership, but not the perceived legitimacy to make full use of its powers. It has been 
contended however that, as Russell acknowledges, legitimacy should be viewed as a continuous 
rather than dichotomous concept.829 Appointment may not provide the same level of legitimacy 
that flows from a democratic mandate, but that does not mean that appointed members are 
illegitimate per se. An appointed chamber can point to other characteristics which can be 
viewed as a source of legitimacy. These include, in the case of the House of Lords, the prevalence 
of expertise amongst its membership, the more proportional party balance when compared 
with the House of Commons, and the ability of the House to carry out its functions ably and 
efficiently. While this lesser form of legitimacy may not equate to that which can be boasted by 
members of the elected lower House, it has enabled the House of Lords, since 1999, to increase 
both its assertiveness and its impact on the legislative process. It has been shown that, not only 
does the House of Lords defeat the Government with increasing frequency and severity, but its 
defeats often have a lasting and meaningful impact on the policy process. When coupled with 
the fact that both the public and members of the lower House have been shown to regard the 
House of Lords as more legitimate than it was prior to 1999, this suggests that the House of 
Lords may already possess the requisite perceived legitimacy to exercise its powers and carry 
out its functions.    
    
It has been argued also, that this lesser legitimacy could be increased further through reform of 
the system of appointment. No attempt has been made to suggest that the House of Lords, as 
currently constituted, is without a perfect upper chamber. It has been shown that the House 
does contain members from a wide variety of professional backgrounds with expertise and 
experience in a range of different fields, but it must also be acknowledged that this expertise is 
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not perfectly balanced, and due to the continuation of Prime Ministerial patronage, is not a 
prerequisite of membership of the upper House.  The removal of powers of patronage from the 
Prime Minister and party leaders and placing of responsibility for appointments with an 
independent Statutory Appointments Commission would not only serve to increase the 
perceived legitimacy of individual members, who could be certain that their elevation was based 
on merit alone, but would also heighten the sense of legitimacy of the chamber as a whole, 
which could point to the fact that its continued appointed nature had the approval of the 
people’s elected representatives in the House of Commons. A Statutory Commission could also 
take steps toward ensuring a more desirable blend of knowledge and experience by making 
appointments that fill the gaps in the current House’s expertise. The acceptance of a lesser, but 
not insignificant form of legitimacy as a basis for the continued existence of an appointed House 
of Lords, might be a sacrifice worth making if it meant, not only the retention of the House’s 
distinctive character, but also the retention of an efficient and effective revising chamber.  
 
One cannot deny that an elected second chamber would be a more democratic and more 
legitimate second chamber. But it would also be a more assertive chamber. It has been argued 
that, while the Parliament Act procedure continues to preserve the primacy of the House of 
Commons, a predominantly elected House could rival the House of Commons in a way an 
appointed House would not. It is true that, should they come under increasing pressure, the 
conventions that govern the relationship between the two chambers could be codified. It is true 
also that while many other second chambers around the world are elected, these countries do 
not suffer from great constitutional crises, and procedures are in place to deal with the event of 
legislative impasse. But the possibility remains that while the primacy of the House of Commons 
might be retained, a predominantly elected second chamber might challenge the will of the 
House of Commons in a way hitherto unknown. 
 
It has been argued also that the powers of the House of Lords can be viewed as moderate when 
placed on the international spectrum. Given that Russell has concluded that the powers of the 
House are adequate for it to function as a check on government and the House of Commons,830 
the Government is, it has been submitted, quite justified in not seeking to alter the formal 
powers of the upper House. However, it is also submitted that, should the Government press 
ahead with the introduction of elected members to the second chamber, it should at least 
consider the arguments in favour of bringing the House of Lords into line with other 
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comparable upper Houses by giving the second chamber an enhanced role in relation to 
legislation which seeks to alter the constitution or fundamental human rights. Further, the 
Government should also consider providing the House with a more practical power over 
delegated legislation.   
 
Baroness Taylor concluded her speech to the House of Lords in the following terms:  
 
“I do not think that the House of Lords is perfect. We could improve it... My defence is the 
practical fact that this House works. No one could have designed it in the way that it is but it 
has evolved into a very useful Chamber.”831 
 
This, it is submitted, is an argument to which the Government should pay great attention. It may 
not provide a complex, theoretical justification for the continued existence of an appointed 
chamber of Parliament, but it is, nonetheless, a very difficult statement with which to disagree. 
The situation the House of Lords finds itself in today is, as Baldwin notes, “the result of a long 
evolutionary process.”832 He suggests that, when considering the issue of Lords reform, one 
should remember the story of Sir Isaac Newton’s bridge at Cambridge. He recounts the story as 
follows: 
 
“Newton, so the story has it, designed and constructed a wooden bridge over the River Cam. 
Now the design was so ingenious and the construction so precise that each of the component 
parts, once in place, held together without the need of bolts, nails, screws or indeed any other 
fastening. This perplexed and baffled all the great men of the time, none being able to 
comprehend why a bridge built in such a fashion could work. Yet work it did, as was 
abundantly clear for all to see. Such was their curiosity that following Newton’s death they 
dismantled the bridge in order to ascertain how it worked. From doing this they learnt only 
two thing, first, even by taking it to pieces they were unable to pinpoint how or why the bridge 
had worked, and secondly, having taken it to pieces they were quite unable to rebuild it.”833 
 
This is, it is submitted, something the coalition should bear in mind before the House of Lords is 
altered in a fundamental and potentially irreversible way. Evolutionary, rather than 
revolutionary reform, could well be the answer to the Lords reform problem.  
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APPENDIX 1 – A Brief History of Lords Reform 
 
 
The House of Lords has existed in some form or other since at least the fourteenth century, for 
many centuries the legislative equal of the House of Commons, and often the chamber from 
which the Prime Minister was selected. As King observes, though frequently described as the 
‘second chamber’, there was, until the early 20th century at least, “nothing secondary about 
it.”834 Only in the field of tax and finance did the House over time yield supremacy to the 
Commons. But the period between 1911 and 2011 has seen a steady evolution and 
transformation of the upper House from what one might consider to be a bizarre feudal relic to 
a crucial component within the legislative and political framework of this country.  
 
The formal powers of the House of Lords were first curtailed and codified by Asquith’s Liberal 
government in 1911, following the refusal of the Conservative-dominated House to pass Lloyd 
George’s famous ‘Peoples’ Budget’ of 1909. The relationship between the two houses, one 
containing a majority of democratically elected Liberal members, the other overwhelmingly 
biased in favour of the Conservative party,835 had already shown signs of instability, particularly 
when their Lordships saw fit to veto Liberal home-rule legislation for Ireland in 1893. But the 
rejection of a budget was the final straw, and as King describes, “following two general 
elections, which returned the Asquith Government to power”,836 and with the “reluctant 
collaboration of the King”,837 the Lords were “finally dragooned into accepting that they were no 
longer to be coequal with the Commons.”838 The Parliament Act of 1911 completely removed the 
powers of the House over money bills,839 and replaced the absolute right to reject primary 
legislation with a suspensory veto, whereby any bill passed by the Commons in three successive 
sessions could be presented for Royal Assent without the approval of the Lords. The House 
retained one absolute veto under the Act, the power to reject a bill proposing to extend the life 
of Parliament beyond the statutory five years.  
 
But the 1911 Act did more than just curtail the powers of an intransigent chamber. It also 
indicated for the first time that the hereditary principle was no longer an appropriate 
mechanism for selecting members of the upper house. The preamble to the 1911 Act indicated 
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that it should be seen as nothing more than in interim measure to contain the Lords until a new 
House could be “constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis”,840 a substitution that 
could not “be immediately brought into operation”.841 To this day, the intention of the preamble 
has yet to be implemented. Indeed, if the 1911 Act was intended to be nothing more than an 
interim measure, “the interim has been, to say the least of it, protracted.”842  
 
The delaying power of the Lords was then reduced further from three sessions to two by 
Clement Atlee’s Labour administration with the passing of the Parliament Act 1949, itself 
enacted under the 1911 Act procedure. Perhaps more significant was the voluntary diminution 
in power accepted by the House in 1945, the so-called ‘self-denying ordinance’ known 
commonly as the Salisbury convention after its creator Lord Cranbourne, later 5th Marquess of 
Salisbury. Despite the changes implemented by the 1911 and 1949 Acts, the House of Lords 
retained considerable statutory powers. As Bogdanor notes, “even after 1949, it would have 
been possible for the Lords to wreak havoc on a government’s programme.”843 Indeed, the 
power to delay all legislation for a year meant that the Lords could “render the last year in office 
of a government of the Left completely futile.”844 The problem was that after the war, the House 
of Lords had become a “Conservative as well as conservative bastion.”845 The inherent bias of 
the aristocracy had manifested itself into an outright obstruction to socialist policy which, with 
a Labour majority in the Commons after 1945, looked set to provoke conflict between the two 
Houses of Parliament. Fearing a further reduction in power, or even outright abolition, the 
Lords opted for a policy of self-restraint, and accepted Lord Cranbourne’s proposal whereby 
government legislation, no matter how repugnant, would not be impeded by the Lords where 
the government had a mandate for such a change. Thus, if the legislation had featured in the 
governing party’s manifesto at the preceding general election it would not be obstructed in the 
Lords.846  
 
But it is not only in the arena of legislative power that there has been notable change, so too has 
the composition of the House evolved and adapted over time. The legal powers of the House 
have not changed noticeably since the 1949 Act, but the body of people entitled to exercise such 
power has transformed significantly. As King puts it, “the house still stands, and it still stands at 
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the same address, but hundreds of old residents have moved out and hundreds of new ones 
have moved in.”847 The transformation began in 1958 with the passage of the Life Peerages Act. 
Prior to the passing of this Act, the entire membership of the House, with the exception of a 
handful of Law Lords and Bishops, was constituted entirely by hereditary peers, male 
aristocrats who inherited their title along with the right to sit and vote from their fathers. 
Further, Labour and the smaller parties were dangerously under-represented. In 1955 for 
example, there were just 55 Labour peers compared with 507 Conservatives, 238 crossbenchers 
and 42 Liberals.848 Macmillan’s legislation allowed for the creation of peerages for life (peerages 
that would not be passed on after death), while retaining the hereditary element in the House. 
This not only allowed more Labour peers to be created, going some way to rectify the party 
imbalance in the House caused not least by the reluctance of Labour supporters to accept 
hereditary peerages,849 but also allowed women to be admitted to the House for the very first 
time. The Act allowed party politicians as well as notable experts to enter and contribute to the 
work of the House, but the effect of the Act should not be overstated. The House remained 
hereditary-dominated with a considerable Conservative bias for many more years.  
 
Further change came in 1963 when the Peerages Act was passed, allowing those that inherited 
hereditary peerages to renounce their title and seat in the Lords. It was due to the passing of 
this Act that Tony Benn was able to continue his political career in the Commons, a career that 
had been put in jeopardy in 1960 when the death of his father meant that he was forced to 
succeed as Viscount Stansgate. The 14th Earl of Home also benefitted from the Act when he 
disclaimed his Earldom in 1963 to enter the House of Commons and become Prime Minister. 
The Act also allowed hereditary peeresses to take their seats in the House, a right already 
enjoyed by female life peers.850  
 
Very little changed in the House of Lords for the next thirty or so years, until it was transformed 
once again by Tony Blair’s Labour government. Labour had fought the 1997 general election 
promising a two-stage reform. The first phase would see the removal of all hereditary peers 
from the House of Lords. The ending of the ancient right of the hereditary aristocracy to sit and 
vote in the House was to constitute an initial, self-contained reform to make the Lords “more 
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democratic and representative.”851 Proposals would then be considered and put forward by a 
Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament to complete the reform process. The House of 
Lords Act implemented the first stage of reform in 1999, ending the right of the hereditary peers 
to sit and vote in the House. However, to secure the acquiescence of the Conservative peers and 
prevent prolonged resistance, a compromise was agreed with the leader of the Conservative 
party in the Lords, Lord Cranbourne, whereby 92 hereditary peers were allowed to remain.852 
The Weatherill amendment (so named because it was moved by former Commons Speaker Lord 
Weatherill) sought to retain some semblance of the hereditary peerage at least until the second 
stage of reform was carried out. Fifteen hereditary peers were elected by the whole House as 
office holders, with a further seventy-five elected by electoral colleges made up of the 
hereditary peers from their own party groupings.853 In addition, two hereditary royal office-
holders were exempted; the Duke of Norfolk (Earl Marshall) and the Marquess of Cholmondeley 
(Lord Great Chamberlain). However, those not elected by their hereditary colleagues lost their 
right to sit and vote, and over six hundred peers were expelled from the House.854  
 
However, since the passage of the 1999 Act, the second stage is still yet to be implemented. A 
number of attempts were made by Labour governments to establish a consensus, but all met 
with failure.  A Royal Commission was established under the chairmanship of Conservative peer 
Lord Wakeham to “consider and make recommendations on the role and functions of the second 
chamber.”855 The report made 132 recommendations and proposed a reformed House 
consisting of around 550 members, the majority of which would be appointed by a statutory 
Appointments Commission, with a minority of 65, 87 or 195 elected regional members.856 The 
Commission proposed no radical change in the balance of power between the two Houses.857  
However, the report was criticised for its gradualist approach and the timidity of its 
proposals,858 and though it was accepted by the government,859 its recommendations were 
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never implemented. There then followed several periods of sporadic but protracted discussion, 
interspersed with periods of inaction and delay. Indeed, “there were occasional votes but 
certainly no decisions – save possibly decisions not to decide.”860 
 
In May 2000 a non-statutory independent Appointments Commission was formed to relieve the 
Prime Minister of the task of nominating non-party political working peers to the crossbenches. 
The Commission has the additional role of vetting all nominations for membership of the House 
for propriety before their names are sent to the Queen. However, the Prime Minister retains the 
right to nominate peers from his own party, along with the considerable power to determine 
how many peers are created at any given time, and what the balance between the parties in the 
House is to be. Nominations from the other parties now come from the respective party leaders, 
and are then transmitted to the Queen by the Prime Minister. The powers of patronage retained 
by the Prime Minister therefore remain considerable.  
 
The Labour Government published its White Paper The House of Lords: Completing the Reform in 
November 2001.861 Its proposals included the removal of the remaining 92 hereditary peers, the 
creation of a statutory Appointments Commission to nominate independent members, and the 
inclusion of 120 elected members to represent the nations and regions.862 However the White 
Paper’s proposals received little support within Parliament.863 The House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee then published a report on Lords reform in February 2002.864 
The report recommended that the second chamber be predominantly elected, 60% in total. The 
remaining 40% would be appointed by the Appointments Commission; half of which would be 
nominated by the political parties, the other half independent, non-aligned members.865  Once 
again these proposals were not implemented and the Government announced in May 2002 that 
a Joint Committee of both Houses would be formed to consider options for reform and attempt 
to build a consensus.866 The Joint Committee published its first report in December 2002,867 
which set out “an inclusive range of seven options for the composition of a reformed House of 
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Lords.”868 In February 2003 both Houses voted on the seven options forwarded by the Joint 
Committee, which ranged from a wholly elected House to a wholly appointed one. The House of 
Commons rejected all seven options, although the proposal defeated by the fewest votes was for 
an 80% elected chamber, while the Lords voted by three to one for a fully appointed House.869 
Indeed it has been noted that, “by defeating eight resolutions to amend the status quo, the 
Commons was left with the status quo – but the status quo is barely distinguishable from one of 
the eight defeated outcomes, and one of the more decisively defeated at that.”870 With the House 
of Commons clearly confused as to its preference, the then Leader of the House Robin Cook 
could offer no better advice than that members “go home and sleep on this interesting 
position.”871 
 
In March 2005 the Constitutional Reform Act received royal assent. The Act made provision for 
the removal of the Law Lords from the House, placing them within a new Supreme Court,872 and 
made significant modifications to the office of Lord Chancellor. This included removing the 
functions of Speaker of the House and allowing for the creation of a separate office of Lord 
Speaker, the first of which was Baroness Hayman who was elected in 2006. In February 2007 
the government published another White Paper, The House of Lords: Reform.873 The proposals 
centred around a hybrid house with 50% of its members elected and 50% appointed. 
Parliament debated the White Paper along with a range of options for reform in March 2007. 
The Commons strongly endorsed the retention of a bicameral system, and supported the 
removal of the remaining hereditary peers.874 The 50/50 model was rejected, but a motion 
proposing an 80% elected and 20% appointed chamber was passed by 305 votes to 267, and 
the motion for a fully elected House succeeded by 337 votes to 224.875  
 
Votes took place in the House of Lords the following week, and every option for reform was 
rejected, their lordships strongly endorsing a fully appointed House.876 The then Leader of the 
House of Commons, Jack Straw, heralded the newfound consensus and announced his intention 
to pursue cross-party talks.877 This culminated in the 2008 White Paper, An Elected Second 
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Chamber: Further Reform of the House of Lords,878 which set out plans for either a fully or 80% 
elected second chamber, with appointments to be made by a new statutory Appointments 
Commission should there be an appointed element. Once again, the provisions of this White 
Paper were never implemented.  
 
Some less radical reforms were included in the government’s Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Bill which was introduced into the House of Commons in July 2009. The Bill 
contained provisions to end by-elections to replace deceased hereditary peers, to disqualify 
members found guilty of a serious crime, to suspend or expel members, and to allow members 
to resign and disclaim their peerages.  However, these provisions were all lost in the wash-up 
period before the 2010 general election, and were not implemented. 
 
It can be seen from the brief chronology presented here879 that while there have been some 
successful attempts at adaption and evolution over the last century, the more recent history of 
Lords reform has been a story of protracted debate, indecision and delay.  
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APPENDIX 2- List of Peers’ Primary and Secondary Professional Areas 
 
 
Table 2: Primary and Secondary Professional Area of Members of the House of Lords 
 
 
 
 
 
Area 
 
 
 
Primary 
 
 
 
Secondary 
 
 
 
Total 
% of House 
with this 
area as 
primary 
% of House 
with this area 
as primary or 
secondary 
Architecture, engineering and construction 5 8 13 1% 2% 
Agriculture and horticulture 20 4 24 3% 3% 
Banking and finance 59 28 87 8% 12% 
Business and commerce 61 34 95 9% 14% 
Other private sector 23 10 33 3% 5% 
Legal professions 54 13 67 8% 10% 
Manual and skilled trades 1 7 8 0% 1% 
Culture, arts and sport 14 9 23 2% 3% 
Journalism, media and publishing 25 10 35 4% 5% 
Education and training (not HE) 5 13 18 1% 3% 
Higher education 59 17 76 8% 11% 
Medical and healthcare 15 12 27 2% 4% 
Transport 5 2 7 1% 1% 
Police 8 0 8 1% 1% 
Representative politics 151 37 187 22% 27% 
Political staff and activists 15 9 24 2% 3% 
International affairs and diplomacy 18 3 21 3% 3% 
Civil service UK 10 6 16 1% 2% 
Armed forces 12 1 13 2% 2% 
Royal family staff 2 0 2 0% 0% 
Local authority administration 8 10 18 1% 3% 
Other public sector 12 15 27 2% 4% 
Trade unions 21 7 28 3% 4% 
Voluntary sector, NGOs and think tanks 25 9 34 4% 5% 
Clergy or religious 29 2 31 4% 4% 
Unclassified 42 0 42 6% 6% 
Total 699 265 964 100% 100% 
 
(Source: Russell, M. and Benton, M. Analysis of Existing Data on the Breadth of Expertise and 
Experience in the House of Lords: Report to the House of Lords Appointments Commission (London: 
Constitution Unit 2010), p.15) 
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APPENDIX 3 – Specialisms of Former MPs 
 
 
Table 3: Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Specialisms of Former MPs in the House of 
Lords 
 
 
Specialism Primary Secondary Tertiary Total 
Farming and Agriculture 2 3 1 6 
Trade and Industry 4 6 0 10 
Energy 3 4 1 8 
Environment 1 4 1 6 
Economics and Finance Policy 14 7 0 20 
Technology Policy 0 1 1 2 
Culture, Media and Sport 7 0 0 6 
Law 5 2 1 8 
Constitutional Affairs 3 1 0 4 
Scottish Affairs 6 1 2 9 
Welsh Affairs 6 2 0 8 
Northern Irish Affairs 8 0 2 10 
Health 2 0 2 4 
Education 9 3 0 12 
Transport 3 0 2 5 
Home Affairs 7 2 0 9 
Social Services 0 3 0 3 
Disability 1 0 0 1 
Social Security 5 2 0 7 
Defence 8 8 0 16 
Foreign Affairs 13 5 2 20 
International Development 6 0 0 6 
Employment 5 4 1 10 
Consumer Protection 1 0 2 3 
Housing 0 3 0 3 
Total* 119 61 18 198 
 
*In addition 32 members were assigned no specialism in this analysis 
 
(Source: Russell, M. and Benton, M. Analysis of Existing Data on the Breadth of Expertise and 
Experience in the House of Lords: Report to the House of Lords Appointments Commission (London: 
Constitution Unit 2010), p.47) 
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